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# East Europe Report

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9 OCTOBER 1986

## EAST EUROPE REPORT

### CONTENTS

#### AGRICULTURE

##### ALBANIA

- Hoxha's Works Support Intensification of Agriculture  
(Hysen Lacej; ZERI I POPULLIT, 27 Jun 86)..... 1

#### ECONOMY

##### INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- Hungarian-Bulgarian Economic Relations Described  
(Gyorgy Varga; FIGYELO, No 36, 4 Sep 86)..... 5

##### ALBANIA

- Delays in Handling, Transporting of Goods Deplored  
(Dhionis Naqellari; ZERI I POPULLIT, 27 Jun 86)..... 9

##### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Metallurgy Developments in CEMA to Year 2000 Viewed  
(SVET HOSPODARSTVI, 6 Aug 86)..... 11

##### HUNGARY

- Awarding of Direct Foreign Trade Rights Discussed  
(FIGYELO, No 35, 28 Aug 86)..... 15

Change in Foreign Trade Organization Discussed (Peter Naray Interview; NEPSZABADSAG, 3 Sep 86).....	20
1985 State Investments Analyzed in Article (Pal Pozsonyi; FIGYELO, 21 Aug 86).....	25
POLAND	
Study Details Household Expenditures on Private Market (Slawomir Mierzejewski; WIADOMOSCI STATYSTYCZNE, No 5, May 86).....	31
POLITICS	
ALBANIA	
Difficulties in Educating Youth Examined (Hamit Beqja; ZERI I POPULLIT, 24 May 86).....	36
Shehu, Other 'Internal Enemies of Party' Condemned (Sotir Manushi; ZERI I POPULLIT, 28 Jun 86).....	40
Lack of Literary Criticism From Institute of Literature (Thimi Nika, Alban Tomori; ZERI I POPULLIT, 27 Jul 86).....	43
HUNGARY	
Political Dilemma of Post-1956 Generation Described (Magdolna Balazs; VALOSAG, No 5, 1986).....	46
ROMANIA	
Report on Romanian-Soviet History Symposium (Gheorghe Tudor; ANALE DE ISTORIE, No 2, Mar-Apr 86).....	56
YUGOSLAVIA	
Political Scientist Veselinov Discusses Defects of System (Dragan Veselinov Interview; BORBA, 2-3 Aug 86).....	65
Ethnic Structure of Party in Major Cities (Boris Vuskovic; NASE TEME, No 3-4, Mar-Apr 86).....	76

/12223

AGRICULTURE

ALBANIA

# HOXHA'S WORKS SUPPORT INTENSIFICATION OF AGRICULTURE

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 27 Jun 86 p 2

[Article by Hysen Lacej: "Only an Intensive and Modernized Agriculture Can Face and Solve Great Problems"--Studying the 49th Volume of the Works of Comrade Enver Hoxha]

[Text] The teachings of Comrade Enver about agriculture constitute a complex with extremely broad dimensions. They include the major problems of our party agricultural policy, touch on the problems of planning, and enter the various agricultural disciplines, the problems of agrotechnology and the sciences of these fields, they penetrate the whole organizational chain from the work of the cooperative member or brigade leader up to the organizational and managerial activity of the party and state in the districts and at the center. Such a consideration extends over four decades, from the time that our recently freed peasant who worked the land became its owner, up until the time that mechanization and applied chemistry, systematized procedures and land reclamation were widely introduced into our agriculture. This entire road of profound transformation is the work of our party, of its Marxist-Leninist policy for agriculture and the countryside in general, of the teachings of Comrade Enver, who pursued them step by step, with unparalleled dedication.

There is not a single volume of Comrade Enver's works which does not touch on the matter of agriculture. We have just had in hand the 49th volume, with materials of the 14 preceding years. That was the second year of the Fifth 5-Year Plan, now we have entered the eighth. It is understandable that many of the tasks which Comrade Enver laid out in the materials of that time and which we study again today, have already been solved or are well on the way to solution. But essential in these materials also is that broad, knowledgeable view of the ideopolitical, technical, and technological problems of organizations, etc. In this regard, these treatises preserve great values and are currently of assistance in all the organizational and scientific work in the field of agriculture.

Comrade Enver in his speech at the second plenum of the party Central Committee on 20 June 1972, which is included in this volume, points out: "Often it is said that agriculture is an 'industry without a roof.' This

is a true image with consequences, but under no circumstances must be hide the defects, ignorance, backwardness, lack of organization, and the preservation of old methods of understanding and executing the requirements of agrotechnology." This problem is treated more than once by Comrade Enver, for he was at the center of our party's concern that agriculture and our agricultural production become independent of atmospheric conditions, natural factors, etc. The path of intensification and of modernization in which our agriculture entered, for which great investment sums have been put to use, leads directly to the lowering of this dependence and with the passage of time has created the conditions for realizing that important teaching of the eighth congress that agricultural production is conditioned by better harmonization with scientific criteria of the totality of human, material, agrotechnical and nature factors. It is precisely this more scientific exploitation, based on the great material and technical capacities created by the party, which makes us achieve high production quotas even in conditions of protracted drought, in conditions of deep winter freeze or of excessive wetness, etc.

They are these conditions which constitute the true capacity of our agriculture in all its branches, to achieve fully and everywhere the tasks of the plan, but also to set before itself other needs for more skillful and fruitful solutions in all fields, such as that required by the 13th and 14th plenums of the party Central Committee. But this cannot take place with old-fashioned methods and with empiricism. "Empiricism in agriculture and in its every process," says Comrade Enver, "must be replaced with scientific methods and with scientific insights. Only this changes agriculture from a 'factory without a roof' to a 'factory with a roof.'" Therefore, not empiricism but this true scientific knowledge where so many results are achieved, is the first essential condition for carrying out those very great tasks in regard to grains and vegetables, livestock, and orchards, industrial crops, etc. As Comrade Enver has stressed, the issue in regard to these problems is that the scientific knowledge, for agriculture as everywhere else, cannot be equated with some recommendations of agrotechnical manuals, even though these do have their value for mass use.

Scientific thought is not static, it develops. And with each step taken new needs for other more fruitful solutions are born. Nevertheless it will be admitted that sometimes even those altogether well-known conclusions which are in the manuals and which are timeless are not respected. In such cases other factors enter in, sometimes ideological, sometimes organizational. That which happened in the Lushnje District is an extreme case. Part of the nitrogenous fertilizer planned for the corn was applied to the wheat. In brief this means that you hurry to come out ahead for wheat, whereas for the corn, you know beforehand that something will remain unrealized. Thus with these biased attitudes criticized early and continually by the party, agriculture remains truly "without a roof." Such actions are as unjust and unscientific as they are also ideologically harmful, a thing which could attract the attention of party organizations, as a concept and practice rather wide spread in this district.

Nevertheless the issue is scientific thought, which does not stand still, static. This also is a consequence of that great work which the party has done for the wide distribution and adoption of agricultural sciences among the masses. The large number of scientific research institutions in these fields is also evidence of this concern. So now when an opinion is proposed it cannot be accepted simply because of some superficial experiments or simply because somebody specialized in that field said it. The saying that science knows no fetishes is familiar. It requires debate, discussion. All this above everything is in the service of those great tasks which the 14th plenum of the party Central Committee laid out, when it required that achievements in wheat, cotton, etc., be extended, but also set the need for radical changes in such sectors as livestock, orchards, or particular crops as corn, beans, potatoes, etc. Every discussion and development of technical and scientific opinion must without fail serve these great solutions. We speak of the needs in the development of livestock. Comrade Ramiz Alia in the 14th plenum emphasized: "Livestock continues to remain the station where the consequences of all the agricultural shortfalls, especially of grains, are unloaded." There are not a few problems concerning livestock, but let us pause at two of them. The first problem: an interesting work is taking place in the expansion of fodder crops. But the reports and achievements for these crops must be seen and studied. This year, Kruje planted its fodder corn late. The truth is that this year's weather conditions favored it, but under other conditions it would have failed. Corn was planted beyond the deadlines passing from the first fodder crop to the second crop. Why? Simply in order to get one more harvest of silage as an early crop making about 150 quintals fresh mass per hectare. Some specialists in this case think that it is necessary to lose one harvest of silage in order to gain double the nutritive units in September only by planting corn on schedule. The second problem: there is talk about the number of livestock for different districts, for field, hilly, and mountainous zones. Nevertheless there is no unified factor to determine livestock numbers according to zones. There are only the considerations that Sarande and Lushnje have few, Shkoder has a large number, etc. The problem becomes evident when we bear in mind both the great capacities for fodder products and the needs of agriculture for manure, and above all the present and prospective needs of the people for livestock products.

Problems such as these lead to a demand: debates may take place, opinions may be given, but finally the Ministry of Agriculture must make one or the other solution in agreement with a scientific conclusion which is considered the most acceptable, not leaving optional those conclusions recommended by scientific data, seeing them as dynamic, and seeking to realize them as dynamic. The opinions of different specialists are not identical, for example, about the time to apply nitrogenous fertilizer. The economic effectiveness or noneffectiveness depends upon this technical opinion. Further. There are different opinions about the time for plowing with organic fertilizer, whether in the fall or in the spring. Some support one thesis, some oppose. Upon what basis? Is it not necessary then that discussions on such problems, and not only these, take place more often and in an organized manner? Finally, one must act in accordance with the conclusions which will emerge.

In this manner the movement, the dynamic of technical and scientific thought, leads also the specific solutions, sometimes partial other times complete, but in essence it always requires dynamic organization also. It can always be said that in Sarande District the wheat crops are often affected by diseases, it can be said that this district has conditions, many possibilities for expanding its areas of corn. The same thing may be said also about areas within various districts, but this conclusion must be reported to the Ministry of Agriculture and the organizational solution specified, without yielding to the subjective viewpoints of some managers, or to the narrow interests of a particular unit or of some district. "Problems beg for direct head-on solutions, not isolated from one another," says Comrade Enver in one of the materials of the volume. It is this harmony in the reviewing of all factors and also in their execution in a harmonious manner, which leads to solutions which are always correct and responsible, in accordance with the great possibilities of our economy, as a whole, and, in its framework, of our intensified agriculture which is being modernized from year to year.

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ECONOMY

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

HUNGARIAN-BULGARIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS DESCRIBED

Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian No 36, 4 Sep 86 p 9

[Article by -rg- [Dr Gyorgy Varga]: "Machine Industry in the Leading Role"]

[Text] The volume of Hungarian-Bulgarian commodity trade in the 1986-1990 plan period--according to the protocol on the national economic plans' coordination and the targets of the five-year trade and payments agreement--will increase to 2.3 billion rubles at current prices, which will be 25.5 percent more than the volume of commodity trade during the preceding plan period. With an approximately 60-percent share, machine-industry deliveries will remain decisive in future as well. The planned bilateral specialization and cooperation agreements will foreseeably account for about 40 percent of the trade volume. The first year was slow in getting started: with summer about over, civil-law contracts between enterprises are still lacking for between 15 and 20 percent of the annual protocol's targets. The reasons behind this are, among others, failure of the Hungarian enterprises' demand to rise as expected, and the paucity of new products offered by the Bulgarian enterprises.

Bulgaria ranks fifth among Hungary's CEMA trading partners. Development of our mutual economic relations was dynamic until recently, in agreement with both countries' economic interests. The trade statistics bear this out. Commodity trade between 1981 and 1985 exceeded by about 13.5 percent the volume targeted in the long-term agreement. This can be attributed mainly to the outstanding growth during the first three years, at an average rate of more than 15 percent. Import of the Bulgarian machine industry's products increased considerably during this period, which permitted an expansion of the export of Hungary's machine-industry products.

The growth of commodity trade, and within it of trade in machine-industry products, ground to a halt in 1984. After two years of decline, the total turnover dropped from 408 million rubles in 1983 to 352 million rubles last year. This can be attributed predominantly to the development of machine-industry deliveries. Machine-industry products accounted for 61.4 percent of the 1983 trade turnover, but in 1985 their share barely exceeded 50 percent; and although, according to the plans, it will again attain a 62-percent share on average for the 1986-1990 period, the annual protocol for the five-year period's opening year has targeted only a 56.2-percent share for machine-industry products. It is noteworthy that while in 1983 the share of machine-industry products in

each country's deliveries was nearly identical--with a difference of merely 1.6 percentage points in favor of Hungarian export--in 1985 this difference was already very significant.

#### Causes of Slump

The protocol on commodity trade in 1986 targets a turnover of 395 million rubles, about 12 percent more than the actual volume of deliveries in 1985. And the share of machine-industry products within the total turnover will again increase.

From the preceding it follows that in Hungarian-Bulgarian economic relations the most important task is actually to increase the share of machine-industry products within the trade turnover, in accordance with the long-range targets. What must be done to this end? Since the development of trade in the preceding years was influenced decisively by the decline of the Bulgarian machine industry's deliveries, the main task of the enterprises in both countries is to find the reserves that can be uncovered in this branch.

The Hungarian enterprises' orders were hampered by their own financial problems and the mandated curtailment of their investments and development projects.

The enterprises will have to pay more attention in future to ensuring that the assortment and quality of the offered Bulgarian products agree more closely with the Hungarian enterprises' demand, in such commodity groups as machine tools, electric motors, carts, and batteries, among others. In addition, every effort must be made to include as many new machine-industry products as possible in the list of offered commodities. Namely, new products have recently been in short supply in the following commodity groups, for example: miscellaneous vehicles, computer hardware, mechanical measuring instruments, new types of overhead trolleys, and mechanical typewriters. The Hungarian enterprises' orders may be influenced also by experiences--examples of which are becoming more frequent on both sides--such as problems in conjunction with product quality, delays in settling such complaints, failure to observe delivery schedules, etc. Incidentally, such examples occurred in conjunction with deliveries of computer hardware, office mechanization equipment, and cart parts.

#### Modern Technology


The Bulgarian enterprises' activity in the Hungarian market will certainly be enhanced by the completion in Budapest of the new Bulgarian trade center, built into the side of Gellerthegy. In contrast with the permanent premises the Bulgarian trade center occupied up to now, the new center has ample space for showrooms of high quality, and for shows and exhibitions. An important task awaits in the coming plan period also the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, under whose auspices cooperation between enterprises can be intensified.

The long-term trade agreement for 1986-1990 calls for a balance-of-payments equilibrium for the five-year period, and for each year within it as well. Continuous equilibrium will thus require the simultaneous and proportional

expansion of both export and import. Therefore the tasks outlined above are of fundamental importance also from the viewpoint of achieving the trade agreement's targets.

Road vehicles, which constitute a third of machinery export, are the most important commodity group within the Hungarian machine industry's exports to Bulgaria. (Their share of machinery import is 16 percent.) The Hungarian articulated buses and trolleybuses, together with parts for them, play the dominant role in this commodity group. The vehicle-industry import consists mainly of freight cars and trucks.

Nuclear power plant equipment, machinery for the food industry and agriculture, medical equipment and other products of the instrument industry, also low-voltage products, machine tools, and complete plants (bread factories) are very important items within the Hungarian machine industry's export. In addition to vehicle-industry products, decisive within the import from Bulgaria are mainly the various hoisting and transporting machines (electric and gasoline-driven carts, and overhead trolleys) and their parts, also machine tools, construction and road-building equipment, refrigeration equipment, and office mechanization equipment.



#### Structure of Hungarian-Bulgarian Commodity Trade in 1985 (in Percent)

Key:

- |  |                         |
|--|-------------------------|
| 1. Hungarian export                    | 4. Machinery, equipment |
| 2. Hungarian import                    | 5. Farm products        |
| 3. Products in the nature of materials | 6. Consumer goods       |

Under the new five-year plan period, attention will focus on subassemblies and parts (of hydraulic and pneumatic equipment and refrigeration units) in the Bulgarian deliveries, and on high-tech equipment in both countries' deliveries. Here it should be pointed out that computer hardware is playing an ever-greater

role in mutual exports. Bulgarian is a large producer of peripherals, and Hungary gets a significant amount of Bulgaria's output. In exchange Bulgaria buys semiconductors, various other electronic components, line printer, terminals, etc. from Hungarian enterprises.

After the commodity groups supplied by the machine industry, the next in importance within the mutual deliveries are--according to the trade agreement for 1986-1990--metallurgical products, chemicals, and consumer goods. During the five years, metallurgical products and chemicals will account for about 21 percent of the volume of export and import; and consumer goods, for 12 percent. Bulgarian calcined soda is important to the Hungarian economy. What led to these shipments was Hungary's participation in building the Devnya combine. The Bulgarian shipments will supply more than half of Hungary's demand for this product. Otherwise trade in chemicals is expected to show dynamic growth under the current five-year plan, which can be attributed to a significant rise in the mutual deliveries of pharmaceuticals, and to Hungarian deliveries of plant protectants. Prominent within the zero-net-balance deliveries of metallurgical products are Hungarian aluminum ingots, among others. Bulgarian vegetables and fruit, canned foods, and tobacco are significant within our import of farm and food-industry products, and so are Hungarian seeds and stock for the reproduction of flowers, within our export.

Production specialization and cooperation are spreading in important industries--thus in the production of road vehicles, computer hardware, electronics, machinery and equipment for materials handling, and machine tools--and also in the pharmaceutical industry and the production of plant protectants.

There is lively scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries in the field of modern technology and equipment. The preferential areas include microelectronics, computers, robotics, the spreading of flexible manufacturing systems, economization of the consumption of energy and materials, bioengineering and biotechnology, higher farm yields and better processing of farm products.

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ECONOMY

ALBANIA

## DELAYS IN HANDLING, TRANSPORTING OF GOODS DEPLORED

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 27 Jun 86 p 2

[Article by Dhionis Naqellari, economist: "Subjective Delays in Loading and Unloading and 'Objective' Consequences in the Balance Sheet of the Enterprise"]

[Text] Some problems of loading and unloading goods in shipping and receiving enterprises.

Reduction of handling time is one of the greatest possible reserves for utilizing the increase in transport productivity to full advantage. But this requires better organization of work in shipping and receiving enterprises.

In order to reduce loading and unloading, time, along with measures taken to intensify the various types of transport, continual work has been done to mechanize these processes. At the "Enver Hoxha" seaport in Durrës, at the railroad stations in Fier, Tirana, Elbasan, etc., and at enterprises with massive production, such as the coal mines in Memaliaj and Mushqeta, the chromium mine in Bulqize, at sawmills and combines, etc., there has been wide introduction of mechanized loading and unloading processes. Manual labor has been replaced by cranes, electric cranes, excavators, bunkers, and other types of mechanisms.

But in all these enterprises everywhere, where does the responsibility lie for the mechanization of loading and unloading operations in the movement of goods? In some enterprises in districts, due to errors in the minute organization of work, there are still great delays in the loading and unloading of goods. According to data provided by organs which control utilization of means of transportation, in the first 5 months of this year alone, 2,000 cases of transport delays have been recorded, representing over 900,000 tons/hours that means of transportation were not utilized. In concrete terms, in such enterprises as the trade and enterprise in Durrës, the collection enterprise and Agroexport, over 184,000 tons/hours of delays have been recorded. In Elbasan District, the figure is over 259,000, especially in the timber combine, in the construction enterprise, and in the cement factory, etc. It is certainly not normal that we have means of transportation and, at the same time, goods remain without transport to the stores. The delays caused by shipping and receiving of goods must therefore be understood.

Transport delays in loading and unloading in the enterprises of Elbasan, Fier, or Tirana also occur because the decisions taken by the chairmen of executive committees of the people's council of these districts--to work on an extended schedule with two or three shifts in shipping and receiving enterprises--are not being implemented. But the sections of these committees, which do not exercise proper control and do not display tenacity in implementing the appropriate decisions, are responsible for this too. In Tirana, Fier, Elbasan, Skhoder, and Vlore, work is not coordinated between the transporters and the shippers and receivers of goods. The railroad stations, for example, work two or three shifts, while those who receive goods by rail work only one shift! After 3:00 pm every day, therefore, hundres of tons of transport capacity remain unutilized. It is said about this "organization" that there is a reserve inventory prepared for work and it may not be used; there are means and goods which may not be moved from the sations. But the railroad station managers are also responsible for organizing more precise information with the enterprises for the flow of goods.

At the 14th plenum of the party Central Committee, attention was again drawn to the fact that everyone at his work front bears the responsibility for fulfilling his tasks in a steady manner. In some cases, transport delays also occur because the workers assigned to this duty do not perform their task well. Although the organs for monitoring transport utilization have specified which people are responsible for the delays in loading and unloading there has been a lack of measures taken in their regard. In arbitration analyses in districts and in the monitoring and review sections attached to executive committees of the people's councils of districts, correct conclusions have not been drawn and those responsible have not been confronted with their responsibility. Even in the enterprises mentioned in this article as responsible for transport time delays, the managers have shown themselves to be "generous" with the state's money, passing on fines to the enterprise and transforming subjective justifications in "objective" reasons.

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ECONOMY

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

# METALLURGY DEVELOPMENTS IN CEMA TO YEAR 2000 VIEWED

Prague SVET HOSPODARSTVI in Czech 6 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by js: "The Main Directions of Development Pertaining to Metallurgy During the 8th Five-Year Plan"; excerpts from the press conference with Eng Z. Suchy, candidate of sciences, deputy minister of metallurgy and heavy engineering; first paragraph is SVET HOSPODARSTVI introduction]

[Text] The comprehensive program of scientific-technical progress for CEMA member countries through the year 2000 set the direction for further progress in the intensification of production on the basis of accelerated scientific-technical progress. At the 41st extraordinary session of last year, CEMA member countries agreed on a coordinated approach in developing and utilizing the basically new types of equipment and technologies by concentrating their efforts and agreed-upon close comprehensive cooperation within the framework of CEMA along five priority directions--electronification of the national economy, comprehensive automation, nuclear energy, new materials and technologies for their production and processing, and biotechnology.

The complex of tasks, primarily those involving development of new materials, also impacts upon metallurgy. It is essential that the main effort in this regard be aimed at the development and the acquisition of familiarity involving new and the perfection of existing technologies for production involving the smallest consumption of energy, raw materials, materials, and specialized technical equipment, particularly for introduction of industrial production processes involving new high-strength corrosion-resistant and fire-resistant composites and ceramic materials, new resistant coatings and other materials based on ferrous and nonferrous metals, the development of powder metallurgy, the development of amorphous and microcrystalline materials, semiconductor materials for electronics, very pure metals and alloys, and the development of suitable technologies such as the technology of continuous casting and the technology of extrafurnace processing of steels.

All these efforts should be accompanied by the efficient utilization of primary and secondary raw material sources. The ideas of the approved Comprehensive Program were also reflected in the basic intentions of the 8th Five-Year Plan, which were confirmed within the framework of the Main Directions of the Economic and Social Development for Czechoslovakia for the Years 1986-1990 and the Outlook Through the Year 2000, approved at the 17th Congress of the

CPCZ. Basically, further progress is expected of metallurgy with respect to the intensification of production which assures a reduction of the fuel and energy intensity and the overall consumption of metals, which is aimed at improving quality, the structure and assortment of metallurgical products through the better utilization of capacities and the modernization of the production base, accompanied by a gradual reduction in the production of pig iron and raw steel.

The metallurgical industry in Czechoslovakia was primarily established as a material base for our engineering industry and for other branches of the national economy and, with its considerable export volume, also became a substantial source of foreign exchange. With respect to previous intentions, which were still considered by the 15th Congress of the CPCZ, it was assumed that steel production would grow above 16 million tons and the development of the production base also reflected this volume; to a certain extent, this production base is a weighty factor in the current tendencies toward stagnation or only slight increases in production of raw steel and pig iron and weighs heavily with respect to the structural rebuilding of the metallurgical industry.

With its production, the Czechoslovak metallurgical industry covers virtually the entire assortment of basic types of steel, but only about 13 percent represent the production of refined materials, whereas in the industries of advanced capitalist countries refined materials account for more than 20 percent of total production. With respect to the assortment of shapes, we produce around 4,360 basic types (for example, the USSR produces as many as 4,700 types), but problems are represented by peak quality in all groups of steels and dimensional accuracy. For purposes of further intensification within the Czechoslovak metallurgical industry, the entire problem of the metallurgical sector, the sector of ore mining and nonore mining, has been divided into a number of programs:

- a. intensification of the metallurgy of ferrous and nonferrous metals with an emphasis to expanding casting capacities for utilizing the technology of continuous casting of steel,
- b. increasing the utility characteristics of products,
- c. producing new types of materials, including materials for the electrotechnical industry and for the electronics industry,
- d. utilization of secondary raw materials,
- e. expanding the production of single-purpose machines,
- f. rolling within precise tolerances,
- g. development of the coking industry,
- h. development of powder metallurgy,



- i. a program involving the scrapping of obsolete aggregates,
- j. reducing the energy-intensive nature of operations,
- k. the solving of ecological questions.

In the interest of maintaining pace with world developments, it is necessary to place emphasis on the maximum acceleration of even these programs. For example, in developing casting capacities for continuous casting of steel, we are not considering using this technology for 50 percent of our production until 1995, whereas the FRG or Japan are already using this progressive technology for 80 percent of their production today.

An increase in our active participation in international cooperation, particularly involving the CEMA countries, is decisive for the further development of the Czechoslovak metallurgical industry. We are assuring today's production of pig iron on the basis of our cokable coal and on the basis of Soviet iron ore raw materials, whose share in the charge amounts to 79.5 percent. The importation of iron ores from the FRG represents 11.5 percent. Imports of pig iron from the USSR are also substantial with respect to the production of steel.

Seventy-five percent of the demand for nonferrous metals is satisfied through imports, both from nonsocialist countries as well as from socialist countries--a development which will continue to have to be taken into account in future. In cooperation with CEMA member countries, solutions to long-term measures to assure the metallurgical industry of a firm raw materials base will continue and, within the framework of the "Intermetal" international organization, it is expected that our higher active participation will be primarily in the area of rolled materials on which the utilization of our new modern high-capacity roll trains depends to a considerable extent.

The tasks confronting the Czechoslovak metallurgical industry are also reflected in the investment input for the 8th Five-Year Plan at a level of Kcs 18.5 billion. Of some of the more significant projects which are a reflection of specific program developments, it is possible to cite, for example, the development of the hydrometallurgical plant for nonferrous metals at Bruntal, the reconstruction of the alumina plant at Ziar nad Hronom, the expansion of the Kovohute Enterprise at Rokycane to facilitate production of new materials for the electrotechnical industry and for electronics, reconstruction of the cold rolling mill at the East Slovakia Metallurgical Works, development of production of a low volume of highly pure materials at the Research Institute for Metals at Panenske Brezany, etc.

A more efficient utilization of the domestic raw materials base will be supported by the production of nonmetallic magnesite clinker and its processing into metallurgical ceramics products, the previously mentioned expansion of the hydrometallurgical plant for the processing of polymetallic ores containing copper, lead, zinc, and rare metals, and the utilization of tin-tungsten and antimony ores.

In addition to the intensification of the metallurgical process, the attainment of higher degrees of economy in utilizing metals in the processing industry of all other sectors, as well as the timely reaction to the requirements and movements of the world market in assuring export tasks, is no less important a task. And the fact that there is continuing interest throughout the world in the products of our metallurgy is attested to by the fulfillment of export tasks with respect to socialist countries--tasks which were fulfilled more than 111 percent; and those involving nonsocialist countries were fulfilled more than 107 percent.

5911

CSO: 2400/400

ECONOMY

HUNGARY

## AWARDING OF DIRECT FOREIGN TRADE RIGHTS DISCUSSED

Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian No 35, 28 Aug 86 p 9

[Article by A.V.: "The Road to Direct Foreign Trade"; first paragraph is FIGYELO introduction]

[Text] In the wake of the measures introduced at the beginning of this year to simplify the procedures for acquiring foreign trade rights, more enterprises of various size now have a realistic opportunity to conduct such activity directly. But every enterprise applying for this right should be aware that it must make thorough preparations to conduct foreign trade directly, and must carefully weigh the foreseeable advantages and drawbacks against the arising additional costs and expected additional profit. It takes many enterprises long years of preparation before they are finally able to take over the conduct of their foreign trade. In the following we will use the Hungarian Aluminum Industry Trust as an example to illustrate this process. Here it began somewhere in the second half of the 1970's and is by no means over.

Under the conditions in Hungary, MAT [Hungarian Aluminum Industry Trust] counts as one of the giants among the enterprises. A few figures bear this out, such as a total work force of 22,000, and external sales of nearly 29 billion forints (without the internal turnover between the trust's own enterprises). MAT sells 57 percent of its output domestically. Its export to capitalist countries amounts to about 7.0 billion forints; its import denominated in convertible currency is around 15 percent of export. MAT's situation is unique in that no other enterprise in Hungary mines bauxite, converts the bauxite into alumina, smelts aluminum and processes it into semifinished products. The fabrication of finished products is the first phase in the vertical division of production where also other enterprises participate.

### Obstacle to Improving Efficiency

MAT began its trade activity jointly with the specialized foreign trade enterprises. It had four principal partners: METALIMPEX [Foreign Trade Enterprise for Steel and Metal] handled the foreign trade in metals; MINERALIMPEX [Foreign Trade Enterprise for Petroleum and Mining Products] handled the export and import of bauxite, alumina and other minerals; CHEMKOMPLEX [Export-Import Enterprise for Chemical Industry Machinery and Equipment] handled intellectual

export, foreign turnkey projects, and machinery import; finally CHEMOLIMPEX [Hungarian Foreign Trade Enterprise for Chemicals] was responsible for foreign trade in the chemicals associated with the vertical division of production. Until the mid-1970's, this system of relations was the same as the cooperation between production and foreign trade in general. But MAT felt increasingly that this separation of production and trade was an obstacle to the improvement of economic efficiency.

Within the trust, ways and means were sought to bring the two activities closer together. In the economic environment at that time, closer agreement between the interests of production and those of foreign trade seemed the obvious solution. But this has its limits. No matter that MAT's relations with the foreign trade enterprises were always proper, the gap between their interests could not be closed: the fact remained that income for the foreign trade enterprises was expenditure for MAT.

About then the trust's management realized that the required complete harmony between the interests of production and foreign trade could be achieved only if the enterprise itself marketed what it produced. Systematic preparations were launched. First of all, a commercial directorate was established within the trust, to work together with the specialized foreign trade enterprises. A purposeful program of personnel development was begun. Under it, qualified engineers and technicians received training in foreign trade practices and learned foreign language; and efforts were made to attract valuable people from the partner enterprises. This internal organizational buildup also produced a change in mentality: more and more people at the trust realized that marketing is the fulfillment of production activity.

At the same time, there was a growing demand on the part of the enterprise for better access to the foreign trade accounts, to gain insight into the meaningful work. This demand was met partially through partnership agreements that were concluded with the foreign trade enterprises, sharing the risk. The MAT specialists developed their business acumen and familiarized themselves with pricing as well. With the experience they gained in this manner, the specialist wanted to serve the trust even better. The ultimate objective was formulated: in addition to its technical know-how, MAT would gain full knowledge of foreign trade as well. The specialists learned all the technical, legal, financial, etc. essentials of working foreign markets. They deemed direct relations with the foreign partners necessary. Accordingly, all negotiations at that time were held at MAT headquarters, rather than at the foreign trade enterprises.

#### First Licenses

When the trust felt that it had gained the basic knowledge needed to conduct foreign trade directly and had ensured the necessary organizational conditions, it filed an application with the Ministry of Foreign Trade for a limited and parallel right to export. The first license was issued in 1981, for a specified range of products produced by MAT enterprises. Another limited and parallel right was acquired later, with provisions for some import as well. Finally, as of 1 January 1986, MAT has gained unlimited right to export the trust's entire range of products, in both ruble-denominated and hard-currency trade. At

the same time it has also gained the right to import the products necessary for its own output, but excluding imports of machinery and equipment. MAT intends to exercise as of 1 January 1987 its unlimited right to conduct foreign trade directly. This year the foreign trade enterprises will still be transacting foreseeably about 45 percent of the trust's export.

The commercial directorate at the trust's headquarters will oversee and coordinate MAT's foreign trade activity. The Aluminum Industry Trade Enterprise (ALUKER), which was established in recent years and now has about 500 employees, will handle the sale and distribution of the trust's own products. This firm has all the essential functional and commodity departments that a foreign trade enterprise needs to operate successfully. It should be noted that ALUKER functions not only as the trust's "foreign trade enterprise," but also as its general trading and product distribution enterprise. In trade, of course, it is the duty of MAT's commercial director to assert the coordinated interests at the trust's level, while ALUKER's director exercises day-to-day management of sales and distribution. Under MAT's right to conduct foreign trade, the intellectual export and turnkey projects abroad will be handled by ALUTERV-FKI [Aluminum Industry Designing Institute-Metal Industry Research Institute].

According to Gyorgy Milotay, MAT's commercial director, the foreign trade enterprises with which MAT has been dealing up to now are cooperating properly in handing over their agendas. In this spirit, they are willing to release those of their specialists in the handed-over commodities who wish to transfer to MAT so as to continue their former work. From a technical viewpoint, the changeover is proceeding smoothly.

But the process of closely integrating production and trade does not yet end with the trust's takeover of its own foreign trade. A part of this process is a task within the trust itself: the closer coordination of activities and reconciliation of interests, by developing suitable incentives.

#### No Umbrella

What have been the results of the process leading to the right to conduct foreign trade directly, and what further results can we expect of this process, respectively of exercising this right? The enterprise has gained closer access to the market and to information, which is especially important in the case of a basic material that is traded on commodity markets. The trust feeds back the direct and more thorough information into its development policy. MAT's staff members directly get the market feedback, the response to the products shipped, and also the quality complaints that may have been filed in a given case. There is no umbrella in between, to shelter them and perhaps to dampen the impact. There is more responsibility. On the other hand, all the earnings remain within the trust, and everything emerges clearly from the "open books." There is a clear picture of the marketability of MAT's products, and of the profit or loss of MAT's entire operations.

There are also problems, of course. The managers are under much more pressure. The Ministry of Industry is their supervising agency, but the Ministry of Foreign Trade provides professional guidance. This duality generates much additional paperwork, and the managers' workload is increasing also in terms of time.

From the viewpoint of products, the enterprise--due to its position--does not feel the customary conflicts of parallel foreign trade, but not even MAT is spared the direct effects. Here the issue is mainly the problem of personnel. In awarding foreign trade rights, the Ministry of Foreign Trade adheres to the principle of equal opportunity, which has also MAT's full support. But the available brainpower, the number of experienced foreign traders, is limited. Therefore the trust does not agree with the ministry's practice of awarding ad hoc foreign trade rights to various enterprises, too easily in the trust's opinion. Experience shows that this dissipates the existing pool of foreign trade personnel, and valuable people frequently leave--often even from MAT itself--to work for smaller businesses where the export volume is not significant but the pay is good. Within MAT's management it has been suggested that, similarly as in other countries, the granting of export rights ought to be linked to a minimal volume, say, between 3.0 million and 5.0 million dollars. This solution could overcome the unwarranted and excessive proliferation of export rights.

Is it more profitable for the trust to conduct its own foreign trade? Have the costs of preparation and organization been excessive? Of fundamental importance to MAT is the world market price of aluminum at any given time. The price is between 1100 and 1200 dollars at present, but it has already been twice as high during the past five years. Thus the decisive is not the amount of the agent's commission or other costs payable to foreign trade. So far as the total cost of sales is concerned in MAT's case, it cannot be much less than what it was when MAT was dealing through the foreign trade enterprises. But MAT is not approaching this question primarily from the cost side. The economic advantages are demonstrably much greater from the viewpoint of shaping production policy and development policy.

The rounding out of MAT's trade activity has warranted the takeover of its socialist foreign trade. Moreover, there is fruitful scientific and technical cooperation with many socialist countries, and the direct conduct of foreign trade makes the relations with them more complete.

#### Temporary Difficulties

During the takeover, which is continuing even now, the producer and the foreign trader already act jointly or in parallel. The foreign partners have accepted this. Incidentally, it has never been a secret that MAT makes the product which the foreign trader has been selling them up to now. There have been fluctuations during the changeover, accompanied occasionally by losses, temporary difficulties in carrying out shipping instructions and in communication. But these difficulties have turned out to be merely temporary ones, and they never reached a level which could have resulted in a loss of customers. The facts show that sales have not declined, the producer has not been left stuck with unsold products, the trust has not lost market share and has not suffered substantial price losses.

MAT now intends to proceed further in two ways. On the one hand, as already noted, it wants to integrate even more closely the processes of production and marketing, through measures within the trust. On the other hand, it will continue the development of its foreign marketing network. Besides expanding its

network of exclusive agents and commission agents, the enterprise has its own representatives stationed in several of the more important countries (in the United States and Sweden, for example), and in two very important markets it has founded marketing companies jointly with local partners. Both Hongalox GmnH [Limited Liability Company] in Austria, and Alutrade GmbH in the Federal Republic of Germany were founded in the 1980's, when MAT already had the right to conduct foreign trade directly.

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ECONOMY

HUNGARY

## CHANGE IN FOREIGN TRADE ORGANIZATION DISCUSSED

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 3 Sep 86 p 10

[Interview with Dr Peter Naray, deputy chief of the Enterprise Management and Auditing Affairs Main Department, Ministry of Foreign Trade, by Tamas Szonyei: "Change in the Organization of Foreign Trade"; date and place not given; first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] [Question] What relationships are evident between the organization of foreign trade and the economic environment, or between organization and profitability? These are the questions we discussed in an interview with Dr Peter Naray, deputy chief of the Enterprise Supervision and Auditing Affairs Main Department at the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

[Answer] The organization of socialist foreign trade developed after the nationalizations. Between 1945 and 1948, there still were several thousand enterprises engaged in foreign trade, most of them privately owned. The state monopoly of foreign trade was embodied in the constitution of 1949, and foreign trade was assigned to specialized enterprises, separate from the economy as a whole. There were fewer than 10 such enterprises in 1949. The central agencies decided what to export and import, and the task of the enterprises was to implement these decisions. Competition was entirely out of question, nor could more than one enterprise export or import the same commodity. The principles of this system remained in place essentially until 1968, although with several changes even before then. By 1955, the number of foreign-trade enterprises was already 28, and in 1956-1957 nine production enterprises were authorized to export directly. This was the first time that the foreign markets' ripple effects made themselves felt to some extent within the organization of foreign trade. It was recognized that isolation could have also harmful effects.

### Changes After 1968

The 1968 reform of the economy's management formulated the need to establish the unity of the foreign and domestic economic processes. This was achieved basically with the help of economic regulators. From the viewpoint of foreign trade, an essential feature of the 1968 economic reform was that the enterprises concerned were able to make independent decisions regarding also their export and import, within the limits of the introduced system of economic instruments and the system of state regulation. But the change in the organization of foreign trade was evident first of all in a substantial increase of



the number of enterprises engaged in foreign trade. Whereas from 1962 to 1965 only five enterprises were granted the right to engage in foreign trade, between 1967 and 1972 the number of such enterprises increased from 43 to 116. But the underlying principles of the organization of foreign trade remained unchanged. As before, only one enterprise could export or import the same commodity. If some industrial enterprise was granted the right to engage in foreign trade, the right of the enterprise that conducted the export or import up to then was revoked. Thus a competitive situation could not develop.

[Question] The reallocation of circulating capital likewise occurred in 1968, and the foreign-trade enterprises are still feeling its effect: their capital shortage. What warranted then this solution for the system of financing foreign trade?

[Answer] Through the reallocation of financial resources to the domestic producers and users, specifically by making commission agency agreements mandatory between the production and the foreign-trade enterprise, it was intended to establish the unity of the external and domestic economic processes. The significance of partnership agreements, which presuppose closer cooperation, also rose. But trading on the foreign-trade enterprises' own account was limited, and its share fell below 10 percent after 1968.

[Question] Nearly 20 years have elapsed since 1968. What significant changes have there been in the meantime?

[Answer] The changes taking place in the world economy have produced modifications in Hungary's system of economic management as well. A certain reversion began from 1973 on, and the state administrative agencies again took over certain matters over which the enterprises had had decision-making authority. In conjunction with this, the number of newly granted authorizations to engage in foreign trade dropped: only 18 enterprises were granted this right between 1973 and 1979. The realization grew in the late 1970's that the system of managing the economy, and together with it also the organization of foreign trade, had to be developed further. Numerous problems arose in conjunction with the existing organization. The "one commodity, one enterprise" principle produced compulsory business relations that were criticized by both sides. First of all the production enterprises complained that the foreign-trade enterprises had no incentive to let them adjust as closely as possible to world-market demand, were not transmitting the information necessary to this end, were slow and cumbersome, and were not interested in small lots. The compulsory relations established by administrative decisions had to be replaced with a system based on independence and greater incentive. The modifications from 1980 on have been very spectacular. In 1980, only two enterprises were granted the right to engage in foreign trade, but 16 enterprises each in 1981 and 1982, 24 in 1983, 41 in 1984, and 25 in 1985. At the same time, the number of ad hoc authorizations likewise rose sharply, exceeding 900 in 1985.

[Question] But this is merely the quantitative side of the question.

[Answer] True. But Generalimpex, one of the enterprises granted in 1980 the right to engage in foreign trade, is a precedent of the qualitative changes:

it is the first foreign-trade enterprise of the general type, authorized to trade--on the basis of the ministry's decision--even in commodities in which other foreign-trade enterprises are specializing. With this the administration of foreign trade has abandoned the "one commodity, one enterprise" principle. The principle of parallel rights to engage in foreign trade was enacted into law in 1981. That was the time when differentiation within the organization of foreign trade began. That was when subsidiaries appeared, as well as joint enterprises of producers and foreign traders; and lately even joint domestic enterprises with foreign equity participation have been granted the right to engage in foreign trade. This organizational differentiation permits integration or coordination of the various interests of production and foreign trade, and a desirable increase in the number of smaller foreign-trade enterprises.

### Fundamental Change

[Question] Decree of the Minister of Foreign Trade No 7/1985 is the most recent statute on how the right to engage in foreign trade may be acquired in Hungary. What are the most important provisions of this decree?

[Answer] Since 1 January 1986, a permanent right to engage in foreign trade may be acquired under simplified licensing procedures, or [an ad hoc right, through] so-called individual licensing. The introduction of simplified licensing procedures is a change of fundamental importance. There are three essential requirements that must be met to obtain a permanent right to engage in foreign trade: The applicant must be a production enterprise; the application must be for the right to engage in foreign trade denominated in convertible currency; and the commodity to be traded must not be included in the export list published as the decree's supplement. If the application meets these requirements, the license is issued within 45 days. The Ministry of Foreign Trade will reject an application that otherwise is in order, if the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce finds that the applicant's participation in foreign trade might adversely reflect on the other Hungarian business organizations in the foreign market.

[Question] This sounds like a sort of rubber-stamp clause. What is the difference between adverse reflection on the other Hungarian business organizations in the foreign market, and otherwise desirable competition?

[Answer] When a new enterprise enters a foreign market, this automatically creates a competitive situation. As the organization representing the interests of enterprises, the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce bears in mind in its opinion that an enterprise which is unreliable in its shipments and late in its payments must not be allowed to damage the reputation of the other Hungarian enterprises in the given trade, or of Hungarian commodities in general.

[Question] I concede that the simplified licensing procedures are useful. But may I ask: Why is licensing at all necessary for hard-currency export, at least in the case of commodities that are not on the export list?

[Answer] According to the Foreign Trade Law enacted in 1974, only the business organization licensed by the competent authority has the right to engage in foreign trade. This right may be granted only when it is in the interest of

the national economy to do so, and when the enterprise in question has, or is able to create, the business, organizational and personnel conditions necessary for the successful conduct of foreign trade.

#### Risk of Mistake

[Question] Then may I ask: What is the reason behind this law? Why can't the enterprise decide whether or not to export and assume responsibility for all the consequences of a possible mistake?

[Answer] A country's system of economic management, its traditions, external economic environment, and the organizational structure of its foreign trade are closely interrelated. A command-directed economy needs only a few foreign-trade enterprises that do not compete with one another. Where the enterprises are independent and make their economic decisions on the basis of business considerations, a foreign-trade organization is necessary that also employs competition. The situation in Hungary is peculiar. More than half of our total foreign trade is not denominated in convertible currency. International agreements determine the structure of our foreign trade; and foreign-trade contracts specify many essential conditions, the quantities to be shipped, and the prices. It is essential from the viewpoint of the organization of our foreign trade, and must be taken into consideration, that even today the organization of foreign trade in the socialist countries with which we trade is still strongly centralized. Therefore there is less room for enterprise independence in trade with these countries than in trade with capitalist countries, where state participation in the sphere of foreign trade has likewise increased in recent years. It will suffice to point out the spreading of international agreements for so-called voluntary restraints on export.

Another important circumstance is that in some markets there are complicated regulations on many commodities. The Hungarian enterprises have long been cut off from foreign markets. There are not enough foreign-trade specialists who speak foreign languages, and therefore it is not easy for Hungarian enterprises to find their bearings in foreign markets. We must strive to minimize the tuition fee we have to pay for our lack of experience. I think it is warranted that the state should allow an enterprise to enter the world market only under certain conditions.

In harmony with the further development of the system of economic management, the enterprises' independence in foreign trade will increase gradually. Regardless of this, however, some form of state control will nevertheless be retained. The granting of the right to engage in foreign trade has been simplified considerably in recent years, and for a no small circle of enterprises the awarding of this right is essentially automatic. The trends of the changes that have taken place in the organization of our foreign trade in recent years are, I believe, clearly progressive. Naturally, this process is far from over.

#### What Is Behind the Figures?

[Question] On the basis of the simplified licensing procedures introduced this year, 11 enterprises applied for, and received, a permanent right to engage in

foreign trade. At the same time, 580 enterprises applied for individual licenses, and 460 of the applications have been granted. What lies behind these figures? What correlation can be found between the right to engage in foreign trade directly, and profitability?

[Answer] More applications have been received for a permanent right to engage in foreign trade than in the first half last year, but not by much. First, obviously because the enterprises know how complicated it now is to engage in foreign trade, and that it takes time to build up their own foreign-trade staff if they want to engage in foreign trade directly. And secondly, because Decree No 7/1985 has also a very important supplement. It lists 38 foreign-trade enterprises which, in hard-currency markets, may trade in any commodity that is not on the export list. In other words, the principle of parallel rights to engage in foreign trade has been codified more broadly than ever before. The production enterprises may freely choose among these foreign-trade enterprises and, therefore, may be less interested in acquiring the right to engage in foreign trade directly. The increase in the number of applications for an ad hoc right to engage in foreign trade has likewise been moderate. But for the 38 general foreign-trade enterprises, it is certain that there would have been more such applications. Many of the enterprises that did file such applications regard the ad hoc right as an introduction to exercising a permanent right to engage in foreign trade. To your question whether a correlation exists between the right to engage in foreign trade directly and the enterprises' profitability, it is very difficult to provide an answer that would be generally applicable.

The effect of acquiring the right to engage in foreign trade directly is generally favorable. Through it the production enterprises have a better feel of the changes in foreign markets, but occasionally there are examples also of the exact opposite. It has already happened that the right to engage in foreign trade directly has been revoked from an enterprise for that reason. The requirements that foreign trade must meet are rising constantly. But it should be emphasized that significant development cannot be achieved through organizational changes alone. Decentralization and a competitive situation have a stimulating effect on business activity. But some of the enterprises are necessarily losers in the competition.

[Question] And they are complaining?

[Answer] Yes. They argue that their competitor "underbids" them and thereby reduces the national economy's foreign-exchange earnings. The price alone is not decisive. If we consider all the conditions, a lower unit price may perhaps generate more income for the national economy.

In addition to export competition, let us not forget the importance of import competition. A close correlation exists between the enterprises' cost sensitivity and the economic efficiency of import. We have to form an economic environment that is conducive to competition, and lets those enterprises win, develop and raise wages which are more efficient and better organized in their production and foreign trade.

ECONOMY

HUNGARY

1985 STATE INVESTMENTS ANALYZED IN ARTICLE

Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian 21 Aug 86 p 3

[Article by Pal Pozsonyi under the "Investment" rubric: "Perhaps at the Lowest Point"]

[Text] (Footnote) (This article supplements the one entitled "Investments in 1981-1985" in the No 31/1986 issue of FIGYELO, and the essay "After Preparing the Balance Sheets" in the No 33/1986 issue.)

The outlays for the socialist sector's investments in 1985 essentially agreed with the plan (194.1 billion forints), while the value of personal investments approximated the plan (47 billion forints) but still fell short. Investment activity in 1985 was more constrained than what the forecast at the beginning of the year had predicted. The 1984 slowdown of investment activity continued, reaching its lowest point in the first half of 1985.

Several factors contributed to the development of this situation. The role of the severe winter weather in early 1985 to the low performance in investment activity during the first half was by no means negligible, but the main reason must be sought in the changed economic environment. During the first half, the enterprises were feeling and assessing the impact of the significantly modified economic regulators (including the effects of the taxes on assets and development projects). The fact that the enterprises and cooperatives, and the organizations representing their interests, were trying hard to get the accumulation tax reduced, and were hoping for its reduction during the year, also played a role in the restrained investment behavior. (It will be remembered that the accumulation tax was abolished or reduced already as of 1 January 1986 in agriculture, respectively on investments for the expansion of export, while in other areas the rates of this tax have been reduced as of 1 July 1986.)

On the whole the regulators were slightly milder than in the preceding years. The accumulation tax introduced in 1985 sets requirements more uniform than those of the measures employed earlier to centralize income, and it has fulfilled well its role of slowing down the investment cycle. The reallocation of central resources also influenced significantly the structural breakdown of investment. The rechanneling of financial resources to the fuel and power industry, and to certain infrastructural areas, limited the resources for some

areas (particularly manufacturing, and certain branches of agriculture and the food industry) to such an extent that technical development and the introduction of new technology ground to a halt.

The overall rate of capital formation that evolved in 1985, 26 percent of GDP's domestic expenditure, was slightly higher than in 1984.




Figure 1. Rates of Capital Formation (Weighted Averages)

Key:

1. Gross capital formation in percent of GDP's domestic expenditure
2. Net capital formation in percent of NDP's domestic expenditure

By international standards--and taking also the limitations of comparisons into account--this rate of capital formation cannot yet be regarded as low. But, in my opinion, the volume of investment has been close to the critical level for years. It is not primarily the volume of investment that prevents investments from underpinning development, but the mechanism for the allocation of resources, plus the unsatisfactory proportion of economically efficient investments. The turning point, regrettably, has yet to come.

#### Vigorous Fuel, Power Industry

We may say with some simplification that the structure of investment determines the economy's performance. However, the national economic structure of investment is relatively very stable as a rule. Spectacular changes are rare. Instead, the proportions mostly change slowly, over a longer period of time.

Branch Structure of Socialist Sector's Investments (At Current Prices, in Percent)

	1980	1981-1984 average	1985
Fuel & power industry	12.4	13.8	16.8
Metallurgy	4.4	3.3	2.3
Manufacturing	13.5	15.0	14.4
Of which:			
Chemical industry	4.2	5.6	6.9
Machine industry	6.4	5.9	4.9
Light industry	2.6	3.1	2.4
Construction industry	4.5	3.2	2.9
Agriculture & food industry	17.7	19.5	17.6
Infrastructure	47.5	45.2	46.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

In the 1980's, the development projects of the fuel and power industry and the chemical industry attained their highest share in 1985. They did so in spite of the fact that the volume of outlays on investments in progress had been very large in the basic materials industries and in the fuel and power industry already at the start of the plan period, and several large-scale investment projects in the mining and chemical industries had been started just a few years earlier. Thus the overall shift in the proportions had appeared cumulatively at the end of the plan period. Simultaneously the opportunities for investment within manufacturing declined, because the credits that had been obtained in the preceding five-year period had to be repaid in this one. Which tied up to a significant extent the resources for development in this area, while the tax burden was the heaviest specifically here.

The structure of investment by size categories of the projects changed only slightly in 1985. The total outlays on investment projects with budgeted costs exceeding 25 million forints were lower by 9 percent than in 1980, but the total outlays on investment projects below this limit were 12 percent higher. Thus the structure shifted as it was intended to shift: in favor of smaller investment projects, although not by as much as had been planned. This indicates a continuation of the 1981-1984 trends.




Figure 2. Investment Starts by Size Categories (at Current Prices)

Key:

1. Billion forints

2. Billion [as published] forints



### The Many Small Projects Add Up

Within the general slowdown of investment activity, the projects close to completion were speeded up somewhat, and the projects in less advanced stages were the ones affected by the curtailment of investment outlays. Therefore the outlays on investments in progress did not decline.

Among the central investments, the number of investment projects completed in 1985 was 14 percent higher than in 1984, and completion was up 12 percent on the basis of the projects' budgeted costs. No new large-scale investment project was started in 1985, but the projects of this type which had been started earlier were still of decisive importance. With the slowdown, there was no perceptible improvement in either the concentration of investment activity in the area of central investments or in their economic efficiency. The various measures affecting investments resulted mainly in that many smaller investment projects were realized.

In the area of investments over which the enterprises had decisionmaking authority, the scarcity of resources for development meant that in 1985 there were fewer investment starts involving substantial budgeted costs, and parallel with this the proportion declined of the development projects which the enterprises financed entirely with their own resources. The significant reduction of investments was in accordance with central intentions, but presumably a contributing factor was the fact that the enterprises did not yet know the objectives of the 7th Five-Year Plan and therefore delayed their planned investment starts by a few months.

An indication of the slowdown in investment activity was that the number of credit applications received from enterprises dropped by 16 percent over the preceding year; and the number received from cooperatives, by 1 percent. (But the total amount of credit requested rose by 25 percent.) The number of applications in the competitions for investment aid was 23 percent lower than in 1984, but the total amount of investment aid requested was 93 percent higher. Thus the demand for investment credit and investment aid was more concentrated. (The decline in the number of applications for investment aid was due to waning interest in energy conservation projects.)

### Machinery Import

Material-Technical Composition of Socialist Sector's Investments (At Current Prices, in Percent)

	Con- struc- tion	M a c h i n e r y			Other	Jointly
		Domes- tic	Ruble import	Nonruble import		
1981-1984	48.6	20.5	10.4	9.6	10.9	100.0
1985 plan	47.4	21.1	9.8	11.6	10.1	100.0
1985 report	48.4	22.2	9.0	10.5	9.9	100.0

Examining the material-technical composition of the investments, we find that the proportion of construction work within the larger investments declined somewhat, but rose in the case of smaller investments. The proportion of machinery from ruble-denominated import dropped sharply (by 11 percent at current



prices, in comparison with the average for 1981-1984), while the proportion of machinery from nonruble-denominated import rose (likewise by 11 percent at current prices, over the average for 1981-1984). As a result, this was the first time ever that the proportion of machinery was higher from nonruble-denominated import than from ruble-denominated import. A substantial proportion of the nonruble-denominated import was for preferential investment objectives. The rise in the importation of modern technology was favorable from the viewpoint of modern technology.

In the case of enterprise investments, 81 percent of the entire capitalist import was installed in investment projects financed by the World Bank, or in projects associated with other preferential investment objectives.

Socialist Agencies' Investment Outlays by Sources of Financing (At Current Prices, in Percent)

	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>
Budgetary grants	21.3	21.8
State loans	13.9	10.6
Development-fund grants	1.0	3.1
Credits	11.0	11.3
Own resources		
Of enterprises	45.2	46.2
Of councils, and other	7.6	7.0

The breakdown of the socialist agencies' investment outlays by sources of financing was similar to the preceding year's breakdown. The minimal shifting of the proportions can be attributed to a change in the scheme of financing the coal industry's large-scale investments.

The share of enterprise resources in the financing of lump-sum and other central investments rose, but the share of budgetary grants rose in the case of council investments. In investments over which the enterprises have decision-making authority, the share of own resources declined. But at the same time the enterprises' deposits rose. Which makes it very likely that the enterprises were setting aside their resources in 1985, expecting the system of regulation to be more favorable for 1986. Abolition of the depreciation charges' centralization as of 1 January 1985 left the enterprises more resources of their own, but overall the payments (to the state budget) through other (tax) channels essentially offset this effect. The establishment of unified incentive funds contributed significantly toward broadening the investment opportunities over which the enterprises have decisionmaking authority. On the other hand, the fact that some enterprises used their retained depreciation charges to give pay increases was unfavorable. All this raises questions primarily regarding pay regulation, instead of questioning the existence of the unified incentive funds themselves.

The sale of bonds to individuals as well as enterprises is a relatively new form of investment financing. Bonds totaling 2.4 billion forints were floated last year, and thus the total of bonds outstanding reached 4.2 billion forints by the end of the year. A fairly significant bond market also developed: bonds worth a billion forints were traded in it last year. Enterprises are holding 40 percent of all the bonds issued.

Parallel with the general slowdown of investment activity, the projects close to completion were speeded up somewhat, and the projects in less advanced stages of completion were the ones affected by the curtailment of investment outlays. Therefore the outlays on investments in progress did not decline.

Thus continuity was far more typical of the investment processes in 1985 than were the signs of the starting or unfolding of new processes. The fact that decisions made in the preceding years had strongly determined the process in the year in question remained a decisive factor of investment activity. The slight quickening of pace in the second half of 1985 and the processes in the first half of 1986 indicate that probably investment activity has already bottomed out from its lowest point last year.

1014

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ECONOMY

POLAND

# STUDY DETAILS HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES ON PRIVATE MARKET

Warsaw WIADOMOSCI STATYSTYCZNE in Polish No 5, May 86 pp 6-9

[Article by Slawomir Mierzejewski, Department of Social Studies, Chief Statistical Bureau: "Household Expenditures For Private-Sector Goods and Services"]

[Text] One of the chief economic and social problems is the second sector of money spent by households that does not find its way into the state-owned sector. In other words, this is a problem of the role of the non-socialized market (in its broadest meaning) in meeting the needs of the population.

The source of data used for this study is the results of research on household budgets. During this research, the money spent by the studied families was recorded according to whether it went into the private market or for goods and services of state-owned enterprises or, in other words, according to the source of the purchases. The results of these studies can be used to estimate the absolute dimensions of the money spent on the second sector as a percentage of total expenditures. Using these findings to estimate the absolute scale of this phenomenon on a macroscale, it must be remembered that "non-socialized sources" in which the studied families purchased goods and services has a broader scope than the macrostatistics term of "non-socialized economic entities". This covers all purchase transactions in individual non-socialized businesses, that is, at retail sales points as well as those found at markets and including sums spent (which is not given in macro-data) at markets for purchases from merchants that do not pay a wage charge (such as agricultural producers) directly to farmers, gardeners, peddlers and other unregistered persons (for example rent, passenger rides, all services performed by free-lance specialists, etc.). This is also attested by the low (according to internal trade data) percentage value of retail sales of consumer goods in non-socialized economic entities which in 1984 amounted to a mean 2.6 percent.

The incomparability of the macro data on the value of services sold is due to the fact that the term "services for people" (households) also covers the non-socialized establishments, that is, the so-called sales by individual farms, private crafts shops and other such establishments that conduct manufacturing, trade or services independently.

The purpose of this report is to portray the differences in expenditures made to non-socialized businesses by the families covered in the studies on

After that come culture, education, sports, tourism and recreation (17.8 percent), personal hygiene and health care (17.5 percent), transportation (15.0 percent) and housing (14.4 percent). With retired persons, the order of percentages is different and the first place is taken by culture, education, sports, tourism and recreation (21.1 percent or 88 zlotys) followed by personal hygiene and health care (19.7 percent), food (19.0 percent), shoes and clothing (18.9 percent), housing (17 percent) and transportation (16.7 percent).

For worker-peasant families, the order of spending in the private sector is as follows: shoes and clothing (21.8 percent), food (19.3 percent) and culture, sports, education, tourism and recreation (19.2 percent) or identical to the level of spending found among employees. Fourth place in the private-sector spending of worker-peasant families is taken by housing costs (18.5 percent) and this is followed by hygiene and health care (16.2 percent) and transportation (14.1 percent). At the same time, for peasants, the order of expenses in the private sector is as follows: housing (29.3 percent), food (23.8 percent), shoes and clothing (23.1 percent), culture, education, sports, tourism and recreation (22.6 percent), transportation (18.9 percent) and hygiene and health care (18.2 percent).

The results of family budget studies show a clear regularity with regard to the absolute level of private-sector spending to meet certain groups of household needs of employees and worker-peasants, peasants and retired persons. All of these groups spend the greatest sum of money on the private market for food, then for shoes and clothing, housing, culture, education, sports, tourism and recreation and then for personal hygiene and health care, travel, fuel, electrical energy and heating. The exception to this is peasant families in which expenditures for shoes and clothing have given up second place for money spent on housing which took third place among all other groups. Another exception is retired persons who spent more on fuel, electrical energy and heating than for transportation which takes seventh rather than sixth place as in all of the other groups (table 2).

Considering the percentage of the "second cash flow" out of total expenditures for certain food items (or services), it must be said that the private sector plays an important if not the most important role in providing people with potatoes, vegetables, fresh mushrooms and fruits and canned fruits. For example, as much as 58 percent of the money spent by the studied families for potatoes went to the private market, 51.1 percent for vegetables and fresh mushrooms and 43.0 percent for fruits and canned fruits. This can be explained by the fact that the private market is more accessible for these goods and has a better assortment and more elastic prices depending on the time of day. The produce buying by retired people on the private market is broken down as follows: 59.7 percent for potatoes, 49.8 percent for vegetables and fresh mushrooms and 38.3 percent for fruits and canned fruits. In worker-peasant families, these figures are 60.0 percent for potatoes, 52.6 percent for vegetables and mushrooms and 32.9 percent for fruits and for peasant families, these percentages are 58.7 percent for vegetables and fresh mushrooms, 50.0 percent for potatoes and 43.8 percent for meat, poultry and meat products.

household budgets and their percentage of overall expenses in relation to the social and economic backgrounds of the studied households and within that group of families, according to the amount of average monthly income per member of family.

The data for 1984 shows that the percentage of sums spent in private businesses for the purchase of goods and services and their overall sum amount to a mean 16 percent in all of the studied families. The particular four social and economic groups vary from one another by this amount. It is its lowest in working families and amounts to 15.5 percent or 1247 zlotys per person per month. For retired persons and worker-peasants, the level of money spent on non-socialized businesses is 16.4 percent (1221 zlotys) and 16.7 percent (986 zlotys per person per month) and goes as high as 20.1 percent (1265 zlotys) among peasant families which means that every fifth zloty is spent in the private sector. This highest percentage of 20.1 percent of money spent by peasant families outside of the socialized sector in comparison to the other three economic and social groups can be explained by the poor development of the network of state-owned goods and services businesses in rural areas and a relatively high percentage (within the infrastructure of rural regions) of private businesses and the market traditions. At the same time, the families of worker-peasants can to a great extent buy more goods and services from state-owned businesses because family members are usually employed in nonagricultural work.

In all four social and economic groups, there is a clear relationship between the percentage of money spent outside of the socialized sector out of the total spent for goods and services per family member. The relationship is that this percentage rises as the income per family member goes up (table 1). In the case of working households, the figure is 12.5 percent (588 zlotys) for the group with the lowest monthly income per person (up to 5000 zlotys) and is as high as 16.5 percent (2200 zlotys) in families in which the monthly earnings per person exceed 14,000 zlotys. Therefore, the difference is four percent. The same figures for the other three social and economic groups are as follows: 13.9-17.7 percent for worker-peasants, 18.2-20.3 percent for peasants and 13.7-17.2 percent for retired persons. It is worth pointing out that while the absolute amount of money spent outside of state-owned businesses shows no significant differences (with the exception of worker-peasant families), the total food expenditures do differ. Every fifth zloty in working households, worker-peasant households and those of retired persons and every fourth zloty among peasants spent for food goes to private enterprises and in this case, the percentage of these expenditures rises as we go from group to group: from 14.2 percent in the highest employee income group to 20.9 percent in the lowest, 15.6-21.9 percent for worker-peasants and 15.2-21.6 percent for retired persons. For peasant families, this figure rises from 24.0 percent for groups with a monthly income per family member of more than 5000 zlotys to 26.6 percent in the 12,001-14,000 zloty income group.

Shoes and clothing take the highest percentage of money spent in the private sector. For these articles, the studied groups spend about 216 zlotys monthly per person on the private sector or almost every fifth zloty (19.5 percent). The next highest percentage is taken by food (18.3 percent or 660 zlotys).

For the purchase of meat (including poultry and meat products), employee families spend every eighth zloty or 13.1 percent on private markets and 12.7 percent for baked goods and every ninth zloty (11.2 percent) goes to the restaurant business. In the case of the families of retired persons, the restaurant business takes fourth place (21.1 percent) after expenditures for potatoes, vegetables and fruits and this is then followed by dairy produce and eggs (16.1 percent), meat poultry and meat products (15.1 percent) and baked goods (13.0 percent). In worker-peasant families, the fourth place is taken by meat for which they spend every fourth zloty (26.7 percent) while their private-market expenditures for daily products is 16.5 percent, 7.0 percent for baked goods, 6.9 percent for fats and 6.6 percent for grain and mill products.

In the studied peasant families, fourth place in their food purchases on the private market is taken by fruits and canned fruits and every third zloty (32.9 percent) they spend on these items goes to the non-socialized sector. Following fruits are fats (17.0 percent or every sixth zloty), dairy products (10.4 percent or every tenth zloty) and restaurants (10.0 percent).

The data shown in table 2 shows that families with higher per-capita incomes buy more on the private market. This is demonstrated by the fact that in comparison with poorer families, they spend more of their money to buy items on the private market. For example, the percentage is more than twice that of employee families for the purchase of baked goods and this amounts to 8.0 percent among families with monthly per-capita incomes not exceeding 5000 zlotys and 16.5 percent for families with monthly per-capita incomes of over 14,000 zlotys. The same figures for meat purchases are 8.0 and 17.0 percent respectively, 1.5 and 3.2 percent for fats, 4.2 and 11.4 percent for sugar, honey and confectionary products and 5.1 and 12.4 percent for restaurants.

The presented findings show the differences in the sums and percentages spent on the private market between households of different social and economic background in relation to the family per-capita income. On a macro-scale, these differences can also be found between provinces because of the varied social and professional structure of their populations.

Table 1. Average monthly per-capita expenditures by households on the private market, by income group

Specification	total	Income groups (monthly per-capita income in zlotys)										
		5000 and less	5001- 6000	6001- 7000	7001- 8000	8001- 9000	9001- 10000	10001- 11000	11001- 12000	12001- 14000	14001- and more	
Employee families												
Expenditures	zł	1247	588	749	854	958	1061	1267	1346	1540	1688	2200
	%	15.5	12.5	13.9	14.2	14.4	14.6	15.8	15.8	16.4	16.8	16.3
including food	zł	660	363	441	498	531	596	676	732	768	855	1044
	%	18.3	14.2	15.7	16.5	16.4	17.4	18.7	19.1	19.1	19.8	20.9
Worker-peasant families												
Expenditures	zł	986	488	667	834	778	845	997	938	1083	1373	1616
	%	16.7	13.9	16.2	17.8	15.9	16.3	16.8	14.9	15.8	18.2	17.7
including food	zł	386	237	342	319	327	320	412	405	430	494	544
	%	19.3	15.6	20.2	18.0	17.6	17.2	20.1	19.4	19.7	20.9	21.9
Peasant families												
Expenditures	zł	1265	787	795	674	1062	1116	1225	1478	1892	1965	2016
	%	20.1	18.2	17.5	15.8	19.3	20.4	20.0	21.5	23.5	24.6	20.3
including food	zł	437	364	377	325	356	455	438	536	550	502	527
	%	23.8	24.0	23.5	20.1	22.3	25.1	24.6	27.3	25.9	26.6	22.6
Retired persons												
Expenditures	zł	1221	658	908	983	1242	1347	1483	1662	1880	1865	2355
	%	16.4	13.7	15.0	15.1	16.8	17.2	17.1	18.3	18.7	17.5	17.2
including food	zł	755	419	589	685	834	825	893	923	992	1061	1187
	%	19.0	15.2	16.9	18.3	20.2	19.7	19.9	20.6	20.7	21.4	21.6

Table 2. The percentage of monthly spending per capita in private businesses out of total expenditures for a given item or group of needs

Specification	Households											
	Employee			Worker-peasant			Peasant			Retired persons		
	total	income group		total	income group		total	income group		total	income group	
		A	B		A	B		A	B		A	B
Food	660	363	1044	386	237	544	437	384	527	755	439	1187
including:	18.3	14.2	20.9	19.3	15.6	21.9	23.8	24.0	22.6	19.0	15.2	21.1
baked goods	26	15	38	16	9	17	10	13	8	33	23	38
	12.7	8.0	16.5	7.0	4.5	6.5	4.5	6.5	3.0	13.0	10.1	14.9
mill products and grain	1	1	1	4	1	6	4	5	6	4	1	6
potatoes	1.8	2.0	1.6	6.6	1.8	9.0	6.6	8.2	8.7	4.8	1.4	7.0
vegetables and mushrooms	43	31	52	3	3	5	1	1	4	74	46	80
fruits and canned fruits	38.9	34.4	35.3	60.0	75.0	83.3	30.0	100.0	100.0	59.7	59.7	58.4
meat, poultry, meat products	121	74	179	60	35	81	61	50	84	135	82	20
	51.1	49.7	51.0	52.6	48.6	57.0	58.7	58.8	56.4	49.8	48.3	52
fats	90	45	124	27	17	33	24	23	32	85	45	139
dairy products and eggs	43.0	38.5	44.1	32.9	26.6	34.7	32.9	33.3	34.0	38.3	34.1	41.2
sugar, honey and confectioneries	165	70	298	182	119	254	243	223	255	194	97	355
	13.1	8.0	17.0	26.7	24.3	30.2	43.8	43.6	40.2	15.1	10.0	19.8
restaurants	8	4	12	15	10	26	23	20	25	15	9	15
alcoholic beverages	2.5	1.5	3.2	6.9	5.4	9.8	17.0	17.7	13.7	4.2	3.0	3.8
shoes and clothing	77	57	97	18	13	24	8	8	8	95	68	116
housing	17.0	16.8	16.4	16.5	14.9	17.5	10.4	11.9	7.6	16.1	16.0	16.3
fuel, electricity and heat	20	9	35	14	6	22	17	10	34	20	9	40
personal hygiene and health care	7.8	4.2	11.4	6.3	3.1	8.7	7.1	4.7	11.5	8.0	4.4	11.9
culture, education, sports, tourism, etc.	12	2	27	1	2	4	3	3	4	12	6	12
transportation	11.2	5.1	12.4	3.4	11.8	8.7	10.0	5.6	6.3	21.1	25.0	4.4
	0.7	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.9	0.8
	216	82	410	240	116	376	251	142	413	147	81	314
	19.5	14.2	22.3	21.8	17.7	23.4	23.1	19.1	24.6	18.9	16.2	20.1
	136	55	235	190	78	310	387	152	681	125	40	292
	14.4	11.7	14.0	18.5	17.7	16.3	29.3	23.6	27.1	17.0	11.2	19.4
	3	2	3	5	—	18	4	2	1	13	8	16
	1.4	1.4	1.0	2.8	—	0.1	1.6	1.1	0.3	3.3	3.2	3.5
	43	17	77	24	15	32	28	19	32	51	27	132
	17.5	12.7	19.0	16.2	13.8	15.2	18.2	16.4	15.5	19.7	17.5	27.7
	128	53	271	69	31	158	73	51	138	88	39	187
	17.8	16.9	18.1	19.2	16.3	26.1	22.6	25.6	24.8	21.1	18.5	17.5
	15	9	28	12	7	19	14	8	20	10	10	31
	15.0	15.3	17.5	14.1	13.0	16.5	18.9	12.5	22.2	16.7	16.7	18.7

Note: Average income per person: A -- 5000 zlotys and less; B -- 14,0001 zlotys and more.

12261

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POLITICS

ALBANIA

# DIFFICULTIES IN EDUCATING YOUTH EXAMINED

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albania 24 May 86 pp 3, 4

[Article by Prof Hamit Beqja: "The Dialectic of Educating Youth and the Overcoming of Its Contradictions"]

[Text] In his speech before the students and teachers of the "Alexander Xhuvani" Higher Institute of Pedagogy in Elbasan, Comrade Ramiz Alia again paused on the problem of the communist education of the young generation and especially on its present aspect and the tasks which face us in this field. He evaluated highly the illustrious role of youth in the whole life of our country by strongly emphasizing the fact that it has been launched and is launched in fire in order to execute every instruction of the party.

As the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha have continually stressed, marvelous qualities and virtues are strikingly apparent in our young people. Politically, they are as closely connected as "flesh and nails" with the party and with the cause of socialism. Ideologically, they are molded by the invigorating teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Their cultural and scientific horizon and their professional knowledge are constantly increasing. At the same time, they are distinguished by the purity of their moral image and by their healthy tastes. They have developed physically and are trained with tenacity to defend their socialist fatherland.

Our young generation has been and is distinguished by its revolutionary, courageous and assault spirit. Youth has been and is at the forefront of the great revolutionary actions and movements of the times. In fact, it has been transformed and operates as a revolutionizing, stimulating and striking force on the level of the whole society.

But we must never forget that the young generation is always in immediate formation. It is a process which will always have its difficulties of growth, its shortcomings in terms of its objective basis and even definite contradictions, not to mention the subjective weaknesses of our educational work. All these cannot be viewed in a static manner. They have a dynamic character and are closely connected with the progress of our society on the road of socialism. Let us not forget what Comrade Enver Hoxha said:



"...We must always view and understand our youth in the context of its vigorous development. This development is accompanied by difficulties in growth and by contradictions." Comrade Ramiz Alia treats the reality of these problems and their development not only in terms of the present, but in terms of the future as well.

Today, a tendency is seen among us toward an ever broader mass schooling of youth. At this time, approximately two thirds of the pupils who complete the 8-year school go to secondary schools. This is true not only in the city, where this phenomenon is much more massive, but on a continually increasing scale in the villages as well. This is a very progressive phenomenon, characteristic of a truly socialist country which makes people's education available to all the masses and develops at an extraordinarily rapid rate to high levels.

We cannot avoid pointing out the socialist spirit of our schools. By studying in school, our youth receives a universal, concentrated and systematic communist education. The great action of further revolutionizing the school has made and is making the value of this education more fruitful every day. In our socialist schools, the young generation is armed with the bases of the Marxist-Leninist world-view and with the rudiments of education for work and inclusion in revolutionary practice; it has a rational knowledge, appropriate to its age, of the essence of national and world cultural and scientific values of both the past and the present; it is tempered physically, begins to be trained militarily, and begins to find its way to the blossoming of its abilities and talents: to put it briefly, the development of its whole personality is in a state of growth. On this path, our young people are strengthened every day to prepare for becoming a new and skilled work force for all sectors of the life of our country, including the economy and culture, as well as in terms of preliminary training needed to be ready to defend the socialist fatherland. All these achievements and goals make it much clearer that this long, systematic schooling, as well as prospects for further qualitative expansion and a further raising of its qualitative level is a victory not only for our youth, but for the whole country.

But as Comrade Ramiz Alia emphasizes again, we cannot forget that there are also objective and subjective shortcomings and weaknesses in this long and systematic schooling. In more precise terms, this schooling still lacks links of the required level and the required quality between instruction and educational activity and social work and practice, revolutionary tempering in the school of life, in the bosom of the working masses. At the same time, we cannot for a moment forget the appeal that Lenin directed to youth: "Only by working and living together with the workers and peasants can you become true communists."

We must emphasize that while being educated at length, our boys and girls also feel to a greater extent the "educational" tutelage of their parents and teachers. We know and see that this conservative and outmoded method of education is still alive and even has a great deal of strength. It is well

known that in our schools, pupils, and students receive specific doses of productive work and vocational practice. This is good. From time to time, various actions are developed: constructive work and socially useful activities of an ideological and cultural nature, although these are not as systematic. At the moment, perhaps, possibilities still do not exist in our schools for these activities to be increased in time. But we must persevere in their development with the necessary productivity and quality, so that they may yield the maximum effect.

At the same time, there is a wide field for multifaceted and varied educational activity with the masses of youth--not only the pupils and students, but also the workers and peasants who also, as a rule, have come from school rooms and have a need not only for revolutionary tempering through work, but also for a universal and systematic educational influence of a communist nature.

But this is not the only contradiction we encounter in our present educational work with youth. However important and negative it may be, there are other contradictions, which--although they may seem "smaller"--are more complicated and of great weight. They, too, are engendered in the well of our socialist progress, as transitory difficulties of growth and as phenomena which accompany this progress. Our task is to recognize them and confront them in the most skilled manner possible.

In his speech in Elbasan, Comrade Ramiz Alia pointed out the changes and vigorous transformations which our socialist life is undergoing and which are reflected positively in the life of youth. He specifically mentioned the transition from the old to the new which has begun and is continuing to become deeper in the areas of people's manner of life, thinking and psychology, their traditions and customs, tastes, behavior, education, etc. In this regard, youth has always been a progressive and revolutionary force which has been guided by the new and which has seized it more rapidly after having been liberated from the burden of outmoded prejudices which have vanished with time and which had become an obstacle to the full emancipation of the new man and for the full flourishing of his personality.

But this development is accomplished by struggling on two fronts. On the one hand, conservative and patriarchal attitudes are still strong. The old customs have a terrible force. They often cling to people like burrs. Since they are the victims and even the slaves of these customs, many conservative forces hinder young people from entering life equipped with the principles and norms of socialist life, communist ethics and new socialist customs which are present in the beginning as they are beginning their formation. In a particular family and school environment, even a micro-social one, where these phenomena are stronger and more virulent, they cause an evident torpidness in the revolutionary vigor of youth, in its courageous innovative spirit and in its struggle to search for and affirm the new, the progressive and the revolutionary.

But this is only one side of the coin. We cannot also look at its other side. It is well known that the youth, to a perceptible degree, lacks experience of life and revolutionary tempering in its school, but not through its own fault. It has still not received it. We have still not helped youth to receive it properly. The phenomenon is in development, fermenting. Under these circumstances, one cannot rule out the fact that especially in these delicate areas under discussion not all young men and women can always be orientated both correctly and rapidly to cling to the new which is really such, which represents a truly healthy and progressive phenomenon and tendency. It certainly can not be ruled out that some of them may be duped by some sort of "counterfeit coin," by some sort of external false but blazing splendor. This is especially true in matters of clothing, fashion, attraction to some types of degenerate music, etc. We cannot for a moment forget that there is a vertiginous opium which now penetrates in various ways, especially through the powerful means of modern, social and cultural information and those of massive propaganda, and which attempt to transmit the poisonous influence of bourgeois and revisionist ideology.

Today, these developments with contradictory elements find more fertile soil in the environment of city youth, among both students and workers. But this does not mean that village youth has been or will be immunized against them. Since there, too, new progressive and revolutionary developments continue to penetrate ever more vigorously, they will, without fail, be accompanied by transitory difficulties of birth and growth.

As Comrade Ramiz emphasizes, much skilled work with youth needs to be carried out in the area of these problems. This is true not only with regard to youth in school, but with regard to all its strata. This work must be distinguished by the strength of its reasoning on questions and especially on our Marxist-Leninist attitudes, which must be linked to real problems of life and of the day, as well as by the spirit of free discussion and debate, which we face with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and the party, as well as with vital and convincing arguments and facts regarding all the problems which arise in life and in our new, present-day social developments.

The party has taught us continually that in educational work with the masses, and especially with youth, we must refrain from using administrative methods, particularly administration measures. Administration methods, and especially, measures--can be used only in exceptional cases when all other means of educational influence have been exhausted and for special elements who appear to be dangerous to society. It may seem that the administrative method solves everything, but this is a mistake, especially in relations with young people who are sensitive and impressionable or whose self-respect has been injured or who have "a mind of their own." It is possible that the "wound" may be suppressed inside, but not cleansed, and it can break open later even more strongly and with even more virulence. Then, long live the administrative methods!

In the treatment he gives to the problems of youth, Comrade Ramiz Alia shows us clearly that the party views them through the dialectical prism, monitoring their new developments and launching us into the struggle to confront, courageously and wisely, the new problems which arise from them.

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POLITICS

ALBANIA

SHEHU, OTHER 'INTERNAL ENEMIES OF PARTY' CONDEMNED

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 28 Jun 86 p 3

[Article by Prof Sotir Manushi: "The Conference Which Tempered Further the Unity of Our Party"]

[Text] Among the events in the glorious epic of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Struggle, an honorable place is occupied by the Extraordinary Conference of the PKSH [Albanian Communist Party]. It took place 44 years ago, on 28-29 June 1942, in Tirana, and constituted a vitally important moment in our party's struggle always to maintain its tempered political, ideological, and organizational unity.

The calling of this conference was not fortuitous. On the contrary, it was the logical result of the thorough and mature analysis which the party, with Comrade Enver Hoxha at its head, made of events and circumstances, and of the irrefutable conclusion that the factionalist current of A. Lulo and S. Premte, which had been created in the ranks of the party, "had to be given a strong and immediate blow, because, if the poison had been permitted to penetrate further, it would have totally destroyed the whole body of our new party." The conference placed concentration on this issue: "The annihilation of the factionalist activities," in order to strengthen the party and its unity. The progress of the conference was helped greatly by the detailed report of Comrade Enver Hoxha, on how the decisions of the First Council of the Party Aktiv of April 1942 had been executed up to that time, and the denunciation he had made of the factionalist activities of A. Lulo and S. Premte and their comrades. On this basis, the conference stressed that "our opinion and attitude must be the same in both political work and the organizational itself," thereby characterizing the unity and oneness of revolutionary thought and action as a major factor so that the party might best accomplish the mission which it had set for itself. In his book, "Kur Lindi Partia (Kujtime)" [When the Party Was Born (Memoirs)]. Comrade Enver Hoxha has emphasized that "The work of the Extraordinary Conference demonstrated the maturity of the party in situations, events and in its work and struggle. This conference proved that the party would not tolerate and would mercilessly combat any liquidating and factionalist activity in its bosom, just as it would mercilessly combat the enemies of the people."

Only a few days after the close of the Extraordinary Conference and as a consequence of it, at the beginning of July 19842, a special meeting of the party Central Committee was organized, where it was decided that A. Lulo and S. Premte should be expelled from the party for an indefinite time. This decision found full approval throughout the country and served to temper further the ranks of the party and sharpen the unceasing revolutionary vigilance of the communists, as well as to instill more vigor into the internal life of the party.

Some 44 years have passed since the Extraordinary Conference of the Communist Party of Albania took place. Evaluating it and its historic decisions from the height to which we have ascended today, there can be no denial of the correctness of our party's Marxist-Leninist line and the unparalleled consistency with which it has struggled for the multifaceted tempering of its unity, which is its distinguishing characteristic and which has given the party the possibility always to ensure its leading role in a full and effective manner.

After the Extraordinary Conference, as well, the history of our party was distinguished by other important events which powerfully influenced the strengthening of the unity of its ranks. Let us recall here the destruction by the party, with Comrade Enver Hoxha at its head, of the "Zjarri" [Fire] group, of the anti-party faction in Vlore, its implacable struggle against opportunist elements and, particularly, against Tito's envoys, who were infamously intriguing in Berat with Koci Xoxe, etc. to strike our party straight in its heart. But all these malicious efforts by internal and external enemies had one conclusion: foul failure, because our party's heart is made of steel and the assaults of enemies do not budge it.

The monolithic unity of the party and its unity with the people were particularly striking when modern revisionism manifested itself and spread in the international communist and workers' movement. In the sharp, tooth and nail struggle with the revisionist treachery, our party unceasingly preserved and tempered its combative unity and further strengthened its character as a Marxist-Leninist party of the new type. The example of our party attested clearly and strongly to the particular correctness of its line of not permitting the introduction into the party of opposing ideologies and the existence of two or more lines. As Comrade Enver Hoxha has emphasized, our party has never set anything above itself except ever-victorious Marxism-Leninism.

Along with ideological unity, our party has devoted and continues to devote special attention to the tempering of its organizational unity as well. Within this framework, and also on the basis of a scientific Marxist-Leninist analysis of the causes which led to the revisionist degeneration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other parties, it has worked out and executed a range of important measures, beginning with the application of the soundest and most studied policy possible connected with party membership, in order to ensure a high quality proletarian class composition

for its ranks, together with strong organization and responsible discipline, as well as the struggle never to permit the spirit of grouping, factionalism and intrigue to find a place in our party. Our party was founded, grew, developed and was consolidated as a party of tempered Marxist-Leninist ideological, political, and organizational unity. In the face of this principled and militant unity, the furious assaults of the Titoites, the Khrushchevites, and other revisionists failed in infamy and became dust and ashes. Against its steel "walls" all the internal enemies of the party have broken and will break their heads--from Anastas Lulo and Sadik Premte to the dangerous gang of the multiple agent Mehmet Shehu. The experience of our party in unceasingly strengthening and tempering the unity of its ranks constitutes a valuable contribution to Marxist-Leninist doctrine for the party.

The true and solid unity of the party has not been given once and for all. It is continually maintained and strengthened only by struggling with contradictions in the bosom of the party, by debate, by principled criticism and self-criticism, and by executing fully the line, decisions, directives, principles, and norms of the party. Unity in the party is not "the unity of comrades," which has at its foundation reciprocal compromises with respect to faults and errors, but a unity achieved by discrimination, discussion, examination, and leveling of contradictory opinions. It is not a gimatic unity, but a unity of revolutionary thought and action. This was emphasized yet again at the 13th and 14th plenums of the AWP Central Committee. At the 14th plenum of the AWP Central Committee, Comrade Enver Hoxha stressed, "...The greater the economic and social tasks of the country are, the more difficult and complex the questions which must be resolved are, the more important becomes the role of the party organs and organizations and that of all communists." From this standpoint, the struggle to resolve the problems set by the present stage of our country's development must always be accompanied by the strengthening of the ideological, political, and organizational unity of the party. This purpose is being served by the new elections in the party, which have entered an important phase. Aside from the fact that they have a strong influence on the tempering and unity of the party, they have been, at the same time, a brilliant manifestation of that unity. This year, the elections coincide with the glorious 45th anniversary of the foundation of the party and its 9th congress, two memorable events, toward which our party is proceeding with ranks closed strongly around its Central Committee, with Comrade Ramiz Alia at the head, holding aloft--as ever--the red flag of victories.

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POLITICS

ALBANIA

# LACK OF LITERARY CRITICISM FROM INSTITUTE OF LITERATURE

Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 27 Jul 86 p 3

[Article by Thimi Nika, Alban Tomori: "Why Do Our Comrades of the Institute of Literature not Involve Themselves in the Literary Criticism of the Day?"]

[Text] To the question posed in the title of this article, the deputy director of the institute, Professor Koco Bihiku, replied: "We are obliged to study the history of Albanian literature of socialist realism. In this framework we have divided the sector of 11 persons into two groups: the first, with three persons, studies preliberation Albanian literature, and the second, with eight persons, that of postliberation." And it is a fact that within the subject matter considered by them, the workers of the literature sector have given their assistance in the study of certain literary theory issues, they have published or they have outlined and are preparing for publication certain monographs on different aspects of the history of current Albanian literature such as: "Albanian Poems of Socialist Realism," "The Typical and Typification in Literature," "The Albanian Novel of Socialist Realism on the Antifascist National-liberation War," "On the National Character of Literature," "The Place and Importance of Humor and Satire in the Albanian Literature of Socialist Realism."

Even from only a backward glance at the subject matter of the last few years a problem clearly appears: there is no direct relation between the literary theory issues of our old and new tradition and those of the day, which are currently a matter of concern for literary creativity and especially literary criticism. From this viewpoint in general the scholars of the literature sector stay enclosed in the "castle" of a traditionalism, we could say crystallized, from which there is no escape. It does not seem normal to us that after the party, last year, drew attention more than once to the priority treatment and to the involvement of literary criticism in creativity, in the study material of the institute precisely 1 year later, 1986, studies like the following are scheduled: "The Novel and Satirical Tales in the Albanian Literature of Socialist Realism," "Lyric Poetry in the Years 1970-1980," "On the Artistic Language in the Novel 'Dimri i madh' (Severe Winter)," and others. Naturally the themes are worthwhile, but for goodness' sake, one thing is a fact: the poetics of the Albanian novel or the lyric poetry of the year 1970-1980 and the other themes may and must

have been studied some years earlier, just as they can also be studied some years later. Seen from this angle the works of this institute cannot be called "current." From this institute according to the most mature opinions one has the right, be it even because of so long an experience, to require both regularity and productivity and higher quality.

From the reply given at the beginning of these lines: "We are obliged to study the Albanian literature of socialist realism," we cannot help posing the question: But literary criticism, is that not possibly a functional part and duty of this institute?

Certainly the comrades of the institute understand very well that the concept "literary criticism" does not imply simply and only criticism and reproach, but a comprehensive evaluation, otherwise the problems would be oversimplified. But as noted in practice and as the party has correctly drawn attention, it is the duty of true scientific literary criticism to bar the way to that kind of literary criticism which consists principally of undeserved praise, and which going to the other extreme loses itself and oversimplifies the notion of "literary criticism."

Inasmuch as, scientifically, the problem is like this, why is the scale of their involvement in print so small, and not only quantitatively? Altogether rare guests in the pages of the press with critical articles are the signatures of Dilaver Dilaver, Enver Muhamet, Spiro Gjoni, and certain others. But even of the professor himself Koco Bihiku when it is not simply a matter of the treatment of literary theory or of the history of literature, but of direct involvement with literary criticism, especially with criticisms and rebukes, when it is a matter of the attitude toward quality or of some work which demands such a thing.

Naturally, mentioning the name of one or another of the comrades of this institute, it is not a matter simply of the name or of one more article, but of an entire concept in the institute which practically excludes literary criticism and which is mistaken. "Nobody thinks of us as a scholarly operation," "We have a lot of work and cannot take time to concern ourselves with literary criticism," etc. From this reply which you hear in the institute you easily understand one thing. That it is not recognized as an assignment is certainly wrong, because it is a genuine scholarly work (certainly when it is done well), and therefore it must be planned.

But another problem emerges here. In the literary and other press dozens and hundreds of critical articles are published; and, while the signatures of institute workers should be in the majority because of their ideoprofessional competence, the opposite has happened. Indeed it may be said confidently that from the viewpoint of following the present situation in literary criticism, except in only a few cases, nobody knows their names, even at a time when the writings must be and should be models of the theory, of the history of literature, as well as of literary criticism, which is today an imperative duty. Comrade Enver Hoxha sometimes, indeed in one entire volume "On Literature and Art," along with assigning a true abundance of tasks for literature and art and the persons who work at them, has often



criticized literary criticisms critics, principally, in regard to current problems which have disturbed and disturb literary creativity. In the same way Comrade Ramiz Alia, if we remember only the speech given to the Korce authors, emphasized that "True art is that which keeps step with the pre-occupations of the people."

Certainly it is a duty of all our scholars and authors to respond always and better to this demand of the party. But it is a truth, likewise, traditional and familiar, that literary criticism must not only stimulate but especially must guide literary phenomena. It seems to us that we do not exaggerate if we say first of all that the workers of this institute who are specialized in these problems should be responsible for this requirement. Unfortunately this has not happened. Editors, journalists, or workers of other political and social sciences in situations have become involved in this task much more than our more distinguished writers. The critical articles in the press witness to this in the first place, likewise the books in the special collections of critical writings, like those of Ismail Kadare, Dritero Agolli, Dhimitri S. Shuteriqi, etc. Expressed or unexpressed, there exists among scholars of the literature sector the erroneous concept of the "distancing in time": "Let time judge the work first, afterwards we'll judge it." This spoken softly, means "I will help you, but not when you need it, rather when I want to." Let the workers of this sector study the creativity of recent decades to offer evidence of its values and deficiencies, but first of all, we think that it is necessary to bear well in mind the party instruction about the involvement of literary criticism with more recent creations, sensing this as a political need, as an essential for getting in position quickly and for hitting the bull's eye immediately. In this way creativity is guided more readily and more effectively.

A parenthesis: In the institute they claim that certain publications are not always predisposed to publish their writings. Without denying occasional negligence of some editorial staff, there is a law known in the press which springs from its very nature: the good article with scientific claims, courageous, as expressed in the language of the press workers, "goes to the printshop by itself, without asking editors and responsible persons." But this obstacle, as was emphasized, is easily overcome, because it is the party which orients and encourages both literary creativity as well as the true militant criticism.

Therefore, we do not think that the cause of the noninvolvement of the comrades of the institute in literary criticism is to be sought in the publishers, but first of all, in their involvement as a citizen and a militant in the problems and literary creativity which pass daily before our eyes and which we must not simply contemplate today in order to deal with them next year.

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POLITICS

HUNGARY

POLITICAL DILEMMA OF POST-1956 GENERATION DESCRIBED

Budapest VALOSAG in Hungarian No 5, 1986 pp 74-81

[Article by Magdolna Balazs, post-doctoral fellow at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences : "A Confession of Sorts About the Generation Born During the Consolidation"]

[Text] What is it that I would like to put down on paper? Why do I feel the need--primarily by clarifying my own situation and the existing conditions, and by stating potential generational traits--to inspire others of my generation to face themselves and to take a stand in the given situation? I believe and sense that there is a latent but quite strong predisposition to do this among the politically receptive members of the post-1956 generation. After all, the process and the political and economic conditions surrounding our birth, our childhood and our maturation is discernibly different (especially to us) from those of the previous generations. It is probable, even if it is difficult to prove, that a larger segment of this generation than of earlier ones is apolitical, even anti-political. Our reasoning, thinking and mentality are primarily or exclusively determined by economic rationality, and political reasons guide and control only some of us, and only in a secondary sense. The reasons for this phenomenon are multifold. On the one hand, one can mention the general tendency, according to which active participation in politics and in public policymaking has always been limited to a minority. On the other hand, the material difficulties of starting a career and the conditions for acquiring a dwelling place (which are in no way improving) compel people currently in their twenties to orient themselves toward the theory and practice of earning money. Thirdly, by becoming more developed, complex and inscrutable (not only in our country, but worldwide) the leadership hierarchy at first glance has little to offer the changing, reshaping ambitions of youth. As it has been always and everywhere, my generation, those who were born after 1957, consists of varying elements. Still, every group should have a definite and emphatically conscious relationship with the prevailing hierarchy, the situation of their world, and their concrete environment. I can only present problems experienced by a thin (though characteristic) layer of society, members of which feel a need to participate in public and political life. Thus, I am not striving to "establish a new generation," to describe its nature, its problems, its intentions or its ideology. For one thing, I am not even sure that people of my age make up a generation or will do so in the future. We only guess that

our political intentions are similar and that our problems have shared causes. We do not even know if anything has happened or will happen that makes us a generation, that gives us shared experiences. Nor am I certain that it would contribute to the cause of developing socialism if some such "great events" were to take place.

Perhaps our share is a latent movement, noticed by no one, yet still present and taking ineradicable root. Perhaps the reform movement, which we hope to be a lasting one, created or will create new types of organizational forms which the leadership will be able to tolerate. Though one thing appears certain: our intentions, motivations and approaches differ significantly from those held by the previous one or two politically oriented generations. I sense a change, a break, primarily in public life, but also in our general attitudes concerning life. The thought occurred to me that a new generation or age-group may answer the same questions in a partly or entirely different manner than their predecessors. This is what I would like to express and turn over in my mind, hoping this to be the first step toward finding and shaping new forms of activity.

#### Critical View and/or Functionalism

Several contemporary sociological surveys have shown, and several analysts, sensitive to issues in public life, have mentioned that the young of today have a less absolutistic idea of having a critical view than do members of previous generations. For them legitimacy is not a requisite--and certainly not an exclusive--issue, and most especially not in the normative sense of the word. Approaching the term in this sense makes possible a critical view and a revelational approach. I do not, I cannot think that such a critical attitude ceased to exist among members of my generation; I merely had to face the fact that legitimacy is a qualitative category, and as such, it is difficult to measure. And also that the present system satisfies and suits--even if not all--a great variety of demands. Individual institutions, at least most of them, have their own requisite functions, and it is a basic task to examine, or at least acknowledge these. From this point of view, it seems that it is possible and perhaps worthwhile to use varying methods in approaching the norms and values of legitimacy. I believe that the political structure in today's Hungary is articulated enough to allow people to influence it rather than simply guarding and emphasizing the normative point of view. Therefore, we must recognize and attempt to realize the combining of critical-normative and functional-analytic approaches, which, instinctively or consciously, are increasingly present.

#### Permanently Between Two Chairs On the Floor

Of course, in our current political and public life the above-described approach always relegates its object to a secondary position. Therefore, the two political cultures representing the extremes which excluded and continue to exclude most people are obviously worthy of examination. And even if this "between-the-two-chairs" situation has always resulted in political failure during Hungary's recent history, it should be noted that a demand for this type of thinking and attitude continues to be present. As for my own generation, here and now, I sense that such a demand is growing.

One of our "chairs" is the state itself, together with its party and institutional system, its /de jure/ and /de facto/ operational mechanism and regulatory network. Our primary objection to it is not due to its bureaucratism and its occasional alienation, nor its developed centralism, its smoothly working ability to integrate people, or the exclusivity of its decisions. Rather, we object to the fact that its structure is not suitably articulated, at times slowing down and occasionally stopping efforts toward democratization. This in spite of the fact that the articulated nature of interests in our society and the creation and operation of suitable representative systems have already been repeatedly declared. The intention of the central organs to make the institutions more receptive is also evident, and the realization of this intention is already in its first stages. Still, why is this not good for us? Why are we afraid to become involved in the process of democratization, so fervently desired and so long awaited, about which we know that--in this political structure and under the existing system of institutions--it can be reached only gradually? And even if we become involved, why do we desert it so quickly, cursing the official institutions and the times when we expected anything from them and trusted their usefulness?

It is not pleasant to suffer the cynical smiles coming from the direction of the other "chair," from the side of the populist and/or civil rights dissidents, who foresaw and foretold all of the above consequences. To hear their analyses, based on great experience, concerning the complete, almost naive, impossibility of our intentions and efforts, and the peculiarities of a "totalitarian East-Central European authority system." This opposition is our other "chair," a complement and political product of every East European structure. During the 1970s, when they first organized themselves, these groups demanded, and in part continue to demand, representative democracy modeled on the Western examples and freedoms that are in fact missing, or are limited, in this part of Europe. And since these values are missing from actual political practice, they oppose it and, trusting in the power of confrontation, carry on their critical-revealing activities, making comparisons between the two political structures and emphasizing the neuralgic aspects of East European life. I have no doubt that this attitude was relevant at one time. In my view, however, our relationship to reality, the totality of political structure, has already changed somewhat. Probably because reality--even if only in traces and germs--gave us reasons to undergo a change, which is also discernible among the few dissident leaders and oppositionist intellectuals. The one-time rigid opposition evolved into differentiated and polarized attitude patterns. Nowadays we can classify the sometime-critics by their willingness to cooperate with the existing system, to think about its development or their rejection of it. On this level, it depends on one's nature, whether one notices the small improvements, possibly even considering them parts of a trend, or claims that in fact nothing happened, the changes are merely technical and serve to mislead the public. Developing and stabilizing a sense of relativity is a crucial question; I consider this an important difference between my generation and their predecessors. In other words, it cannot be said that we fail to see the unsolved important problems, the disturbing phenomena, or that we would not like to see changes in crucial areas. Still, we feel that the policies of the

central organs provide cause for optimism; that there are changes and positive phenomena in Hungary's political and social life, and that the reform of the political structure is not hopeless. Gradual improvement of the social and political atmosphere in post-1956 Hungary convincingly supports our views on this.

Yet, in most cases the people who end up between the two chairs are those who are sensitive to the relative merits of the situation. Both of the other alternatives deserve their own chairs; those who uncritically consider the present situation to be good, substantially unchangeable and not calling for change, as well as those who reject it entirely and believe that it can only be changed through confrontation. I wish to emphasize, however, that when it comes to their political strength and their influence on the shaping of processes, there are differences between these two forces. At the moment, I am merely indicating the existence of the two dominant political cultures, describing their characteristics, and stating that many people do not wish to occupy either of these two "chairs." They shy away from the "chair" of state institutions, because the dictatorial practices of earlier times implanted a lasting distrust in us. At the same time, even though the reforming intentions of the central organs is undeniable, we also see that efforts are frequently stopped at the middle and lower levels, or at least they lose their original content. We worry, and we have cause to do so, that as parts of the state machine, we will not recognize the point at which we still have some of our original intentions, before we lose it all in the process of realization. Naturally, in the course of implementation every intent loses some of its original, pure value. Still, if one looks at the system of structure and mechanism that--regardless of the center's current intentions--evokes suspicion and presents a schism between the higher, middle and lower levels of its functionaries, one hesitates to make the first steps toward joining it.

Nor are we attracted by the "chair" offered by the dissidents. Not because we are comfortable or lazy, as many claim, but because increasingly more among us realize that the authority structure is not as rigid and closed as to reject all negotiation and communication, leaving only the method of all-out confrontation. We are justified in thinking that there are small openings which could be enlarged gradually. In order to do this, however, we must communicate, negotiate, in other words, participate in the political process. Of course, some of these small openings are the results of earlier pressure from the dissidents; thus, there can be little doubt about the relative usefulness of these groups or about the justification for their existence. It must also be realized, however, that the articulation and democratization of the authority structure can only be initiated by the central organs, even if the stimulant for such changes is their desire to prevent crises.

Rejecting extreme confrontation, and the resulting political isolation, is also a matter of principle. Private individuals are justified to exhibit such a behavior pattern in relation to all existing state and institutional structures. However, the same thing is not justified if a person, or a movement, intends to operate in the political sphere. Those who want to change and improve the current situation must always compromise with the existing institutional system.

Based on the above, it may seem that those who reject these two undeniably adequate patterns of political behavior and refuse or are unable to participate in them, are relegated to a position between the two chairs. In my view, this is not the case. The existing structure is able to accommodate an approach that strives to develop a not exactly positive value system, but rather a practice that has the potential to realize values: one that would like to integrate theoretical democratic values with the functional approach and practical political mechanisms of authority; one that would like to be simultaneously pro-government and oppositionist in nature. In a small country, which--in the interest of its development--was always compelled to be pragmatic and tough at the same time, the birth of such an attitude is perhaps not unreasonable. The deeply rooted possibilities for it have been created by our traditions and heritage.

#### Traditions Do Not Limit Our Thinking, Only Our Opportunities

I mentioned earlier that our generation tends to be more pragmatic in its approach than earlier critical outsiders have been. The dissidents of the early 1970s, including some students of Lukacs, were historians of philosophy by vocation, while the second wave of dissidents are sociologists, or at least produce writings with a sociological bent in criticizing the system. They were followed by the aestheticians and critics who, because of hurt pride or in order to preserve the purity of their souls and personalities, never became involved in official politics; what is more, they thoroughly despise it. Perhaps we are not mistaken about the dissidents when we detect signs of theoretical loosening in their intellectual pursuits and the extent and character of their efforts. History of philosophy is definitely an exact social science, sociology is somewhat more pragmatic, while aesthetics is an elusive field that allows intimations. It appears to me that not many from my age group progress along this line. In spite of their diplomas, many of them do not participate in what has traditionally been considered intellectual activity. The Prussian type of scholar and the dissident academic both seem to be heading for extinction. The activity of politically sensitive people from my generation, as well as that of the social scientists--who are never free from the influence of politics--appears to be much more pragmatic, at times workmanlike and less ideological than the work of their predecessors. No great theories, proving that socialism is un-realizable and untenable are born. Nor do we see works analyzing the makeup and operation of the authority structure, though an essay concerning the last item does appear occasionally. The conceptual dominance of the center's politics has been dropped and made more pragmatic, but this has influenced the thinking and activities of the generation of the consolidation only to a minor degree. This pragmatism, this innocent approach, untouched by the burdens of the past, formed within us a strong drive, indeed a sense of justification, to destroy the myths of past and present. Our pragmatism motivated, and continues to motivate, us in this direction, although in the arena of concrete deeds we are compelled to acknowledge the limiting force of myths from past and present. As consequences of actual deeds, and especially of their results, we had to recognize the tremendous integrative force of the two basic traditional forms in political life: the fact that both would like to co-opt the values contained in the "Third Road" attitude and the combined existence and potency of critical and functional approaches, for their own purposes. Also, that



both oppose the political strengthening and institutionalization of a "Third Road" attitude. After all, that would trespass against the privileges held by the makers of policies, and those who are able to directly relate to those policies. Thus, the "Third Road" attitude will not be allowed to organize into a movement for a long time; but perhaps this is not one of its aims. Rather, it could be an intellectual striving, a political behavior- and thinking-pattern, whose right to exist and utility we would like to have recognized. Because this is the way our social reality is: it is not to be rejected out of hand, at times it even appears promising, but it is still a long way from being good. And perhaps also because our mental characteristics also differ from those of earlier generations.

#### Inability To Identify and Ability To Tolerate

Our inability to identify is not universally applicable; it applies to the propaganda activities of the two political cultures, the operational mechanism of their institutions and occasionally their aims. We frequently find ourselves unable to identify with official propaganda, although in recent times it has become more subtle and refined. Of course, it can be added here that only a few of the institutions (the press, television and radio) are professionally involved in propaganda activities, and even in these areas there are smaller and greater opportunities for subtly stating one's opinions or taking a critical stance. Why do we not make greater use of these opportunities or the ones offered by institutions relatively free of one-sided ideological limitations? Because we are afraid of the power of these institutions to repress persons, human values, individuality and individual character, and of their operational mechanism which threatens refinement, honesty and natural behavior. Also because we worry about our own individuality, hard-earned personal autonomy and self respect, at a time when only a few of us possess these values. When it comes to the breadth of society, only a few of us have been able to establish an independent and conscious behavior pattern for themselves.

I also consider the propaganda of the dissidents insincere. I suppose that even they are not convinced that their demands for representative bourgeois democracy, the re-establishment of the multi-party system, the introduction of free market-based economy, and the creation of unlimited individual rights are realizable. Still, their legitimacy is derived from proclaiming these principles, comparing them with conditions existing in socialism, and announcing their absence. As for their institutions--although they are not yet very large, and thus are unable to swallow people--their political effectiveness is limited, and their inward-turning nature and artificially swelled sense of importance frequently make them appear petty. In my view it is incorrect to base an attitude and a behavior pattern on the proposition that there have been very good periods in the modern history of Hungary, and some of these were even substantially perfect in their operations, until some people at some time ruined everything. It is worthwhile and necessary for the younger generations also to face the far-from-glorious periods and events, the resulting deeply rooted and imbedded mistakes and mentalities of our history. Only this will lead to the ability to survey the contemporary situation and propose correcting measures realistically.

Still, there can hardly be any doubts that the two political cultures demanding reasons for our inability to identify with them (and criticized for this in the above passages) are justified in their existence and are even occasionally and partially useful. Lacking either exclusive authority or the injured pride derived from being ignored, we are in no position to be intolerant. We are striving to make use (at least for ourselves) of whatever we consider positive and exemplary in either of the two political patterns. A generation growing up with the capacity for tolerance--which might result in being treated more tolerantly by others--offers the means for creating and operating the most progressive political construction permissible in this region.

#### Our Virtual Demands and Virtual Dissatisfaction

At the same time, it is difficult to be patient, difficult to wait for opportunities. In part, this is a generational trait, as man is most dynamic, most ready for action and most virulent between the ages of twenty and thirty. When should one want to change everything, or most things, if not now? When should one feel that one has a chance to do anything, that one can define, shape or at least participate in important processes? After all these are the years when one tries to identify with various matters and phenomena, adopting as many of these as possible. The desire to belong is very strong, and this search for one's place, the seeking of positions from which one can develop a defensible life-strategy, implies active efforts.

On the other hand, beyond these generational traits, there are the historically rooted conditions of Eastern Europe, including the basically and at times elementally unsettled nature of political culture and existential circumstances. Detailing the latter is not within the scope of this essay; I merely wish to refer to my remark at the beginning of this article, according to which many in my generation are prevented from taking part in public activities, because their most basic living conditions are not assured. Naturally, I am talking here about the most basic conditions, not those involved in a chosen exclusive way of life, or a course of acquiring consumer goods, which are also to be found among the youth of today.

The political system of structures and institutions, which is (still) far from being genuinely democratic, but which holds out promises of democratization, presents a great challenge to an ambitious young generation. And this creates the first tense situation, involving the given situation and our virtual demands. The substance of the reform process is that its direction will remain in the hands of the central leadership, who will determine the degree, speed and rhythm of changes. In order to insure continuous progress and in order to safeguard tranquility, naturally, they are very cautious and, most of the time, very slow. They decide to make various changes, but at times they implement this decision cautiously and always very slowly. Of course, things such as speed, the degree or pace of change are relative terms. It is easy to dismiss complaints from young people as signs of generational impatience, due to their desire to change everything overnight. I believe, however, that there is more to this. For one thing, we hear that the older generations are also dissatisfied with the pace of the reforms. On the other hand, we also see how much the exaggerated cautiousness, the slowness, and the envy of the



apparatus (especially at the middle and lower level) have isolated and alienated those of our age group who attempted to make changes within the established structure. As a result, we can refer to those individuals as fortunate, who--primarily because of the strength of their character--have been able to override attempts to isolate and neglect them, and have found situations and activities in which they can realistically evaluate their own abilities and limitations. Every effort should be made to prevent the rise of a new angry generation, whose disenchantment would cause them to over- or underestimate both their own abilities and opportunities, and the traits and possibilities of the political system.

It appears that the solution of political problems in our country is likely to remain an intellectual task, a primary terrain for intellectual efforts. This is caused by the character and basically centralized leadership of the reform process, as well as the continuously great distance and lack of active contact between the central leadership and the rest of the society. As long as this remains unchanged, the schism between our virtual demands and our virtual opportunities will not be bridged. This is why I consider so important the strengthening of bourgeois society, traditionally weak in Eastern Europe, and the firm implantation of various and already burgeoning voluntary activities.

#### Reforms Are Difficult to Implement, Even Though They Are Indispensable

Perhaps I am not greatly mistaken if I consider most of the reforms introduced since 1953 as realized only in part, and if I view them as efforts that do not alter the substance of the existing structure. Any program launched with the intention of reforming the economic leadership mechanism in Eastern Europe also implies intentions to reform the entire political and leadership structure. In today's strongly integrated system tying together global economy and global politics, there are no possibilities for the strict separation of economic and political structures. An exclusively economic reform cannot be initiated, saying that the alteration of political institutions would be started later, when time and circumstances allow. In other words, when the program of economic reforms is launched, we are also talking about the reform of political structure. How the propaganda machinery conveys this "downward" is quite a different issue. Reference to changes in economic factors and global market conditions can always be used to illustrate the necessity of reforms.

However, in a hierarchically constructed system, such as exists in this country, efforts oriented at increasing articulation and creating greater pluralism will threaten the interests of many people. In the economic sphere, any relegation of plan-directive methods and the state-operated sector will conflict with the interests of functionaries working in the state machinery; and, of course, this is not an insignificant group, whether we consider its size or its influence. We are talking about a hierarchy that was established in 1948, has solidified since that time and continues to satisfy many demands. Thus, in my view, the initiating of reforms did not coincide with the consolidation of an anti-reform group within the central leadership. Decentralization--or any change, for that matter--works against the interests of an existing, well-established and influential system of relationships. In

addition, we should not forget that structural changes call for certain material and technical conditions, which are either available or not.

Thus--considering the "substance" and the above-mentioned basis of the political structure--the feelings that our reforms are unfeasible at this time appears justified. Still, the necessity for reforms has been actively discussed for more than twenty years, and economists, sociologists and politicians have thought about and in terms of reforms, indicating the inevitability of reforms and the intentions of higher leadership to introduce them. The improvement of economic conditions in Hungary since 1953, the slow movement of the country toward a market-oriented approach and the similarly slow but noticeable improvement in the mood of society indicate that the unreformability of a socialist system has not been proven yet.

#### Final Remarks Without Final Consequences

I sense that members of my age group tend to differ from people of previous generations. Even the oldest among us are the children of the consolidation. None of us could refer to a revolution as the "great chance that we missed," whether we experienced it either as a child or a university student. Our elementary and formative experiences are tied to uneventful periods, so no matter how slowly things change or how urgent the problems awaiting solutions may be, we do not desire great social upheavals.

The question is justified: In view of the fact that we do not wish to become parts in the political culture and institutional system of either existing extremes, what, if anything, can we still do in order to speed up the positive processes, to solve the problems, to defend the values and life-styles of the citizenry? I do not believe that the answer lies exclusively in organized mass activities. For one thing, such activities occur too infrequently in Eastern Europe to be able to serve as a basis for transformation. Given the nature of the situation here, it is also likely that activities of this type soon run out of breath after their enthusiastic beginnings, and their integration or elimination by the authorities bring extensive damage to the career of their participants. In my opinion, it would be desirable instead to gather people in circles, groups and clubs representing a certain degree of progressivism, while staying away from tasks that are not in their spheres of competence. Through un-spectacular but enduring action, it would be possible to develop a deep stream of social consciousness, which would not immediately become a victim of confrontation in the interest of furthering the career of its leaders or attracting large masses of people. These groups would simply exist, performing useful everyday functions, ready for future action; after all, it is difficult to know when their strength may be needed, when they could be further mobilized. Such clubs or circles could be formed around a political, cultural, or even environmental issue. In addition to contributing to the dissemination of information and the development of community life with their regular meetings and the subsequent debates, they would also share the merit of offering to members of their audiences opportunities for taking possession of the world and their own reality, to form their individual and community approach to the unsolved tasks connected with the political system of their country and the world. Much can result from these--largely intellectual, personal and introspective--struggles. It

is hard to tell when people belonging to such clubs, or even those who only casually visit some of their meetings, may develop a desire to demand or initiate political action. For my part, I do not consider these clubs to be parts of any political movement, only forums or stations where /consciousness of the responsibility for seeking solutions/ can be formed and solidified. These clubs, together with the internal strain and struggle of intellectual activity, could result in the development of stable self-esteem, and even the ability to respond to challenges. It would even be possible to reach what I consider the most optimal situation under the circumstances: one in which the citizenry and the intellectuals would become allies opposed to the professional politicians in discussing concrete issues or processes.

I believe that a political system which aims to operate successfully for a long time must neither alienate people who, while critical of the system, are also looking for solutions, nor put them through the "meat-grinder" of integration; rather, they should be provided the position of partners and should be faced during the discussion of concrete issues. This observation is based on my impressions, according to which the reverse of the "salami-tactics" of the 1950s is being put into effect, co-opting the most valuable elements of the dissident movement to become part of the establishment.

At the moment, my proposal merely indicates the necessary direction of this effort, focusing primarily on emphasizing a change in our activities, in the interest of bringing better organization and increased usefulness to this generation. I believe that there is no need to add to our series of failures, and I sense that our mental proclivities are not driving us in that direction. Therefore, we should find those areas and forms of activity which make it possible, here and now, to fight for a more complete and rational human life.

12588

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POLITICS

ROMANIA

# REPORT ON ROMANIAN-SOVIET HISTORY SYMPOSIUM

Bucharest ANALE DE ISTORIE in Romanian No 2, Mar-Apr 86 pp 131-137

[Article by Gheorghe Tudor: "A Romanian-Soviet History Symposium on the Theme 'The Political Leadership of the Socialist Society by the Party. The Expansion of Socialist Democracy'"; passages within slantlines published in italics]

[Text] On the basis of the Convention on Scientific Collaboration Between the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies Under the RCP Central Committee and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism Under the CPSU Central Committee, the proceedings of the Romanian-Soviet symposium on the theme "The Leadership of the Socialist Society by the Party. The Expansion of Socialist Democracy" were held in Bucharest on 4-6 December 1985. It was the seventh symposium on problems of common scientific interest between the two institutes.

The delegation of Soviet historians consisted of P.A. Rodionov, first deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, the head of the delegation; Dr V.I. Bondar, section chief; Dr N.I. Kolcenko and Dr A.N. Samosudov, sector chiefs; and R.S. Saravatova, scientific researcher.

The Romanian delegation consisted of Dr Gheorghe Zaharia, deputy scientific director of the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies under the RCP Central Committee, the head of the delegation; Dr Gheorghe Surpat, sector chief; Dr Ion Alexandrescu, principal scientific researcher; and Dr Elena Muresan and Dr Gheorghe Tudor, scientific researchers.

The Soviet delegation was received by the director of the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies under the RCP Central Committee, Ion Popescu-Puturi, a reception in which the USSR ambassador to Bucharest, E.M. Tiajelnikov, also participated. After describing the main directions of economic and social development of Romania resulting from the documents of the 13th RCP Congress and reaffirmed at the recent Congress of Science and Education, Comrade Ion Popescu-Puturi presented in detail the tasks which devolve upon the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies under the RCP Central Committee in the light of these documents and which have to do with thoroughly studying theoretically the problems of the development of our socialist order, improving the ways and methods by which the RCP exercises the

political leadership of the Romanian society, and thoroughly studying the changes that occur in the field of production forces and social relations, in the physiognomy and structure of the social classes, in the relations among them, and in the life of the state. In addition, the bilateral meetings between the two institutes were regarded as particularly positive, it being stressed that they help to achieve a fruitful exchange of opinions on the main problems of building the new social order in Romania and the USSR and to know the positive experience gained by the RCP and the CPSU in guiding the working people in the two countries along the path of socialism and communism.

The proceedings of the symposium were chaired alternately by the heads of the two delegations.

The following papers were presented by the Soviet historians: "The Party in the Political System of the Soviet Society," by P.A. Rodionov; "The Relationship Between the Communist Party's Leading Role and the Socialist Society's Investitures of Power," by V.I. Bondar; "The CPSU and the Improvement of Socialist Social Self-Leadership in the Contemporary Stage," by N.I. Kolcenko; "On the Improvement of the Mechanism for the Leadership of the Socialist Society by the Party," by A.N. Samosudov; and "The Guidance of the Economic Development of the Socialist Society by the CPSU," by R.S. Saravatova.

In its turn, the Romanian delegation presented the following papers: "The Party's Place and Role in the Socialist Society's Political System in the Current Stage," by Gheorghe Zaharia; "The Dialectical Relationship Between the Party's Leading Role and the Socialist State's Functions in the Current Stage," by Gheorghe Surpat; "The Improvement of the Unitary, Democratic Guidance of All Economic and Social Activity by the Party in the Current Stage of Development of the Socialist Society. The Development of Socialist Self-Leadership," by Gheorghe Tudor and Ion Alexandrescu; and "The Improvement of the Ideological and Political Educational Activity for Forming and Developing the Socialist Consciousness of All the Working People," by Elena Muresan.

In his paper, the head of the delegation of Soviet historians, P.A. Rodionov, dealt in detail, in the light of the new edition of the CPSU program and the other documents that will be subject to discussion at the upcoming congress of the party of the Soviet Communists, with the way in which the CPSU exercises its role of a guiding force within both the political system and the whole society, /with the relations and relationships existing between the party and the other components of the Soviet political system, and with the role that goes to the Communists in mobilizing the working people to fulfill the tasks for building the socialist and communist society in the Soviet Union./

Analyzing the process of expanding the CPSU's leading role in the current stage, the paper said that this is determined "also by, in addition to other factors, the objective necessity of the future development of society's political system and especially by the development of the people's socialist self-leadership by completely attracting the citizens into the management of state and public affairs, by improving the activity of the elected bodies of state power, by expanding the role of the trade unions, the youth organization, and

other mass organizations of the working people, and by effectively using all forms of direct and representative democracy."

Referring to the methods by which the CPSU guides the Soviet society, in the paper it was stressed that "in contrast with any sort of revisionist views, the CPSU has always started and also starts now from the fact that the Marxist-Leninist party's leadership covers all spheres of life: economic, political, social, and ideological. Without this, the construction of socialism and communism is condemned to anarchism, which is followed by the gravest consequences. But the party achieves the leadership of society by methods of political and organizational work, since this leadership is only political and not administrative."

Starting from the necessity of improving the ways and methods by which the CPSU exercises its role of a guiding political force in society, the author also referred to the measures proposed by the party documents to increase the political system's efficiency, to expand and develop Soviet democracy: "It is a question of providing a wider possibility of voting in the activity of the party and state bodies, of better organization in preparing and adopting the decisions on the great state problems and those of social life, of taking into consideration, in the suitable cases, the conclusions of the standing committees of the soviets, the trade unions, the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and the women's organizations, of handling with maximum attention the proposals of the working people, and of raising the degree to which the population is informed about the decisions adopted and the results of implementing them. It is also a question of continually developing the democratic premises in running the enterprises and of other such measures."

In the paper, extensive comments were also made about the dialectical relationship existing between the growth of the party's leading role and the continual growth of the position of party member, of the tasks that devolve upon the Communists in implementing the party's policy: "Under the current conditions, when the party has to solve problems that are exceptional in their dimensions, complexity, and importance, the growth of the role of the Communists assumes greater and greater importance, the same as their responsibility for the state of affairs in the staff to which they belong, as well as in society in general, and for the implementation of the party's general line. Passiveness, indifference, and irresponsibility are manifestations incompatible with the character and nature of the Marxist-Leninist party, which must distinguish itself and is distinguishing itself by inspired communist activity. Each Communist is called upon to be an example, a model of high discipline, of organized work, of initiative, and of dissatisfaction with shortcomings, who participates actively in all the activity to improve all aspects of social life."

After describing a broad set of problems with regard to defining the notion of internal party democracy, the author dealt with the mechanism by which internal party life and internal party relations influence the life of society. He stated: "In the final analysis, the development of the party, the enrichment of its internal life, influences all social life, just as the latter influences the development of internal party life. Moreover, the principle of reciprocity, about which V.I. Lenin spoke in his time, also operates in such

development. The problems of increasing the influence on society and developing the party are inseparable. A creative atmosphere within the party also determines the general atmosphere, the necessary and favorable political climate for influencing the whole society."

Extensive space in the paper was devoted to presenting the intense and multi-lateral activity that the party bodies and organizations are performing to welcome the CPSU Congress, as well as the influence that this is having on strengthening and developing the party itself: "The preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress, and the campaign of reports and elections that is occurring in this period, have the mission of helping and, of course, are helping to increase the activity, initiative, and sense of responsibility of the Communists for the cause of the party organizations and of the party in its entirety, for increasing each party organization's fighting ability, for strengthening the ties with the masses, for developing internal party democracy and criticism and self-criticism, and, in the final analysis, for expanding the party's leading role."

In his paper, V.I. Bondar concerned himself in detail with presenting /the role that the state has in the Soviet society, with the relationships existing between the state bodies and the party bodies, as well as with the relationship between the state bodies and the mass and public organizations and with the ways and forms by which the Soviet people participate in the management of state activity./

In connection with the state's role in society, after stressing that "the state organism has a special position in the socialist society's political system, determined by the fact that it is the only organization that unites all members of society, regardless of class and national affiliation, of age, of vocational activity, and so on," the speaker stated how empty and unrealistic those theories are which want to reduce the state's role and what negative consequences they would have on all of society if they were put into practice. "Once, as you know," the author said, "pseudoinnovative proposals were made with regard to forcing the process of abolishing the state, with regard to mechanically transferring its functions to the public organizations. But these proposals proved to contradict reality. Under the current conditions, it is premature for us to speak of abolishing the state. On the contrary, historical experience teaches us that where the weakening of the socialist state's role and power occurs, the elements of anarchy and wildness increase. Consequently, today we must speak not of weakening but of strengthening the whole populace's socialist state, which is called upon to be the chief instrument for carrying out the will of the whole populace. The socialist state has been and remains the irreplaceable instrument for constructing the new society, for protecting and developing its gains."

Regarding the relationships that must exist between the party and the state, the fact was stressed that "the CPSU has always acted against the attempts to put between the communist vanguard and state power an equal sign that leads to the distortion of the bases of the party's mutual relations with the masses and their organizations and to the merging of the functions of the state and party organizations."



On the same principles, the speaker also dealt with the problem of the dialectical relationships established between the state bodies and the mass and public organizations, stressing the fact that under the Soviet society's conditions there are fewer and fewer differences between the people's power attained through the state (state power) and the people's power attained through the public organizations (public power). But it was pointed out that "this does not mean at all the possibility of their being identical, since it would lead to the minimization of the socialist state's role and to the elimination of the qualitative determination of political power, of those differences that exist between the state organizations and the public organizations; in their activity, the former rely on the law created by the state and on a paid, designated apparatus and use coercion as one of their methods of operation, and the activity of the public organizations is achieved by bodies elected by the respective organization's members, usually voluntarily, without the application of the measures of state coercion."

In his paper, N.I. Kolcenko concerned himself with presenting a highly topical problem that is widely reflected in the new edition of the CPSU program, namely that of /the development and improvement of socialist social self-leadership in the contemporary stage./ Right from the start of his paper, the author stressed that between the forms of revolutionary self-leadership existing under socialism and those that will operate in the communist society there are many similarities, springing especially from the fact that "the bases of the future communist self-leadership are already laid under socialism" and that "under socialism self-leadership already represents in itself a completely new type of management of the country's affairs in comparison with the previous types of leadership."

At the same time, the author stated that, due to the level of development of the production forces and the organization of society, some differences exist between the manner of manifestation of self-leadership under socialism and that under communism: "Social self-leadership under the conditions of socialism still has, inevitably, a political character, since the classes will still exist for a rather long time. Of necessity, it assumes a political form, since the state still exists and self-leadership is achieved first and foremost through the state." Other characteristics of social self-leadership under socialism, pointed out by the author, derive from "its principal links; this coincides with the main components of the socialist society's political system, and it cannot be otherwise, since socialism's political system itself is built on the bases of the people's self-leadership, serving, furthermore, as an expression and instrument of it," and it assumes an all-inclusive character "explained by the fact that it is based on the absolute power of socialist social ownership."

The speaker then concerned himself in detail with presenting the main forms of socialist self-leadership existing in the Soviet Union in the current stage. Of them, the soviets of people's deputies, whose broad, democratic character is also demonstrated by the working people's strong representation in these bodies, stand in the forefront: 2.3 million working people are chosen as deputies, and over 30 million in various organizations work with the soviets. The trade unions in the USSR, which contain over 136 million working people,



are the second important link--as the speaker stated--for the expansion of soviet socialist self-leadership. Set up, like other organizations, on the bases of self-leadership, the Soviet trade unions play an important role in economic and administrative, social, and cultural construction. Other mass and public organizations that make up the system of Soviet self-leadership were also mentioned in the paper: the agricultural production artels--the kolkhozy--which have about 17 million members, the consumer cooperative system, which has about 60 million members, the Leninist Komsomol, in which 42 million young men and women operate, the unions of creation, the scientific and technical, cultural, and sports associations, and other organizations that are concerned with the multilateral expression and the implementation of the working people's specific interests, all uniting in their ranks--on bases of self-leadership--millions and millions of working people.

In his paper, A.V. Samosudov dealt with the set of problems connected with improving /the mechanism for the leadership of the socialist society by the party,/ which he regards as being one of the most important themes for the development of revolutionary theory and practice. In this context, the author stated that both he and other Soviet specialists tackled this problem while bearing in mind the following directions: "methodological aspects of the leadership of the socialist society by the party, that is, scientific knowledge of this process; the distinguishing of the political character of this leadership, that is, its content as a political phenomenon with a certain kind of activity; and the analysis of the mechanism for party leadership of the socialist society, that is, the distinguishing of the principal essence of the ways and methods of practical fulfillment of the Communist Party's leading role in society."

In addition, what must be understood by the mechanisms for the leadership of the socialist society by the party was also defined in the report, they being: "the reflection of those objective links that appear between the party and other parts of the political system on different levels of the social structure. For this reason, it cannot be an arbitrary construction, does not tolerate subjectivistic, voluntaristic distortions, is formed in accordance with the laws of the party's development and activity, with its role in the socialist society, and is improved on the basis of their deeper and deeper penetration into the content, essence, and character of party leadership."

Turning to a description of the activity performed by the CPSU to improve the mechanism for party leadership of the socialist society, the author dealt particularly with the necessity of improving the party's style of work. In this context, it was stressed that, in the activity of all party organizations and of the work staffs, the CPSU will promote a creative attitude, high responsibility and principledness, the capacity to objectively and self-critically evaluate the results obtained, and a considerate and responsive attitude toward the people, toward their needs and complaints.

The improvement of the mechanism for the leadership of the socialist society by the party is also conditioned, as was stated in the paper, by the continual improvement of the work with the personnel. The party's new documents attach great importance to completely taking public opinion into consideration in

promoting to leadership positions people mature from a political viewpoint, upstanding from a moral viewpoint, and competent and with a spirit of initiative, and in more actively promoting women.

Another problem that the speaker considered to be of major importance in improving the leadership of society is closely connected with the situation of the party itself. In this regard, it was stated: "The party's power to act depends on the composition of the party's ranks, their unity, the correct distribution of the party forces, the matter of improving with time its structures, the concrete forms of practical activity, up to the level of the new conditions of party work, and other factors in development within the party. Here, the leading role of the Communists is the most important factor. In many respects, the solidity of the party's ties with the masses and its activity among the people depend on the way in which this role is manifested."

In the paper presented at the symposium, R.S. Saravatova dealt with the problem connected with /the guidance of the Soviet society's economic development by the CPSU in the current stage./ In this context, it was stressed that the basic tasks of the CPSU, of all the working people in the Soviet Union, in the field of economic and social activity are those "of securing the fundamental renovation of the technical-material base on the basis of the newest gains of the scientific and technical revolution, the improvement of the social and, above all, economic relations, deep changes in the content and character of labor under the material and spiritual conditions of the people's life, and the activation of the entire system of political, social, and ideological institutions."

Concerning herself with the ways and means proposed by the documents of the upcoming CPSU Congress to perform these important tasks, the author mentioned: the cardinal necessity of speeding up scientific and technical progress to increase labor productivity; the achievement of structural changes in the economy on the basis of obtaining a suitable ratio between consumption and accumulation, between the branches producing means of production and those producing consumer goods; the continual improvement of production relations by increasing the effectiveness of centralized leadership and the suitable expansion of the economic independence and the responsibility of the centrals and enterprises; and the activation of the human factor. In addition, the author stressed that, in order to attain these objectives, a series of important programs were adopted back in 1985 "for raising the technical level and speeding up the development of machine building and the rebuilding of heavy metallurgy, developing power production, improving the design activity and capital construction, introducing new technologies, expanding the production of computer technology and using it in the national economy, and others."

Considerable space in the paper was devoted to presenting the main tasks that devolve upon the 12th 5-year plan (1986-1990), which, according to the new edition of the CPSU program, must become a pivotal 5-year plan in all directions of the economic and social development of the country.

Regarding the contribution of the delegation of Romanian historians, among the many problems that determine the national political system's content and

features, Gheorghe Zaharia dealt in his paper with the essential aspect of the place and role that go to the Romanian Communist Party in ensuring the proper functioning of the national political system, in developing all its components, and in drawing the masses of working people into the guidance of the complex economic and social mechanisms. In this spirit, the RCP, in its capacity as the vital center of our socialist nation, is performing in the political system, whose chief component it is, a vast activity to devise the measures and solutions needed for the advance of society and to organize and mobilize the people's forces to carry out the Program for Building the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society and Advancing Romania Toward Communism. In addition, the Communist Party's role of a guiding force in the country's political system cannot be separated from the way in which the party bodies and organizations work, from the political responsibility of each activist, of each Communist, from the Central Committee to the basic organizations in the economic and social units, and from the devotion and revolutionary determination with which they strive to implement the party's policy.

Along with securing all these political and organizational factors---it said in the paper---the RCP is manifesting constant concern for continually developing the country's political system, for improving its activity.

The creation of party and state organizational bodies and structures was noted as a feature of our political system with important consequences along the line of guiding the social and economic processes and imparting the style of work characteristic of the party to the most important fields of their activity.

Gheorghe Surpat dealt with a problem discussed widely both in the specialized literature in our country and in the international literature, namely that of the dialectical relationship between the party's leading role and the socialist state's functions in the current stage.

In this context, the fact was noted that the state's functions have a dynamics of their own, in accordance with the relations and processes specific to each stage of the revolutionary process of building the socialist society.

The speaker dealt in detail with the dialectical relationships existing between the Communist Party and the socialist state and between the state bodies and the organizations for socialist, working-class self-leadership and the mass and public organizations. The socialist state, as an exponent of the people's power, is the administrator of all national wealth, it not being able to be replaced in this capacity by anyone.

The leadership of the state, economic, social, and public bodies--central and local--by the party is achieved both through its political line, materialized in the decisions of the party national congresses and conferences and the plenums of the Central Committee, and through the Communists who perform their activity within them, in their leadership bodies, with the Communists militating for the application of the party's political line and for the integration of the party bodies and organizations into economic and social life.

In their paper, Gheorghe Tudor and Ion Alexandrescu presented the main directions of the process initiated by the Romanian Communist Party and its secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, after the ninth party congress, to improve the unitary guidance of all economic and social activity by the RCP. The measures adopted by the party to strengthen and develop socialist ownership and the system for planning the national economy and for introducing throughout the national economy, beginning in 1978, the new economic and financial mechanism, self-administration and economic self-management were thus described in detail.

A special place in this framework was also given to the problems connected with the methods of exercising in practice the principles of socialist, working-class self-leadership. The role and tasks that go, at the level of the economic units, to the working people's general assemblies and councils in running the enterprises and institutions and in mobilizing all those who work to fulfill the plan targets and to develop socialist democracy were described.

After presenting, in a reasoned way, the dialectical relationship between the building of the new order and the necessity of forming and developing the socialist consciousness of the masses, Elena Muresan, in her paper, dealt with the main ways and directions of improvement in ideological and political educational activity resulting from the documents of the 13th party congress and of the Expanded Plenum of the RCP Central Committee in June 1982.

At the close of the discussions, the convention on collaboration between the two institutes--a document that, through its provisions, creates a favorable framework for expanding the scientific and information exchanges between the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies under the RCP Central Committee and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee--was renewed in the presence of the Soviet Union's ambassador to our country, E.M. Tiajelnikov. In addition, the Soviet delegation, together with the management of the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies, was received at the Propaganda, Press, and Radio-Television Section of the RCP Central Committee. The USSR ambassador was present. On that occasion, the fruitful results of these bilateral symposiums were stressed.

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POLITICS

YUGOSLAVIA

POLITICAL SCIENTIST VESELINOV DISCUSSES DEFECTS OF SYSTEM

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2-3 Aug 86 p 9

[Interview with Dragan Veselinov, School of Political Sciences at Belgrade University, by Mica Milosevic and Djoko Kesic: "Despair Is Not Advisable"; date and place not given]

[Text] The price of wheat and bread represents the economic essence of Yugoslavia ever since the war, says Dr Dragan Veselinov, referring to the recent entanglement without disentanglement concerning the bakers. Whether or not the price of bread went up so that it could come down is a matter that can be interpreted in different ways depending on the depth of the consumer's pocket, but the depth of our farm crisis is already a matter for another and longer scenario in the irresistible reality of our economic and social relations. The alternative is a reasonable risk, says Dragan Veselinov of the School of Political Sciences at Belgrade University, going on to make the case, with the arguments of a superior expert, as to what all this implies when such a complicated subject is involved.

[Question] Adoption of a more uniform farm policy is a refrain which in past days has echoed in the Yugoslav Assembly, but how, it was also to be heard on the same occasion, is this to be done when often there is more unity on farm affairs among the countries of the European Economic Community than among our own republics and provinces?

[Answer] The moves being made now in political efforts in Yugoslavia will have difficulty getting beyond the context of defending the positions gained by the industrial population over the farm population and over the industry that processes agricultural products. This is a political defense on the part of all industrial classes and industrial centers against agriculture.

It is difficult to say whether it is possible for Yugoslavia to overcome that vested position with some cautious policy because the preponderance of the vested positions is great.

And that preponderance is not merely economic. It is also ideological. It is also one related to ownership. There are a great many traditions involved in those vested positions, there are a great many habits, a psychological mind-set toward those traditions, and finally--politics preserves this infallibly.

Many people are fooling themselves in thinking that it is possible to carry out an agricultural reform without reforming the economic system and the political system. They are fooling themselves because industry is burdened with immense technological redundancies, with unproductive manufacturing processes, with immense surpluses of manpower, which is in addition also wrongly distributed. This imposes the necessity of sharing out low personal incomes to the industrial population. The low personal income does not allow farm prices to be reformed so that they would move at a relatively faster pace than the prices of finished industrial goods. After all, if that happened, then that would have to signify an essential blow to the standard of living, to family stability, and to trust in the government.

The government's most recent decisions have made it clear that the government is not allowing the economic position of industry and its population to be threatened, and it is ready to defend that vested position of the urban population to whatever extent Yugoslavia requires in the present balance of power.

#### A Shifting of the Resentment

[Question] All indicators show that agriculture is the basic foundation on which Yugoslavia's stability should be built and that the reform of agriculture has after all been wrenched out of the economic and political context.

[Answer] No separate reform of agriculture is possible. Certain improvements can be made on a branch-to-branch basis within agriculture, say, between live-stock raising and primary production, or within field cropping the positions of certain crops might be improved at the expense of others, but a general improvement of the position of agriculture is not possible.

The measures which the government is proposing only shift the center of gravity of protest from certain positions of certain branches of agriculture to other positions of other branches. It can abruptly improve the position of wheat, which it has in fact been trying to do, but at the same time the position of corn was eroded once again. We do not have any farm policy that is effective across the board. Farm policy has to be conducted Yugoslav-style.

[Question] In other words, what is called for is creating an effective model?

[Answer] The problem is not thinking up a successful theoretical model of an effective agriculture which Yugoslavia's farm policy might advocate. The problem is proving that this is in the interest of Yugoslavia, and for the present it does not turn out to be in the interest of Yugoslavia to develop in that direction, since the way the Yugoslav political system is set up, it protects the regional economy and it will be ready to protect the regional economy all the way to the limits of a possible disintegration of many interregional ties. Our system is set up in such a way that it is willing to test the limits of a regional policy rather than the Yugoslav idea of integration. For instance, there is no central support price on wheat, corn, milk, and so on. Consequently, the peasant is not motivated to invest. He undertakes to deplete the fertility of his land. He can go on doing this for a few years, and it will be asked after the fact whether he has been successful in this or

not--depending on whether he manages to find employment outside agriculture or not. If he takes employment outside agriculture, his operation has been successful. He abandons it because he has scraped off the fertility, but if his employment in the city fails, in one way or another he will have to be a burden on the community, a burden on his family, or he will go on producing at a minimum subsistence level to supplement the income of his family, whose members are already employed somewhere off the farm.

#### The Incomparable Homestead Farms

[Question] Is there any reason at all, then, to speak about any advantages of ours over Western Europe in agriculture?

[Answer] We had a type of farm which Europe could not beat. The salash or homestead farm. The salash is the most productive European farm. We destroyed thousands and thousands of salashes, we destroyed a mode of production which was a combination of village and district economy. This was a twofold farm such as did not exist in Europe. We broke it up on behalf of the idea of a poor and docile peasant, the peasant work cooperative and the combine. Now we are paying a high price for that mistake. The costs are high on the semi-efficient peasant farm such as we have today and on the semiefficient large farm, which will in fact be less and less efficient, especially in primary production. Yet it was only a question of modernizing the most efficient system of agricultural production (which even the classic writers knew nothing about). We gave that up on purely ideological grounds.

[Question] Which means that all this that is happening with bread is a quite logical consequence of all of that?

[Answer] As far as I am concerned, it is. As a matter of fact, the price of bread is being used to protect the standard of living and political trust of the industrial population. But the industry processing agricultural products cannot be protected with the price of bread. Which is why in a sense the government is covering the losses of the processors, the mills, and the bakeries. It does this with the new credits it is extending to the combines, so that certain losses can be covered out of the new credits. The government will not allow the combine to go under. However, the price of wheat is lower than the price of bread. There will never be a retreat concerning the price of wheat. Yugoslavia will always maintain relatively low purchase prices and will exert downward pressure on primary production, exert downward pressure on wheat, corn, sunflowers, and other crops--but in such a way that it moves that pressure from crop to crop in turn so that the resentment is never concentrated on just one of them.

Wheat policy will be based on the monopoly power of the government to decree the purchase price, and it will not allow a market in the sense of supply and demand. It will thus get a strict regional policy in wheat production. When you have a government monopoly price that is set, a price at which everyone must buy a product, then regionalism is thereby encouraged to develop at a fantastic rate. At a very fast pace! Then competition is lost between customers, and then it makes no difference to whom the seller sells, and since it

makes no difference to him, he must sell it within his region. And then the police come, then come the courts which will prosecute him if he wants to move out of his region, and especially if he dares to sell at a higher price than the government has ordered.

### Living on a Symbol

[Question] Cheap bread is like a symbol to protect the elementary standard of living. Everything else is becoming more expensive, but just touch bread and you will immediately have a full-scale drama with the FEC in the heroic leading role. But is cheap bread enough all by itself?

[Answer] Man does not live on bread alone, but in the socialist countries the Yugoslav is first in the consumption of bread flour. When you take how much he earns on the average, this is about \$160 a month, you are surprised that he is third in the world with respect to per capita calorie consumption. But the balance of his diet is heavy on the starch side. Accordingly, it is true that bread is a symbol, but if you think that this is an artificial symbol, that is not the case. The Yugoslav lives on starch, since a large portion of the Yugoslav population is living on a very low personal income. Bread may be a symbol of life for him, but it is also life in reality.

[Question] But what if it is an illusion that the balance can be maintained solely with a policy of cheap bread, and things give way somewhere else?

[Answer] It is an illusion. But it can wait, since the limits of the decline are unknown. There are countries in a far more grave economic situation than Yugoslavia, socialist countries, and there is no final decline. But when the population is placed before the dilemma of whether to undertake a technical revolution fraught with social conflict in order to keep pace with the present-day industrial world or to hold with the present system in which there are no social risks, in which it is possible for all to be equal and in which hundreds of thousands of people have employment they do not deserve and in which no one will be hungry--when it comes to that point of asking the question, no one can rightly say in Yugoslavia today: the population will opt for industrial reform. I think that decisive segments of the population will opt for total leveling.

Deep down we favor technological reform and we favor risk, a reasonable risk, but Yugoslavia does not have the maturity for that. It even seems that socialism in general does not have the maturity to attempt to risk a technological reform carried out on an economic basis, since it brings a revolution in relations among social classes. It takes the system out of its politicized state and inaugurates the domination of the economy. No one is willing to undertake a thoroughgoing ownership reform. The gusts of fresh air are only marginal undertakings. Yugoslavia long ago did what Hungary is doing today. We have been their model. Accordingly, socialism has not yet started out on the road of reform.

[Question] With this inadequate level of production and with the mouths we have to feed, aren't we risking a situation in which we would be unable to feed ourselves?



[Answer] Theoretically one can imagine that kind of lower point, although it is difficult to say whether it will ever be reached, since the country's total downfall at the level of the population eating bread, at the level of one shirt, or at the level of one room for each inhabitant, that level is not likely to be reached. The country's technological base is higher than that. We use the expression "bread diet" and "one shirt" in a figurative sense in order to emphasize the relative gap which will exist between Yugoslavia and the industrially advanced countries. We will continue gradual growth at a rate, say, of 0.1, 0.2, or 1 percent. So, in an absolute sense Yugoslavia's standard of living will be rising, and I am convinced that that is possible, since our moral and political motivation will continue to keep us going for a long time yet. We are not in such a deep psychological depression that we would give up production. Even the Poles did not give that up.

### The Paradoxes of the Crisis

[Question] The crisis we confront is ever fiercer and fiercer. However, you would think it concerned someone else, there is talk and more talk, but the turnaround never comes. Does the crisis have to escalate to extremely unpleasant forms for us to really wake up out of our mental lethargy?

[Answer] What do I think about the crisis? Yugoslavia is not yet in a real crisis of survival: This is not yet a crisis for demonstrations, for deep resentments, for major intellectual ferment, for an explosion of new theories and strong socialist criticism of outmoded beliefs.

Our intelligentsia has not yet offered a strong theoretical criticism of the present system, nor has it offered an alternative picture in distinct outlines of a socialism that would be more attractive than the Social-Democratic version of capitalism. That is why we can think with good reason that we will wait for a long time yet to get out of the crisis.

Incidentally, this is not an exclusively economic crisis anyway. If it were just an economic crisis, it would be enough for us to follow certain formulas of good economists. This is a crisis of the system; this is a fundamental crisis. It is a reflection of the general crisis socialism has fallen into. It is also a crisis of the socialist intelligentsia. And until it finally abandons the Bolshevik and Leninist concept of society, which is a semi-Asian response to the questions of industrialization of an old state, we will have to wait. We have distanced ourselves from that concept by virtue of democracy—even though it is limited, but we have not distanced ourselves from the attempt to break up the economy. All of socialism rose up as a protest against economic dehumanization.

But if we adopt the Social-Democratic concept, then we will no longer persist in the attempt to develop the market, to develop a modern state, planning, and so on, but with somewhat reduced social contradictions, which is what the "welfare state" counts on. Were we to adopt that, then we would have to abandon the communist version of interpretation of the world. This could be done, but it means abandoning our intellectual identity, the positions we have taken, the psychology of the population, an immense consciousness built up with propaganda, which has its real price. Whoever attempts to abandon that overnight,

or even step by step, will have to count on uncertain decades. Only then will there be growing awareness in Yugoslavia that socialism cannot be made on Brioni. There will have to be many victims before that awareness takes root.

#### Historic Craving

[Question] In other words, aside from the revolution, both a mental evolution and an evolution of civilization are required?

[Answer] Absolutely. We had the idea that the act of taking political power is at the same time sufficient for us to create a system with that government authority, which is like a sparkler, to create mutual relations and ethics, new basic political units, for us to destroy the state, for us to relieve the party of responsibility because of what it is doing (yet we still keep it in a position of quite effective authority), and so on. We have lost the sense of socialism as an effort of a clear-headed intelligence, and a craving has developed for historical solutions on the basis of political self-confidence.

[Question] That has been going for a long time?

[Answer] That is true. But we at least live in a time when it is safe that we will see the birth of socialist criticism that will probably be effective. We will live and are already living in a rich time in which our consciousness is tense. We look at the world around us and we see things. Perhaps our hopes and ambitions have not been rewarded, but we gain at least the acuity of a critical ability. We have not become intellectually so stupefied as to lose an interest in criticism. And that is a good thing, since you do have socialism where that interest has been blunted, it has been turned into indifference and passive resistance.

[Question] It is often mentioned that the reform in the sixties had more chances to succeed than this one represented as the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program. Why is that?

[Answer] Because Yugoslavia's crisis in 1965 was much more an economic crisis and much less a political one. But today the crisis is both economic and political and also a legal and moral crisis. It is today all-inclusive. A rudimentary crisis of the system did exist in 1965, but it was much more an economic crisis. That is why the list of the measures at that time, formulated very straightforwardly, could have pulled the economy forward in a year or 2, but it still required changes in relations of social classes as well as in the location of political power. That is why even it could not succeed. So, it turned out even then that the limit on economic reform in socialism, including Yugoslav socialism, is the inability to reformulate the balance among political forces. This is the limit of economic reform in socialism. At the core of that limit is the traditional inflexible position of the party. The economic reform presupposes that the party will get out of the economic system, that it will lose its political dominion over the economy, and, if there is some question of its purely political effectiveness, it will go into the Assembly and bear responsibility for what it does. After all, a powerful economy imposes on the political system and the leading political forces responsibility for the moves they make. As soon as you start out in the direction of

reform, you come hard up against another power. This is the power of the party, which does not brook questions. It raises its ideology and its moves of the moment to the rank of protecting the state.

The key, if the present stabilization program is to be implemented at all, does not lie in some particular scientist being able to formulate a good anti-inflation policy or a good tax policy, or a good investment policy. The problem of carrying out the reform in Yugoslavia is not an economic problem. The problem lies in the balance of political power and the position of the party. We the socialist intelligentsia do not yet have an answer to that.

[Question] If all of that was so clearly evident even at past congresses, when changes were made in the congresses, what must the situation, both political and economic, have objectively argued for in that case?

[Answer] Yes, your congress is a cross section of Yugoslav consciousness, raised one ideological note. A congress cannot resolve those issues, since it is not a theoretician. The attempt to eliminate the party from the political system in a voting sense has had the result that the party governs, but it is not accountable. How is a political system to be devised in which the party will be accountable for what it does, at the same time to make that a stable system and to preserve the idea of socialism and a reliable party? Our thought does not have an answer as to how that should be designed.

[Question] The Chinese are doing that without a complex?

[Answer] However paradoxical it might seem, China has certain advantages over Yugoslavia. It has at least three advantages.

First, it is a mononational country. It has the problem of economic basins, but it does not have the problem of basins based on nationality. In Yugoslavia the nationalities are distributed among the economic basins.

Second, China is a country with exceptional work discipline created over thousands of years. This is a country in which the government hierarchy is respected. Maoism has not managed to destroy that.

Third, they have a magnificent general culture, a culture on which they can rely when their world relations are at issue. This is a country which does not have a complex.

The Yugoslav does have one, he comes from a country that was underdeveloped for decades, from a country which does not have a separate history as a state, he comes from a country whose components have been forgotten as states in European history. None of that is true of China.

[Question] It is in man's nature not to give in to weakness. To what extent could that factor provide a kind of energy to overcome what we have been talking about?

[Answer] Well, that is a psychological factor, and in his stubbornness man shows that he does not reconcile himself to some existing situation. The persistence with which the Yugoslav is talking everywhere about the crisis, yet he is incapable of extracting himself from it, shows that he still has a great deal of patience. He is still more a rhetorician than he is a creator. It can still be constructive to speak, since while one speaks, one has to be thinking.

[Question] Unless in the meantime he falls into despair?

[Answer] That is not advisable. Some stupid things can be done out of despair.

[Question] But revolutions are also made out of despair.

[Answer] No, I think that for all of us who did not participate in it, at least for me, it is incomprehensible. When you delve into the anatomy of a revolution, then it is evident that it is a political overturning which at some particular point has seized upon the aspirations of the fallen social classes united in a single ambition, a very simple one, to have bread, to have a job. And when the revolution is over in the sense of the moment of taking power, then all of a sudden it is evident that actually there has been no economic revolution and that the problems we confronted are those same problems which were the reason for beginning the revolution in the first place! Those are the problems of unemployment, the problems of technological development, the problems of privileges.

[Question] Plus doctrinaire ignorance?

[Answer] You get a paradox. A bourgeois form of exploitation has been replaced by leveling as another form of exploitation, one that is more concealed, but far more dangerous. It deadens society. It pulls it forward, but it also brings about very grave conflicts within certain relatively short periods of time. Because of the inefficient economy, this leads toward total exploitation within a state, an invisible exploitation. Slowly it builds up the contradictions, and it also resolves them more slowly. This could carry us to the point where we would have at one and the same time a low level of development and abundant conflicts.

I think that all of us now, all the socialist countries, have been piling up the contradictions, postponing their resolution to a future time. And it is difficult to say what will happen at that point, since we do not have intellectual theories of socialism's recovery. We are still under the spell of capitalism in almost all aspects. And Lukac's saying that he was not impressed by capitalism led him to bow to the power of oriental despotism. We have to be considerably more cautious toward both sides.

They Were Clearer

[Question] Let us go back to your argument that the intellectuality of our party has fallen off greatly by comparison with the fifties or sixties.

[Answer] Yes, I honestly do think that. It is not that we know less today than we did then, but our knowledge today is poorer relative to the present gravity of the situation than was their knowledge relative to the gravity of the situation at that time. We are today relatively weaker than they were. In a quantitative sense, we know more; however, we do not have answers to the questions they had answers to. They at least had a political response to a government situation--they carried out a revolution and defended the state. They reduced certain contradictions within the state, with a horrifying propaganda they equalized people's minds and built a system of trust in the existing state and the system, and now that is coming back almost like a boomerang because no provision is made for its change. This is a hard place to start out from.

The intelligentsia, which has grown up in the meantime, what I might call the present-day party intelligentsia, has not yet freed itself of that consciousness, nor of the terminology in which it was communicated. After all, if you look at party declarations today for their sharpness and relative clarity, for the firm logical construction of the sentence, we are today weaker than the party intelligentsia 4 or 5 decades ago. We have a much greater number of things hidden in our sentences that require deciphering. Our euphemisms are almost nonsensical. Our self-deceptions are immense in the sentences which we make. They were clearer.

In other words, they located their targets better than we. Perhaps their job was in fact easier, since the previous crisis was so deep that the targets could also be detected more clearly. Today it is much more complicated. Perhaps more time is simply needed for the thought to grow up which will be able to grasp this in consciousness.

#### Practice Says a Lot

[Question] How is it possible to explain the weakness of political economy?

[Answer] Do you know why economics is unable to offer a formula? Socialism itself is a protest against economics. It is a criticism of economics. Political economy at every university in Yugoslavia teaches you to hate the commodity, it teaches you to hate money, it teaches you to scorn people who fight for money. And yet Yugoslavia has never been so profoundly radical and pre-disposed against economics to fall into the kinds of crises the other socialist countries have fallen into. We have a certain level of sound health which we have retained. We have never fallen into the kind of misery and conflict the other socialist countries have fallen into, into the ruination of entire strata, into the camp system, indeed even to the slave system on which one economy built itself up. We have never fallen into that.

Yet on the other hand we have never allowed the consequences of economics to develop, since then we would have had to give up all of those reasons why we carried out the revolution. We have to realize that we carried out a revolution in the framework of one economics, in one particular kind of economics, and that because of the particularity of the contradictions at that time, we probably do not have the right today to assert that we can settle accounts

with economics as a whole. We can deal with certain effects of an economics of the past, but we cannot attack economics as a whole. A change of direction is needed, then, toward economic science, but that is an economic science that consists essentially of studying the market and modern planning. And then working on the political system of checks and balances that would stand above that, to control changes in the social lineup of forces.

[Question] How is it that our experience has counted for so little?

[Answer] I think that practice says a lot, but practice is not mere production, but rather experience and consciousness. Ask people if they want an uncertain system, as the cyberneticists would put it--a stochastic economic system, or do they want 100-percent employment even at the price of having one shirt and one loaf of bread? I think that many, as I have said, would opt for that kind of system.

#### The Nationality as an Excuse

[Question] We are threatened with exclusiveness, although we never tire of talking about opening up the economy, about the unified market, about democratization of society, and so on and so forth. What is going on?

[Answer] Because of disintegration of the economy we are objectively threatened with disintegration of the state. If Yugoslav governmental integration is in jeopardy, then the ambitions of all strata will be attacked. This kind of defense of the economic and political system does threaten us with that. Because of the high rate of inflation the economy is gradually being sold at bargain prices on the world market. It will be having an ever more difficult time repaying its credits, and even if we repay them, we will have a hard time taking future credits. That is, we will be isolated, not on the basis of credit, we will be technologically isolated and left to ourselves. Under those circumstances of a severing of the economic, technological, and indeed even political integration with Europe, it will be more and more difficult to break up the regional policy, to exhaust our feudal potential. In order to defend itself it will use the nationality as an excuse for that defense. After all, when an economy is going under, then a policy seizes upon the ambitions and fears of all in defending itself. Then it abandons both the theory of the class struggle and class relations. It leaves that framework and looks for that vocabulary and those alleged relations by means of which it can effectively defend a certain region. Then it finds the nationality and it will use it in order to maintain the present situation. And that can lead to racism, it can lead to enmity, and to a Yugoslavia so poisoned that our ancestors would be amazed that it was possible in spite of all their ideas and ambitions.

That kind of disintegration of the state can ultimately threaten the idea of Yugoslavia, and in the final analysis it also threatens the idea of socialism, not as a firm Bolshevik idea, but it threatens in general the belief that the very word "socialism" contains any advantage whatsoever. It leads toward compromise of an entire theory, it leads toward compromise of the past heroism of all those generations who fought for the system today--but not for a system of unchangeability and rigid beliefs, but for the right of the people to live in their own time.

## Vigorous Thought Is on the Rise

[Question] Much is said about the workers taking control of the entirety of income, but they somehow have difficulty succeeding in that.

[Answer] In general the very idea of self-management is very unclear in a philosophical sense. And this thesis that the worker or a social stratum can by its consciousness and managerial capability take over the entirety of economic and social reproduction, this is vulgar in the extreme. To speak metaphorically, Yugoslavia is not the property of any one stratum. It is the homeland of all social classes living in it and able in their mutual relations to preserve it as a state, capable of integrating as a part of Europe in both technological and economic terms. It is their property. If a gamble is made on a theory that only one social stratum should take control of the entirety of social reproduction, then one falls into the danger of imagining an entire system through which that stratum would supposedly take control. Then you also have the artificial strength of that stratum, which is illusorily stressed, since it does not have it, and you have an illusory system (which you impose on it), but it is unable to take advantage of it. The real political space thereby becomes disorganized and is thereby subject to the inevitable day-to-day arbitration of the party. In theory this is not what it wants, but it itself threw the boomerang. It is in session and is unable to adjourn.

However, thought is growing up within it, a thought which by scrutinizing experience to date is coming closer and closer to stating the necessity of vigorous evasive maneuvers. I think that we are about to see solutions which will surprise us, but will also be rewarded with effectiveness. The intellectual efforts will be immense, but it seems that we have completed the phase of primitive accumulation and the politicized version of consciousness. I am cheered at the prospect of our saying a calm farewell to our past.

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POLITICS

YUGOSLAVIA

## ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF PARTY IN MAJOR CITIES

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[Article by Boris Vuskovic: "Nationalities in the LCY: Ethnic Composition of the Membership of the League of Communists in Major Cities of the Republics and Provinces"]

[Text] 1. Scope of the Survey and Methodological Remarks

This analysis of the ethnic composition of the membership of the LC in certain major cities (opstinas) of the various republics and provinces was decisively limited by the following circumstances:

- a) In the statistical records of the LC the ethnic attribute of members is entered as a separate characteristic without any cross reference whatsoever to other attributes of the LC member. For that reason the analysis of the ethnic composition of the membership of the LC remains outside a broader party context.
- b) The figures on the ethnic composition of the LC membership of cities which we possessed were not continuous in time, so that we were unable to follow the trend.
- c) We did not obtain any data whatsoever on the ethnic composition of the membership for cities in SR Montenegro, and it was therefore left outside our scope.

On the basis of these features of the data on the ethnic composition of the LC membership in cities which were supplied by the opstina LC committees, our analysis was essentially directed toward two questions:

- 1) What is the relation of the ethnic composition of the LC membership to the ethnic composition of the population of the particular cities (on the basis of the 1981 Population Census)?
- 2) What is the relation between the ethnic composition of the membership and the population in the cities as compared to that same relationship at the level of the republic or province?



Just two more technical remarks at the end of this introductory section.

First. We did not have figures on the age-specific composition of ethnic groups in the cities, yet it is essential, since the party population can be compared only to an appropriate (adult) statistical population within the general population. This is also very essential because the age-specific composition of ethnic groups differs radically. Thus among the Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and certain other ethnic groups four-fifths of the population are over age 17, while among Gypsies, for example, this group does not represent even half! This, of course, has decisive importance in establishing the roots which the party has in the particular ethnic group, that is, in computing the proportion of LC membership in the particular ethnic group. So, since we did not have figures on the age-specific composition of ethnic groups in the cities, but since we wanted to compare the age-specific composition of the membership and the population, we used the following procedure. We applied to the population in the cities the age patterns of the ethnic groups characteristic of them at the level of the respective republic or province. Certainly, there are minor discrepancies between the age-specific composition of ethnic groups in the cities and their characteristics in the entire republic or province. However, even those assumed deviations will still yield a far more realistic picture of the relation between the ethnic composition of the membership and the population than would have been obtained if we had compared the party membership to the total population rather than the adult population of the ethnic groups. The importance this has can be illustrated by the datum that in the cities analyzed in SR Croatia, SR Slovenia, SR Serbia, and SAP Vojvodina the adult population represented approximately three-fourths of the total population, while it represented about two-thirds in SR Bosnia-Herzegovina and SR Macedonia, and only slightly more than half of the total population in SAP Kosovo.

Second. For purely technical reasons we drew no distinction between the terms nation, people, nationality, and the phenomenon of ethnic nondeterminacy (Yugoslavs).

## 2. Cities in SR Bosnia-Herzegovina

We possessed data on the ethnic composition of the LC membership for four cities in SR Bosnia-Herzegovina: Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo, and Tuzla. Four ethnic groups were most numerous in all these cities: Croats, Muslims, Serbs, and the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs). Because of the small number of members of the other ethnic groups, the statistical findings are not really the most instructive measure, and therefore we did not take the other ethnic groups under consideration.

### 2.1. Banja Luka

In 1981 there were 24,369 members of the LC in Banja Luka and a population of 183,618, 120,000 of them adults, which means that 1 out of every 5 adults was an LC member (20.47 percent).

However, the ethnic composition of Banja Luka's LC membership differs essentially from the ethnic composition of the population, and this is manifested

in the very large differences among the ethnic groups with respect to the proportion of LC members.

Serbs with 62,000 members (52.1 percent of the adult population) make up by far the most numerous group in the ethnic composition of the population, followed by an equal representation of Croats (21,000, or 17.5 percent) and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (20,000, or 17.2 percent), and then after a considerable interval Muslims (12,000, or 9.9 percent). All other ethnic groups taken together comprise about 3.3 percent of the adult population. At the same time Serbs are the most numerous in the ethnic composition of Banja Luka's LC membership (14,128 members, or 58 percent), followed by Muslims (4,355, or 17.9 percent), and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (2,873, or 11.8 percent), and finally Croats (2,395, or 9.8 percent).

If we compare the figures given above and present them in a table, we get the following situation:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Pop- ulation</u>	<u>% of Mem- bership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Popula- tion in LC</u>
1) Serbs	52.1	58.0	111.3	22.65
2) Croats	17.5	9.8	56.0	11.43
3) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	17.2	11.8	68.6	13.96
4) Muslims	9.9	17.9	180.8	36.81

There is no question that the ethnic composition of the LC membership differs markedly from the ethnic composition of the population. That is, the Serbs, although they have a somewhat higher share in the composition of the LC membership than in the population, are still in relative terms the most uniformly represented in the ethnic composition of the LC membership (index 111.3). The other ethnic groups show very significant differences: Muslims have almost twice the representation in the LC that they have in the population (index 180.8), by contrast with the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs), who have a share of two-thirds, and Croats with only half, of their respective shares in the population.

On the basis of what we have said it is understandable that the proportion of LC members in the various ethnic groups is very uneven: more than 1 out of every 3 adult Muslims is an LC member (36.8 percent of the statistical population); slightly more than 1 out of every 5 Serbs (22.8 percent) is a member; and then 1 out of every 7 of the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (14 percent); and 1 out of every 9 Croats (11.4 percent) is a member of the LC. That is, there is a drastic difference between the extremes: approximately a threefold higher ratio among Muslims than Croats.

## 2.2. Mostar

In 1981 Mostar had a total population of 110,337, an adult population of 71,000, and 16,394 LC members, which means that 1 out of every 4 or 5 Mostar inhabitants belonged to the LC (22.98 percent). The ethnic composition of

Mostar's population shows different characteristics than that of Banja Luka. That is, in Mostar's adult population Croats are the most numerous (25,500, or 35.6 percent), and then Muslims (20,000, or 28.2 percent), Serbs (13,500, or 19 percent), and the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (11,000, or 15.2 percent). Other ethnic groups are really small (2 percent of the total population).

The ethnic composition of the LC membership does not even approximately reflect the composition of the population in Mostar. That is, Muslims are most numerous in it (5,968, or 36.4 percent), then Serbs (4,890, or 29.8 percent), and Croats (3,670, or 22.4 percent), and finally the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (1,570, or 9.6 percent).

In table form the relationship between the ethnic composition of the population and the membership in Mostar is as follows:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Population</u>	<u>% of Membership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Population in LC</u>
1) Croats	35.6	22.4	62.9	14.44
2) Muslims	28.2	36.4	129.1	29.66
3) Serbs	19.0	29.8	156.8	36.12
4) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	15.2	9.6	63.2	14.49

There obviously exist two drastically opposed situations in the interrelationship of the composition of the membership and that of the population. On the one hand Serbs and Muslims have a share in the membership far greater than their share in the population. For the Croats and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) it is quite the reverse; they have a considerably lower proportion of the LC membership than of the population (two-thirds). This results in very large differences in the proportion of the particular ethnic group in the LC membership. More than 1 out of every 3 adult Serbs is a member of the LC (36.12 percent), and then almost 1 out of every 3 Muslims (29.66 percent), but only 1 out of every 7 ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (14.49 percent) and Croats (14.44 percent).

### 2.3. Sarajevo

In 1981 Sarajevo had a population of 448,500, an adult population of 283,000, and 83,765 members of the LC. So, all of 29.6 percent of Sarajevo adults were members of the LC, which means almost 1 out of every 3 adults, which is more than in the other cities of SR Bosnia-Herzegovina. Again in the ethnic composition of Sarajevo's population we encounter those same four most numerous ethnic groups, but in a different order: most numerous are the Muslims (111,000, or 39.3 percent), then Serbs (88,500, or 31.3 percent), and the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (47,000, or 16.5 percent), and finally Croats (25,000, or 8.9 percent). All other ethnic groups taken together represent 2.8 percent of the population.

In the ethnic composition of the LC membership in Sarajevo Serbs are the largest group in absolute terms with 31,273 members of the LC (37.3 percent), followed after a small interval by Muslims (30,612, or 36.5 percent), and then at a considerable distance the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs), with 9,279 LC members (11.1 percent), and Croats (8,170, or 9.8 percent). The most sizable of the other ethnic groups were the Montenegrins (1,713 members of the LC).

The situation is as follows in the form of a table:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Pop- ulation</u>	<u>% of Mem- bership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Popula- tion in LC</u>
1) Muslims	39.3	36.5	92.9	27.55
2) Serbs	31.3	37.3	119.2	35.30
3) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	16.5	11.1	67.3	19.87
4) Croats	8.9	9.8	110.1	32.33

There is no dispute that there is no altogether uniform relationship between the share of the ethnic groups in LC membership and their share in the population in Sarajevo either. For example, Serbs have approximately twice the share of membership of the LC as the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs). Yet, however paradoxical it might seem, the ethnic composition of the membership of the LC in Sarajevo still shows the fewest disproportions as compared to the situation in the other cities of SR Bosnia-Herzegovina we analyzed. That is, both the Serbs and Croats have a somewhat higher share in the membership than in the population, while Muslims show approximately the same difference in the other direction, which to some extent we might expect since it is illusory to expect an absolute uniform pattern of relations between share in the membership and share in the population (unless this has been forced by a bureaucratic administrative action). This kind of situation is obviously disrupted by the fact that the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) have a share in the membership that is only two-thirds of their share in the population.

This is also indicated to us by the differences in the proportion of LC members in the various ethnic groups. Higher than 1 out of every 3 adult Serbs is a member of the LC (35.3 percent), and then almost 1 out of every 3 Croats (32.33 percent), and slightly more than 1 out of every 4 Muslims (27.55 percent), and only 1 out of every 5 ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (19.87 percent). It is obvious that the share of LC members in the various ethnic groups except for the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) does not vary much from the average proportion of party members in the total Sarajevo population (29.6 percent).

#### 2.4. Tuzla

In 1981 Tuzla had a population of 121,717, an adult population of 77,000, and 18,556 members of the LC, which means that 24.1 percent of the adult population were members of the LC.

The ethnic composition of the population shows that the most numerous group in Tuzla are the Muslims (31,000, or 40 percent), followed by Croats (17,000, or 22.2 percent), and Serbs (13,500, or 19.6 percent), and finally the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (12,500, or 16.2 percent). All the other ethnic groups taken together represent 4 percent of the total population. Within the ethnic composition of the LC membership the Muslims are by far the most numerous (9,270 members of the LC, or 49.96 percent of the total membership), followed by Serbs with 5,285 members (28.48 percent), then Croats with 1,724 members (9.29 percent), and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) with 1,272 members of the LC (6.85 percent).

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Population</u>	<u>% of Membership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Population in LC</u>
1) Muslims	40.0	50.0	124.9	30.11
2) Croats	22.2	9.3	41.9	10.09
3) Serbs	19.6	28.5	145.5	39.06
4) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	16.2	6.9	44.9	10.17

The situation with respect to the relationship between the share of the ethnic groups in LC membership and their share in the population shows drastic differences, and it is very similar to that in Banja Luka and Mostar. That is, here again we see a dichotomous division of the ethnic groups: the share of the Serbs and Muslims in LC membership is considerably higher than their share in the population, while the Croats and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) have a share in the membership that is drastically lower than their share in the population, even less than half! It goes without saying that differences are therefore extremely great in the proportion of LC members in the various ethnic groups. Thus more than 1 out of every 3 Serbs is a member of the LC (39.06 percent of the statistical population), and slightly less than 1 out of every 3 Muslims (30.11 percent), while only 1 out of every 10 ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (10.77 percent) and Croats (10.09 percent) is a member.

## 2.5. Comparative Analysis of Membership in the Cities and at the Level of the Bosnia-Hercegovina LC

Within the total membership of the Bosnia-Hercegovina LC there is a rather large disproportion between the share of the various ethnic groups in the membership and in the population. That is, in the republic membership only Serbs have a higher share than their share in the population (index 129.4), while that of the Muslims is almost the same (index 96.1). By contrast with these two groups, ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) have a share in the republic membership that is three-fourths of their share in the population (index 76.8), and the share of the Croats is only two-thirds (index 66.3). If we compare that situation in the republic with the situation in the cities analyzed we get the following table of indices relating the share of the various ethnic groups in the membership to their share in the population.

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Banja Luka</u>	<u>Mostar</u>	<u>Sarajevo</u>	<u>Tuzla</u>	<u>Bosnia-Her- cegovina LC</u>
1) Croats	56.0	62.9	110.1	41.9	66.3
2) Muslims	180.8	129.1	92.9	124.9	96.1
3) Serbs	111.3	156.8	119.2	145.5	129.4
4) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	68.6	63.2	67.3	44.9	76.8

We might draw the following general conclusions on the basis of the data presented:

a) In Banja Luka, Mostar, and Tuzla Croats have a considerably smaller share in party membership than in the population, a share in fact that is even less than the two-thirds ratio that exists at the republic level. Only in Sarajevo, where there are the fewest of them, is their share in the membership higher than their share in the population.

b) Muslims, opposite to the case with the Croats, have a share in the LC membership in Banja Luka, Mostar, and Tuzla that is far higher than their share in the population, especially in Banja Luka. Indeed this is far higher than their average share at the level of the Bosnia-Hercegovina LC. The situation with respect to the share of Muslims in LC membership is altogether different in Sarajevo, where Muslims have a slightly smaller share in the LC membership than their share in the population, and this is almost identical to the republic situation.

c) In all the cities indicated the Serbs--with differing variations--always have a higher share in LC membership than in the population, and this is also the case in the republic LC membership.

d) By contrast with the share of the Serbs, ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) have a share in LC membership in those cities that is lower than their share in the population, in fact there is a very significant difference, and this is also a characteristic of that statistical population at the republic level.

### 3. Cities in SR Croatia

We also analyzed four cities in SR Croatia: Osijek, Split, Rijeka, and Zagreb. In all these cities three ethnic groups represent over 90 percent of the population: Croats, Serbs, and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs), and for that reason we did not take other ethnic groups into consideration because they are so small.

#### 3.1. Osijek

Osijek had a population of 158,790 inhabitants in 1981, an adult population of 120,000, and 13,610 members of the LC, which means that 1 out of every 10 Osijek adults was a member of the LC (11.34 percent).

The ethnic composition of the Osijek population looks like this: Croats are most numerous (70,000, or 58.01 percent), and then Serbs (22,000, or 16.73 percent), and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) with a slight difference (20,000, or 16.73 percent). Hungarians are the most numerous among all the other ethnic groups with 2.51 percent of the total population. The ethnic composition of the LC membership in Osijek shows similar overall characteristics. That is, Croats are most numerous with 6,458 LC members, or 47.75 percent of the total membership, then Serbs with 4,199 LC members (30.85 percent), and they are followed at a considerable distance by the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) with 1,575 members of the LC (11.57 percent). The most numerous of the other ethnic groups are Hungarians (165) and Montenegrins (151) in the LC membership.

However, when we compare the figures on the share of the various ethnic groups in the composition of the population and in the composition of the LC membership, we get the following situation:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Population</u>	<u>% of Membership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Population in LC</u>
1) Croats	58.01	47.45	81.8	9.27
2) Serbs	18.24	30.85	169.1	19.18
3) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	16.73	11.57	69.2	7.84

The table unambiguously shows that Serbs are far more highly represented in the LC membership than in the population (index 169.1), while that is not the case with the Croats, whose representation is four-fifths of their share in the population (index 81.8), and even less is it the case with the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs), whose share in the LC membership is only two-thirds of their share in the population. It is self-evident that the proportion of LC membership in the particular ethnic group will also be disproportionate, since 1 out of every 5 adult Serbs in Osijek is a member of the LC (19.18 percent), while this is true of only 1 out of every 11 Croats (9.27 percent) and 1 out of every 13 ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (7.84 percent).

### 3.2. Rijeka

According to the results of the last population census, Rijeka has a population of 193,044 and an adult population of 145,500. The LC membership that same year was 23,345, which means that 12.09 percent of the population of Rijeka belonged to the LC, that is, 1 out of every 8 Rijeka adults was a member of the LC, which is very close to the Osijek situation. The ethnic composition of the Rijeka population as a whole is also close to that in Osijek, since Croats are the most numerous group (68.58 percent of the adult population, or 100,000 people), but the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (21,500, or 14.78 percent) are considerably more numerous than the Serbs (12,500, or 8.58 percent). All other groups are numerically very small.

These three ethnic groups are also the most numerous in the composition of the LC membership in Rijeka: Croats with 15,121 LC members (64.77 percent) represent the most numerous group in the membership as well, followed by Serbs with

4,213 members (18.05 percent), and the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) with 2,353 members (10.08 percent). Among the other ethnic groups the most numerous in the LC membership are Slovenes (371), and then Muslims (294), and Montenegrins (253).

These figures yield the following results in table form.

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Pop- ulation</u>	<u>% of Mem- bership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Popula- tion in LC</u>
1) Croats	68.58	64.77	94.4	15.15
2) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	14.78	10.08	68.2	10.94
3) Serbs	8.58	18.05	210.4	33.73

It is easy to note that only the share of the Croats is approximately the same in the LC membership as in the population (index 94.4), by contrast with the Serbs, who have twice the representation (index 210.4), and the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs), whose share in the membership is only two-thirds of their share in the ethnic composition of the population of Rijeka (index 68.2). This has certainly resulted in significant differences in the proportion of LC members in the various groups: 1 out of every 3 adult Serbs is a member of the LC (33.73 percent), and then 1 out of every 6 or 7 Croats (15.15 percent), and only 1 out of every 9 ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (10.94 percent).

### 3.3. Split

In 1981 Split had a population of 235,922 and an adult population of 179,000. The party organization numbered 24,974 members, which means that 13.93 percent of Split adults are members of the LC (or almost 1 out of every 7), that is, more than in Osijek and Rijeka. Croats are markedly the most numerous in the ethnic composition of the Split population (150,500, or 83.98 percent), followed then--just as in Rijeka--by the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (15,000, or 8.57 percent), but they are considerably less numerous, and finally Serbs with 7,388 members (4.12 percent), which is half of their share in Rijeka. All other ethnic groups together represent only 3.3 percent of the total population of Split.

In the ethnic composition of the membership of the LC in Split there are 20,994 Croats (84.06 percent), followed by an almost equal number of Serbs (1,680, or 6.73 percent) and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (1,587, or 6.36 percent). The most numerous of the other ethnic groups are Montenegrins (277) and Slovenes (236).

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Pop- ulation</u>	<u>% of Mem- bership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Popula- tion in LC</u>
1) Croats	83.98	84.06	100.1	13.94
2) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	8.57	6.35	74.1	10.33
3) Serbs	4.12	6.73	163.1	22.74



The table presents the situation which in global terms is similar to that in Osijek and Rijeka, but in a considerably more favorable version: Croats have literally the same representation in the membership as in the population (index 100.1), which is not the case in the other places; Serbs have a higher representation in the membership than in the population (index 163.3), by contrast with the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs), whose share in the membership is only three-fourths of their share in the population (index 74.1). It is therefore logical that the Serbs shall also have the highest share of party members relative to their numbers, since more than 1 out of every 5 is a member of the party, while for Croats it is 1 out of every 7 or 8, and for the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) it is 1 out of every 10.

### 3.4. Zagreb

In 1981 Zagreb had a population of 768,700 and an adult population of approximately 586,000. The party organization in Zagreb numbered 84,646 members, so that 1 out of every 7 adults in Zagreb was a member of the LC (14.44 percent of the population).

The ethnic composition of the Zagreb population is closest to that in Split, since Croats comprised 81.58 percent of the population (478,000), ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) 6.8 percent (40,000), and Serbs 5.23 percent (30,500). The same groups are also the most numerous in the ethnic composition of the LC membership: 54,662 Croats (64.58 percent), and then 14,533 Serbs (17.17 percent), and 7,819 ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (9.24 percent). Of the other ethnic groups the most numerous are the Muslims (1,577), and then other ethnically uncommitted (996), and then Slovenes (882), and Montenegrins (804).

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Population</u>	<u>% of Membership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Population in LC</u>
1) Croats	81.58	64.58	79.2	11.43
2) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	6.80	9.24	135.9	19.61
3) Serbs	5.23	17.17	328.3	47.43

The relationship between the ethnic structures of membership and the population shows essentially different features in Zagreb from those in the other three cities in SR Croatia we analyzed. The differences in the share of the various ethnic groups in the membership and population are quite significant. That is, Croats have a share in LC membership that is four-fifths of their share in the population (index 79.2), while the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) have a share in the membership that is considerably greater than their share in the population (index 135.9), which is especially true of Serbs, whose representation in the membership is all of threefold greater (index 328.3). It is quite understandable that this should also be reflected in the proportion of LC members in the various ethnic groups: 1 out of every 9 Croats is an LC member (11.43 percent), and then 1 out of every 5 ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (19.61 percent), and almost 1 out of every other adult Serb (47.43 percent). To be sure, these two ethnic groups, which have a high proportion of LC members, are not large in absolute terms.

### 3.5. Comparative Analysis of Membership in the Cities and at the Level of the Croatian LC

Within the total membership of the Croatian LC we note significant disproportions between the representation of the various ethnic groups as compared to their share of the Yugoslav population. That is, Croats have a smaller share in the republic membership of the Croatian LC than in the population (index 86.2). The share of ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) is as much higher (index 110.6) as that of the Croats is lower. However, the Serbs have approximately twice the share of the membership of the Croatian LC that they have in the republic population (index 200.3).

If we compare this situation at the republic level with the situation in the cities, we arrive at the following table of index numbers showing the relation between the share of the various ethnic groups in the party membership as compared to their share in the population:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Osijek</u>	<u>Rijeka</u>	<u>Split</u>	<u>Zagreb</u>	<u>Croatian LC</u>
1) Croats	81.8	94.4	100.1	79.2	86.2
2) Serbs	169.1	210.4	163.3	328.3	200.3
3) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	96.2	68.2	74.1	135.9	110.6

On the basis of the figures presented we can draw the following general conclusions:

a) In these cities Croats have a differing ratio between their share in LC membership and their share in the population, since the difference between Split and Zagreb amounts to all of 21 index points. In general Croats, who represent the largest group, nowhere have a share in the membership that is higher than their share in the population. In Split and Rijeka their share is equivalent or approximately so, while in Osijek and Zagreb their share in the membership is only four-fifths of their share in the population, which is slightly less than the level of their representation in the total membership of the Croatian LC.

b) Without exception Serbs everywhere have a higher representation in the membership than in the population, and in certain cities the differences are extremely large (for example, all of 160 index points between Osijek and Zagreb). But these drastic differences are after all possible because we are still talking about a group that is not very numerous.

c) The ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) have a share in the membership considerably smaller than their share in the population in Osijek, Rijeka, and Split. Only in Zagreb is their share in the membership higher than their share in the population (index 135.8), and that is higher than their representation in the membership of the Croatian LC (index 110.6).

#### 4. Cities in SR Macedonia

In SR Macedonia we had figures for the cities of Bitola and Skopje. The ethnic composition of the population of these two cities display such great differences that we omitted the usual overall comparison at the republic level, but rather did it separately for each city.

##### 4.1. Bitola

In 1981 Bitola had a population of 137,835 and an adult population of 93,500. That same year there were 10,471 members of the LC, which means that 11.19 percent of the adult population of Bitola were members of the LC.

Macedonians are by far the most numerous in the ethnic composition of Bitola's population, since they represent all of 91 percent of the adult population (85,000), and then come the small groups of Albanians (3,000, or 3.12 percent) and Turks (1,900, or 2.05 percent). Other ethnic groups number less than 1,000 members or less than 1 percent of the total population, and therefore we did not take them into consideration.

Macedonians are most numerous in the ethnic composition of the LC membership with 10,043 members (95.91 percent), followed thereafter by the numerically small and almost equal groups of Serbs (134, or 1.28 percent), Albanians (112, or 1.07 percent), and Turks (96, or 0.92 percent). A comparison of the composition of the membership and the population of Bitola shows the following characteristics:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Pop- ulation</u>	<u>% of Mem- bership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>Macedonian LC, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Group in LC</u>
1) Macedonians	91.00	95.91	105.4	119.7	11.79
2) Albanians	3.12	1.07	34.3	47.1	3.83
3) Turks	2.05	0.92	44.9	39.4	5.00

The most essential feature of the relationship between the LC member and the population in Bitola is the fact that Macedonians, who represent the most sizable group, have an almost equal share in both structures. Major disproportions that exist between the other groups are to some extent statistical in nature, since these are very small groups. This does not mean that they might also be authentically indicative since only 1 out of every 20 Turks is a member of the LC and only 1 out of every 26 Albanians, as compared to 1 out of every 9 Macedonians. Especially since the relationship between the ethnic composition of the membership and that of the population of the city of Bitola is almost identical with that at the level of the Macedonian LC.

##### 4.2. Skopje

In 1981 Skopje had a population of 506,547 and an adult population of 330,000. At the same time Skopje's party organization numbered 55,886, which means that 16.92 percent of Skopje's adult population belonged to the LC (that is, 1 citizen out of every 6), which is far higher than in Bitola (11.19 percent).

The ethnic composition of the Skopje population is rather diverse. Macedonians represent the most numerous group with 220,000, or 67 percent, followed at a considerable distance by Albanians with 47,500 inhabitants, or 14.36 percent. After Albanians we have a number of small and approximately equal ethnic groups: Serbs 16,000 or 4.88 percent, Gypsies 12,000 or 3.59 percent, and two groups of almost exactly the same size: Muslims and Turks (11,000, or 3.42 percent).

The ethnic composition of the membership of the Skopje LC shows these characteristics: Macedonians are the most numerous with 46,352 members, or 82.95 percent of the total party membership in Skopje, then come Serbs with 3,123 members, or 5.59 percent, and Albanians with 3,032 members, or 5.43 percent. After them the ethnic groups are ranked as follows: Turks 629 or 1.13 percent, Muslims 501 or 0.9 percent, ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) 473 or 0.85 percent, and Gypsies 360 or 0.63 percent, of the total party membership.

An analysis of the relationship of the representation of the ethnic groups in the composition of the membership and the population shows these results:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Population</u>	<u>% of Membership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>Macedonian LC, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Group in LC</u>
1) Macedonians	67.00	82.95	123.8	119.7	20.95
2) Albanians	14.36	5.43	37.8	47.1	6.39
3) Serbs	4.88	5.59	114.5	122.0	19.39
4) Gypsies	3.59	0.63	17.5	22.4	2.95
5) Turks	3.42	1.13	33.0	39.4	5.57
6) Muslims	3.42	0.90	26.3	21.0	4.44

It is indisputable that the relationship between the representation of the various ethnic groups in the composition of the adult Skopje population compared to their representation in LC membership shows drastic differences. That is, Macedonians, who are the most numerous group, have a considerably higher representation in the membership than in the population (index 123.8), and the only other group which also has a higher representation in the party is the Serbs (index 114.5). All other ethnic groups analyzed have a share in the LC membership that is far below their share in the ethnic composition of the population: Albanians and Turks only one-third, Muslims one-fourth, and Gypsies one-fifth. In that sense the relationship between the representation of the ethnic groups in the membership and population in Skopje shows the typical characteristics of the republic situation. The percentage of party members in the various ethnic groups is extremely uneven: 1 out of every 5 Macedonians and Serbs is a member of the Skopje LC organization, and then 1 out of every 16 Albanians, 1 out of every 18 Turks, 1 out of every 23 Muslims, and 1 out of every 34 Gypsies.

##### 5. Cities in SR Slovenia

In SR Slovenia we had figures for Ljubljana and Maribor. The ethnic composition of the population of both cities shows almost the same features: Slovenes are by far the most numerous group, and they are followed by the small

groups of Croats, Serbs, and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs). That made the comparative analysis easier.

### 5.1. Ljubljana

In 1981 Ljubljana had a population of 305,211 and an adult population of 231,000. The LC organization numbered 34,036 members, which means that 14.74 percent of the adult Ljubljana population belonged to the LC, that is, 1 out of every 7 adult citizens.

In the ethnic composition of the Ljubljana population Slovenes are the most numerous, representing 83.38 percent of the population (192,500), followed by small groups of Serbs (13,500, or 5.86 percent), Croats (12,000, or 4.44 percent), and finally the still smaller group of ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (5,500, or 2.32 percent).

Slovenes are the most numerous in the ethnic composition of the LC membership of the city of Ljubljana with 27,160 members, or 79.8 percent, followed by Serbs with 2,742, or 8.06 percent, and then Croats with 1,724, or 5.07 percent, and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) with 1,272 members, or 3.74 percent. The relationship between the share in the composition of the LC membership and the share in the population shows the following situation for these ethnic groups:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Population</u>	<u>% of Membership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Population in LC</u>
1) Slovenes	83.38	79.80	95.7	14.10
2) Serbs	5.86	8.06	137.5	20.27
3) Croats	4.44	5.07	114.2	16.83
4) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	2.32	3.74	161.2	23.75

These relations turn out to be different from any we have had so far in our analysis: all the ethnic groups analyzed except the Slovenes have a relatively higher share in the ethnic composition of the LC membership than in the composition of the population! What is more, if we omit the Slovenes and Croats, who have approximately the same representation in both statistical populations, the other two groups (Serbs and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)) have a share in the membership that is considerably greater than their share in the population. There are also significant differences in this regard in the percentage of the ethnic groups belonging to the LC: 1 out of every 7 Slovenes is a member of the LC of the city of Ljubljana (14.1 percent), and then 1 out of every 6 Croats (16.83 percent), then 1 out of every 5 Serbs (20.27 percent), and nearly 1 out of every 4 ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (23.75 percent).

### 5.2. Maribor

The last population census showed a population of 185,699 in Maribor and an adult population of approximately 140,000. The membership of the LC in Maribor

numbered 14,244, which means that LC membership represented 10.2 percent of the population, i.e., considerably lower than in Ljubljana (14.74 percent).

In the ethnic composition of the population of Maribor we encounter the same ethnic groups as in Ljubljana with the difference that there are far more Slovenes (90.19 percent, or 126,000) and considerably fewer Croats (4.15 percent, or 6,000), Serbs (1.74 percent, or 2,500), and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (2,000, or 1.54 percent).

Slovenes are also the most numerous in the ethnic composition of the LC membership (11,488, or 80.37 percent), and then come Serbs (1,037, or 7.28 percent), Croats (910, or 6.39 percent), and finally the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (454, or 3.19 percent). The relationship shown in the table between the representation of the various ethnic groups in the composition of the membership and the population is as follows:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Population</u>	<u>% of Membership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Population in LC</u>
1) Slovenes	90.19	80.37	89.1	9.09
2) Croats	4.15	7.28	175.4	15.69
3) Serbs	1.74	6.39	367.2	42.57
4) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	1.54	3.19	257.1	21.18

These relations show that again in Maribor, just as in Ljubljana, only the Slovenes have a lower share in the membership than in the population. All other groups have a very high share in the membership as compared to their share in the population. That is why differences in the percentage of the population of these groups belonging to the LC are quite significant: almost 1 out of every 2 adult Serbs is a member of the LC (42.57 percent), then 1 out of every 5 ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (21.18 percent), and 1 out of every 6 or 7 Croats (15.69 percent), and only 1 out of every 11 Slovenes (9.09 percent).

### 5.3. Comparative Analysis of Membership in the Cities and at the Level of the Slovenian LC

Relations between the representation of these ethnic groups in the composition of the LC membership and population in Ljubljana and Maribor show both a high degree of coincidence between the two as well as a high degree of coincidence with the republic situation, which is obvious from the table below showing the indexes that relate those structures:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Ljubljana</u>	<u>Maribor</u>	<u>Slovenian LC</u>
1) Slovenes	95.7	89.1	92.2
2) Serbs	137.5	367.2	254.8
3) Croats	114.2	175.4	149.3
4) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	161.2	207.1	236.1

It is easy to see that in both Ljubljana and Maribor, as well as at the republic level, only the Slovenes have a smaller share in the membership than in the population. The other groups have a higher share in the membership, and these differences are rather large. In statistical terms these are immense differences. However, since the Slovenians, who represent by far the most numerous ethnic group, have a relatively smaller share in the membership than in the population, in view of the small size of the other ethnic groups, this fact could be manifested in an extremely high index number of their participation in the composition of the membership. It is precisely that fact that on the one hand is decisive in differences between Ljubljana and Maribor (the Slovenes are more numerous in Maribor than in Ljubljana, and the other groups less numerous, so that the differences are greater), although the global situation is identical. That circumstance is also manifested in the fact that there is a negligible difference between the proportion of LC membership in the general population and in the population of Slovenes: in Ljubljana LC members represent 14.74 percent of the general population and 14.1 percent of the group of Slovenes, while in Maribor this difference is 10.2:9.09.

## 6. Cities in Serbia Proper

In Serbia proper we had figures for Belgrade and Bor. Although the ethnic composition of the membership and population in Belgrade differs quite a bit from that in Bor, we still compare them, taken together, with the situation at the level of Serbia proper.

### 6.1. Belgrade

In 1981 Belgrade had a population of 1,470,073, with an adult population of 1.1 million. At the same time the party organization in Belgrade had 223,781 members, which represents one-tenth of the entire membership of the LCY! As for the relationship between the membership and the population, we can say that 19.65 percent of the Belgrade adults were members of the LC. Serbs are the largest group in the ethnic composition of the Belgrade population with 900,000 (78.5 percent), and then ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) with 125,500, or 11 percent, followed by the relatively small groups of Montenegrins (33,000, or 2.9 percent), Croats (21,500, or 1.9 percent), and Macedonians (15,000, or 1.3 percent). All other ethnic groups taken together comprised 4.38 percent of the population, and individually they numbered 6,000 at the most, that is, they are considerably smaller than 1 percent of the population, and therefore we did not take them into consideration.

Serbs are also most numerous in the ethnic composition of Belgrade's party membership with 152,449 members (68.1 percent), followed by ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) with 46,248 members (20.67 percent), and Montenegrins with 13,838 members, or 6.18 percent, then Croats with 4,024 members, or 1.8 percent, and finally Macedonians with 2,592 members, or 1.16 percent. The other ethnic groups have a share of less than 1 percent of the LC membership in the city of Belgrade.

When we compare the relation between the ethnic composition of the membership and that of the population, we get the following situation for the city of Belgrade:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Pop- ulation</u>	<u>% of Mem- bership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Popula- tion in LC</u>
1) Serbs	78.48	68.12	86.8	17.06
2) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	11.02	20.67	186.9	36.84
3) Montenegrins	2.90	6.18	213.1	41.94
4) Croats	1.90	1.80	94.7	18.60
5) Macedonians	1.32	1.16	87.9	17.27

The relationship between the ethnic composition of the membership and that of the population shows at least two important characteristics:

1) Serbs and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs), which are two very large ethnic groups, have a quite different relationship between their respective representation in the ethnic composition of the membership and their share in the population. That is, whereas the Serbs, which are by far the largest ethnic group, have a rather low share in the composition of the membership as compared to their share in the population (index 86.8), which is indeed the lowest of all the groups analyzed, the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) have a very high share in the membership (index 186.9), which is twice as high as that of the Serbs.

2) The remaining small ethnic groups also show a widely differing relationship between representation in the ethnic composition of the membership and share in the population. Thus Montenegrins have approximately twice the representation in the membership that they have in the population (index 213.1), while Croats have approximately the same representation (index 94.7), and Macedonians quite a bit lower representation in the membership than in the population (index 87.9). However, because of the lower representation of the most numerous ethnic group (the Serbs), the other ethnic groups which have a smaller share in the membership than in the population do not display a drastic difference in that relationship. This situation is also reflected in the percentage of LC members in the various ethnic groups. Thus slightly more than 1 out of every 6 Serbs (17.1 percent), and Macedonians (17.3 percent) is an LC member, and then almost 1 out of every 5 Croats (18.6 percent), more than 1 out of every 3 ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (36.8 percent), and almost 1 out of every other adult Montenegrin (41.9 percent). But, as we have already said, the fact of the lower percentage of the most numerous ethnic group means that there are no major differences from the average percentage when the representation is below what it is in the population (19.7 percent).

## 6.2. Bor

In 1981 Bor had a population of 58,486 and an adult population of 44,000. That same year there were 6,455 members of the LC in Bor, which means that 14.56 percent of the adult population belonged to the LC.

In the ethnic composition of the population of Bor Serbs are most numerous with 33,500 adults, or 75.96 percent of the total population, followed by Walachians with 4,500, or 10.29 percent, and finally ethnically uncommitted



(Yugoslavs) with about 3,000, or 6.3 percent of the population. Other groups, among whom Macedonians are the most numerous (850, or 1.92 percent), are really quite small.

These three groups shared as follows in the ethnic composition of the membership of the LC: Serbs were most numerous with 5,738 members, or 88.89 percent of the total membership, then ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) with 340 members, or 5.27 percent, then Macedonians with 120 members, or 1.86 percent, and so on, but there is not a single Wallachian, not even one! This, of course, confused us, and we tried to unriddle the matter by checking once again the ethnic composition of the population and the membership of the LC in Bor. The ethnic composition of the population, in which the Wallachians are the second most numerous ethnic group, is absolutely accurate. However, there are two reasons why the error does not lie in the classification of LC members:

first, because the number of members of the LC in Bor classified by nationality was 6,452 members in 1981, which means that only 3 members are lacking. If those three members should have turned out to be Wallachians, this still would be negligible as compared to their representation in the population;

second, there is more evidence that this is not a mere administrative oversight in the fact that the LCY Survey (1981) also shows not a single Wallachian belonging to the LC for Serbia proper. This means that the figure on the ethnic composition of the membership of the LC in Bor, showing that there is not a single Wallachian, is accurate beyond doubt.

Now that we have established these figures, the table on the relationship between the ethnic composition of the membership and that of the population shows the following characteristics in Bor:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Population</u>	<u>% of Membership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Population in LC</u>
1) Serbs	75.96	88.89	117.0	17.04
2) Wallachians	10.29	0	0	0
3) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	6.30	5.27	83.7	12.18
4) Macedonians	1.92	1.86	96.9	14.12

There is no dispute that the interrelationship between the ethnic composition of the membership of the LC and the population in Bor displays an exceptional deficiency. That is, a comparison of these structures within Bor shows that only the Serbs have a higher share in the membership than in the population, while the other groups analyzed have a lower share than in the population, while there are no Wallachians at all in the LC: 1 out of every 6 Serbs is a member of the LC (17.04 percent of the total population), then 1 out of every 7 Macedonians (14.12 percent), and finally 1 out of every 8 ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (12.18 percent).

### 6.3. Comparative Analysis of Membership in the Cities and at the Level of Serbia Proper

Although, as we have said, there are significant differences between Belgrade and Bor with respect to the relationship between the ethnic composition of the population and that of the membership, we have nevertheless compared them with one another and also made a comparison with the situation at the level of the LC and Serbia proper. This comparison of the index numbers showing the interrelationship between the representation of the ethnic groups in the membership of the LC as compared to their representation in the population yielded the following results:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Belgrade</u>	<u>Bor</u>	<u>Serbia Proper LC</u>
1) Serbs	86.8	117.0	96.1
2) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	186.9	83.7	187.0
3) Montenegrins	213.1	--	236.6
4) Macedonians	87.9	96.9	117.8
5) Croats	94.7	--	126.2
6) Wallachians	--	0	0

If on the one hand we compare this relationship between the membership and population of Belgrade and Bor, a decisive fact is immediately imposed on us: whereas in Belgrade the Serbs are the group that had the smallest representation in the membership as compared to their share of the population of all the ethnic groups analyzed (index 86.8), while in Bor they had the highest representation (117). Since in both cities Serbs are by far the most numerous ethnic group, their participation in the composition of the LC membership has major importance to the relationships for the other ethnic groups. On the other hand, when we compare the situations in Belgrade and Bor with the situation at the level of Serbia proper, then we can conclude in overall terms that the interrelationship between the share of the various ethnic groups in the membership and population of Belgrade coincides to a high degree with the situation in Serbia proper (which is not the case with Bor). The sizable difference in the index number for Croats and Macedonians is also to a certainty based in the fact that both groups are very small at the level of the population of Serbia proper (about 5 pro mille), and so the statistical representations are subject to sizable fluctuations. In any case, the root of the high coincidence between the interrelationship between the membership and population in the city of Belgrade and the situation at the level of Serbia proper certainly also arises in part from the fact that the numerousness of the LC membership of the city of Belgrade, which amounts to all of 37.75 percent of the total population of the LC of Serbia proper, has a strong impact on the characteristics of the total ethnic composition of the membership in Serbia proper.

### 7. Cities in SAP Kosovo

In Kosovo we analyzed this interrelationship between membership and population in Pristina and Titova Mitrovica. Although the ethnic composition of the population is highly diverse in both cities, it still shows a set of common

features, so that it was possible to compare them with one another and also to make a comparison at the level of the LC organization of SAP Kosovo.

### 7.1. Pristina

Pristina had a population of 210,040 in 1981, but only about 115,000 adult citizens, since the youngest age groups have a high share in the age-specific composition of the population. During that same period there were 21,048 members of the LC in Pristina, so that all of 18.33 percent of all adult citizens were members of the LC. The ethnic composition of Pristina's population shows that two ethnic groups are by far the most numerous: Albanians, who comprise about two-thirds (66.38 percent), and Serbs with one-fourth of the total population (24.53 percent). They are followed at a considerable interval by Gypsies (4.38 percent), Montenegrins (3.7 percent), and Muslims (2.01 percent). The other ethnic groups have a share of less than 1 percent in the ethnic composition of Pristina's population.

The ethnic composition of the membership of the Pristina LC shows that Albanians are again the most numerous with 12,060 members, or 57.3 percent, then Serbs with 6,065, or 28.82 percent, then Montenegrins with 1,524 members, or 7.24 percent, and then Muslims (698, or 3.32 percent), and Gypsies (199, or 0.95 percent).

A comparison of the relationship between these structures offers the following situation:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Pop- ulation</u>	<u>% of Mem- bership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Popula- tion in LC</u>
1) Albanians	63.38	57.39	90.5	16.57
2) Serbs	24.53	28.82	117.5	21.53
3) Gypsies	4.38	0.95	21.7	3.96
4) Montenegrins	3.70	7.24	195.7	35.88
5) Muslims	2.01	3.32	165.2	30.19

The relationship between the ethnic composition of the LC membership and the population in Pristina shows on the one hand drastic differences between the various ethnic groups (since the Montenegrins, for example, have approximately twice the share in the membership that they have in the population, while Gypsies have only one-fifth the share in the membership that they have in the population). But if we leave out the Gypsies, who also have an almost equally low share in other places as well (index 22.4 in Skopje), then the next general characteristic is imposed on us: the more sizable the ethnic group, the lower its relative representation in the membership of the LC. That is, Albanians, who are the most numerous, have a slightly smaller representation in the membership than in the population (index 90.5); Serbs, who are only half as numerous as Albanians, but still very numerous, have a slightly higher share in the membership than in the population (index 117.5); Montenegrins and Muslims, which are very small groups, have a considerably higher representation in the membership than in the population. We have seen similar features in SR Croatia and SR Slovenia. And certainly the representation of LC membership within the various ethnic groups varies quite a bit. One out of every

six Albanians is a member of the LC (16.57 percent), then 1 out of every 5 Serbs (21.53 percent), but by and large 1 out of every 3 Muslims and Montenegrins. Clearly, the Gypsies are least represented, only 1 out of every 25.

## 7.2. Titova Mitrovica

In 1981 Titova Mitrovica had a population of 105,323 and an adult population of 58,000. At that same time there were 8,640 members of the LC, which means that 14.91 percent of the population were party members (which is less than in Pristina--18.33 percent). The ethnic composition of the population of Titova Mitrovica shows almost the same features with minor variations as that in Pristina. Albanians are the most numerous with 59.66 percent (34,500), and then Serbs with 28.73 percent (16,500), and then come the small groups of Muslims with 4.19 percent (2,500), Gypsies (3.35 percent, or 2,000), and Montenegrins (2.29 percent, or 1,500).

The ethnic composition of the membership of the LC in Titova Mitrovica looks like this: most numerous are Albanians with 4,415 members, or 51.1 percent, then Serbs with 3,083 members (35.68 percent), and Montenegrins (520, or 6.02 percent), Muslims (332, or 3.84 percent), and Gypsies (100, or 1.16 percent).

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Population</u>	<u>% of Membership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Population in LC</u>
1) Albanians	59.66	51.10	85.7	12.77
2) Serbs	28.73	35.68	124.2	18.52
3) Muslims	4.19	3.84	91.6	13.67
4) Gypsies	3.35	1.16	34.6	5.15
5) Montenegrins	2.29	6.02	262.9	39.13

The two ethnic groups that are the most numerous in Titova Mitrovica show the opposite situation with respect to the relationship between representation in the membership and representation in the population: the Serbs have a higher share in the membership than in the population (index 124.2), while the Albanians have a smaller representation (index 85.7), so that the difference in the percentage of LC members in their populations is also rather sizable. As for the interrelations of the other relatively small ethnic groups, the differences are considerably greater. Thus the Montenegrins have almost a three-fold greater share in the membership than in the population (index 262.9), while the representation of Gypsies in the membership is only one-third of their share of the population (index 34.6), which is an eightfold difference. Muslims have almost the same share in the membership as they do in the population (index 91.6).

In this sense the percentage of LC membership in the various ethnic groups shows the following features: more than 1 out of every 3 Montenegrins is a member of the LC (39.13 percent), then 1 out of every 5 or 6 Serbs (18.52 percent), and 1 out of every 7 or 8 Muslims (13.67 percent), and right alongside them is 1 out of every 8 Albanians (12.77 percent), and 1 out of every 20 Gypsies (5.15 percent).

### 7.3. Comparative Analysis of Membership in the Cities and at the Level of Kosovo LC

A comparison of the interrelationship between the representation of the various ethnic groups in the membership and the population both between Pristina and Titova Mitrovica and also between these cities and the provincial situation shows the following results:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Pristina</u>	<u>Titova Mitrovica</u>	<u>Kosovo LC</u>
1) Albanians	90.5	85.7	88.3
2) Serbs	117.5	124.2	147.8
3) Gypsies	21.7	34.6	31.3
4) Montenegrins	195.7	262.9	278.6
5) Muslims	165.2	91.6	73.4

We might draw the following general conclusions from the comparative analysis:

a) There are no very essential differences in the overall characteristics in the relationship between the ethnic composition of the membership and the population in the cities of Pristina and Titova Mitrovica, since the differences that exist are more quantitative than qualitative (in this sense everything has already been said in the analysis of the two cities). There is an exception to some extent in the Muslims, whose share in the membership of the Pristina LC is higher than their share in the population (index 165.2), while in Titova Mitrovica it is somewhat below their share in the population (index 91.6).

b) The high degree of coincidence of the overall features of the relationship between the ethnic composition of the membership and that of the population also extends to their relationship at the level of the Kosovo LC as a whole. Here again there is a quite essential difference in the more sizable participation of the Muslims in the ethnic composition of the membership both in Pristina and also Titova Mitrovica.

### 8. Cities in SAP Vojvodina

We had figures for our analysis only for the city of Subotica in SAP Vojvodina. That is why there was also no separate comparison either between cities in SAP Vojvodina or between them and the provincial situation (which we will put directly into the table on the city of Subotica).

#### 8.1. Subotica

In 1981 Subotica had a population of 154,611 and a very large adult population (122,000). At the same time Subotica's party organization numbered 16,581 members, which means that 13.58 percent of the population belonged to the party.

The ethnic composition of Subotica's population is quite diverse. Hungarians are the most numerous, representing about half of the population (58,000, or

47.73 percent), then Croats (26,000, or 21.31 percent), and then Serbs (16,000, or 13.08 percent), and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (12,000, or 9.72 percent). The other ethnic groups are numerically negligible and range less than 1 percent of the population.

On the other hand in the ethnic composition of the membership of the Subotica LC Serbs were the most numerous (5,620, or 33.89 percent), then Hungarians (4,682, or 28.24 percent), then Croats (3,722, or 22.45 percent), and finally the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (572, or 3.45 percent).

The relationship between the share of the various ethnic groups in the ethnic composition of the membership and the population shows the following characteristics:

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>% of Population</u>	<u>% of Membership</u>	<u>Index, Col 2:Col 1</u>	<u>% of Population in LC</u>	<u>Vojvodina LC</u>
1) Hungarians	47.73	28.24	59.2	55.1	8.04
2) Croats	21.31	22.45	105.3	83.6	14.31
3) Serbs	13.08	33.89	259.1	124.9	35.20
4) Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	9.72	9.50	97.7	75.8	13.06

This interrelationship for the various ethnic groups shows large divergences in Subotica, and this moreover is independent of the numerical size of the ethnic groups. Thus Hungarians, who represent the most numerous ethnic group, have a share in the ethnic composition of the membership of the LC which is not even two-thirds of their share in the population (index 59.2). All the three others, by contrast, which again are rather numerous ethnic groups, have a share in the membership that is far greater than the Hungarians, although we encounter major differences within them. That is, while the Croats (index 105.3) and ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (index 97.7) have almost the same share in the membership as in the population, the Serbs have a share in the membership that is all of 2.5-fold greater than their share in the population (index 259.1). That also accounts for why differences in the percentage of the ethnic groups belonging to the party are very great. In Subotica 1 out of every 3 Serbs is a member of the LC (35.20 percent), then 1 out of every 7 Croats (14.31 percent), then 1 out of every 7 or 8 of the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (13.06 percent), and only 1 out of every 12 or 13 Hungarians (8.04 percent).

The situation with the ethnic composition of the membership of the Subotica LC shows considerable divergences from the provincial situation, although in general it might be seen as more favorable than that in the province as a whole. That is, excepting the considerably higher representation of Serbs in the ethnic composition of the membership of the Subotica LC, which is twice as great as the difference at the provincial level, the participation of the other ethnic groups is more favorable: Hungarians have a higher share in the ethnic composition of the membership of the Subotica LC than in the province (although still disproportionate), while the Croats and ethnically uncommitted

(Yugoslavs) have a share in the composition of the membership that approximately corresponds to the population of Subotica, while in the provincial membership their share is considerably less.

## 9. Concluding Discussion

9.1. Analyzing the situation in 17 cities and opstinas in almost all the republics and provinces (excepting SR Montenegro, but including the territory of Serbia proper) we covered a population of over 5 million inhabitants and 4 million adults (a fourth of the Yugoslav population) and 700,000 members of the LC, or more than a third of the total party membership (the organization of the LC in the Federation and the YPA were not included). These are truly high percentages of coverage of both populations, and that is why the results of the analysis are not negligible. It is evident from the data which we possess that neither the membership nor the population were subject to uniform geographic distribution:

<u>Republic or Province</u>	<u>% of Population</u>	<u>% of LC Membership</u>
Montenegro	0	0
Bosnia-Hercegovina	21	37
Croatia	29	42
Macedonia	34	44
Slovenia	26	39
Serbia proper	25	39
Kosovo	20	32
Vojvodina	8	8

This fact should certainly be borne in mind as to the comprehensiveness of certain concluding discussions (although we have tried to overcome this deficiency with supplemental indicators).

9.2. Given the relatively large number and diversity of the units involved in the analysis (17 cities from 7 territorial units and 12 ethnic groups), it was not always easy to find "common denominators" for them, since by and large the situation varies quite greatly both from city to city and from one territorial unit to another as well as from one ethnic group to another. But still it is possible to arrive at certain results which were sociologically and politically interesting. To make the results comparable and easier to examine, and also to make it possible to scrutinize the foundation of certain conclusions, we are appending Table 24, which presents the index numbers of the relationship between the share of the various ethnic groups in the composition of the membership and the composition of the population not only by cities, but also by republics and provinces, including the LCY and the Montenegrin LC (although they were not the subject of the analysis, but they contribute to a more complete examination).

Table 24

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Vojvo-</u> <u>dina LC</u>	<u>Subo-</u> <u>tica</u>	<u>Kosovo</u> <u>LC</u>	<u>Pris-</u> <u>tina</u>	<u>Titova</u> <u>Mitrovica</u>	<u>Serbia</u> <u>Proper</u> <u>LC</u>	<u>Bel-</u> <u>grade</u>	<u>Bor</u>
Montenegrins	258	...	279	196	263	237	213	...
Croats	84	105	...	...	...	126	95	...
Macedonians	...	...	...	...	...	118	88	97
Muslims	...	...	73	165	92	76	...	...
Slovenes	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Serbs	125	259	148	118	124	96	87	117
Albanians	...	...	88	91	86	58	...	...
Hungarians	55	59	...	...	...	...	...	...
Gypsies	...	...	31	22	35	...	...	...
Turks	...	...	100	...	...	...	...	...
Wallachians	...	...	...	...	...	0	...	0
Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	76	98	...	...	...	187	187	84

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Slove-</u> <u>nian LC</u>	<u>Ljubljana</u>	<u>Maribor</u>	<u>Macedo-</u> <u>nian LC</u>	<u>Bitola</u>	<u>Skopje</u>
Montenegrins	...	...	...	...	...	...
Croats	149	114	175	...	...	...
Macedonians	...	...	...	120	105	124
Muslims	...	...	...	21	...	26
Slovenes	92	96	89	...	...	...
Serbs	255	138	367	122	...	115
Albanians	...	...	...	47	34	38
Hungarians	43	...	...	...	...	...
Gypsies	...	...	...	22	...	18
Turks	...	...	...	39	45	33
Wallachians	...	...	...	...	...	...
Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	236	161	257	...	...	...

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Croatian LC</u>	<u>Osijek</u>	<u>Rijeka</u>	<u>Split</u>	<u>Zagreb</u>	<u>Montene-</u> <u>grin LC</u>
Montenegrins	343	...	...	...	...	120
Croats	86	82	94	100	79	90
Macedonians	...	...	...	...	...	...
Muslims	188	...	...	...	...	56
Slovenes	109	...	...	...	...	...
Serbs	200	169	210	163	328	61
Albanians	...	...	...	...	...	37
Hungarians	53	...	...	...	...	...
Gypsies	...	...	...	...	...	...



Table 24 (continued)

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Croatian LC</u>	<u>Osijek</u>	<u>Rijeka</u>	<u>Split</u>	<u>Zagreb</u>	<u>Montene- grin LC</u>
Turks	...	...	...	...	...	...
Wallachians	...	...	...	...	...	...
Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	111	69	68	74	136	59

<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Bosnia-Her- cegovina LC</u>	<u>Banja Luka</u>	<u>Mostar</u>	<u>Sarajevo</u>	<u>Tuzla</u>	<u>LCY</u>
Montenegrins	313	...	...	...	...	212
Croats	66	56	63	110	42	72
Macedonians	...	...	...	...	...	114
Muslims	96	181	129	93	125	102
Slovenes	...	...	...	...	...	66
Serbs	129	111	157	119	146	123
Albanians	...	...	...	...	...	67
Hungarians	...	...	...	...	...	60
Gypsies	...	...	...	...	...	...
Turks	...	...	...	...	...	...
Wallachians	...	...	...	...	...	...
Ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs)	77	69	63	67	45	116

9.3. The first conclusion of an overall nature that irresistibly arises from all the data presented is that the LC is essentially rooted in urban agglomerations. This is well illustrated, for example, by the fact that in just four cities of SR Croatia (Osijek, Rijeka, Split, and Zagreb) about half (42 per cent) of the total party membership of the Croatian LC is concentrated, although these cities have less than a third of the population. We find an approximately similar or even considerably more pronounced tendency of the same kind when we look at the membership of the other republics and provinces or territorial units. For instance, the organization of the LC in the city of Belgrade (not including the organization of the LC in the Federation) has more members of the LC than the entire membership of many republic and provincial organizations of the LC (Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina), although Belgrade has a considerably smaller population than those republics and provinces (except for SR Montenegro). Incidentally, this urbocentrism of the LC is especially obvious from the fact that private farmers are quite marginally represented in the social-and-class composition of the LCY membership.

9.4. This markedly greater overall rootedness of the LC in urban agglomerations displays significant differences from city to city, which can be vividly represented by the proportion of LC members in the adult population. In Sarajevo, for example, the proportion of LC members in the population is all

of threefold higher (29.6 percent) than it is in Maribor (10.2 percent). Certainly, these are significant differences in the proportion of LC members in the population between these cities, and it also represents a certain reflection of the large differences in the proportion of members in the total population as we go from one republic or province to another. Here are these differences of the republics and provinces with respect to the proportion of LC membership in the adult population (1981):

1) Montenegro	18.79%	6) Macedonia	11.97%
2) Vojvodina	14.46%	7) Kosovo	11.08%
3) Bosnia-Hercegovina	14.33%	8) Croatia	10.13%
4) Serbia proper	13.83%	9) Slovenia	9.13%
5) Serbia	13.64%		

In SR Montenegro, then, party membership is almost twice as great relative to population as it is in SR Slovenia! But since on this occasion our analysis is more diagnostic than explicative, we will not go into the causes of these immense differences between the republics and provinces in the proportion of the LC membership in the population, nor will we try to explain the differences in this share of the membership in the population in the urban agglomerations of those republics and provinces.

9.5. An analysis of the membership of the LC in the city population shows a pronounced regularity: the capitals of the republics and provinces show without exception a higher proportion of LC membership relative to population than other cities of the same republic or province. The table below shows the difference in the percentage of party membership in the population in a comparison of the republic and provincial capitals to the other cities which we analyzed (or their average, if there are several of them), and also relative to the population of the respective republic or province:

1) Titograd	25.90%	Niksic	20.60%	SR Montenegro	18.79%
2) Sarajevo	29.60%	Banja Luka,	22.13%	SR Bosnia-	14.33%
		Maribor, Tuzla		Hercegovina	
3) Zagreb	14.44%	Osijek, Rijeka,	13.80%	SR Croatia	10.13%
		Split			
4) Skopje	16.92%	Bitola	11.19%	SR Macedonia	11.97%
5) Ljubljana	14.74%	Maribor	10.20%	SR Slovenia	9.13%
6) Belgrade	19.65%	Bor	14.56%	Serbia proper	13.83%
7) Pristina	18.33%	Titova Mitrovica	14.91%	SAP Kosovo	11.38%
8) Novi Sad	21.71%	Subotica	13.58%	SAP Vojvodina	14.46%

It is reasonable to assume that this tendency for the capitals (without exception) to have a higher membership in the LC relative to population than the other cities, and especially toward that share in the population of the republic or province,\* is one of the causes and facts as to why the capitals are centers of government authority and other power centers! There is also direct support for this assumption in the fact that the bureaucratic-technocratic strata are extremely well represented in the social-and-class composition of the LCY membership. For example, those who work in offices (white-collar workers in the broadest sense) have approximately twice as high a proportion of LC members as blue-collar workers!

9.6. This very high proportion of membership in the LC in the overall urban population is certainly not proportionally distributed among members of all ethnic groups. The results of the study of the ethnic composition of the LC membership in major cities have shown that there are very large differences between the representation of the various ethnic groups and the composition of the LC membership and their share in the ethnic composition of the population, i.e., that the LC is rooted to a highly varying degree in the various ethnic groups both within the cities and also at the republic and provincial level. This is manifested in the overall at the level of the LCY, where Montenegrins (index 212), Serbs (123), ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) (116), and Macedonians (112) have a higher share in the membership than their share in the population; Muslims in this interrelationship have an almost equal representation (index 102), while all the other ethnic groups analyzed have a considerably smaller share in the membership than they do in the population (Croats 72, Albanians 67, Slovenes 66, Hungarians 60).

9.7. If we look at the figures presented in Table 24, in spite of the immense diversity of representation of the various ethnic groups in membership of the LC relative to their share in the population both of the individual cities and also in the republics and provinces, two types of situation nevertheless stand out: first, the situation in which the "native" (most numerous) ethnic group has a relatively higher share in the composition of the party membership than it does in the population, and therefore the other ethnic groups in principle have a lower share, and the other type of situation in which the "native" ethnic group has a share in the membership that is relatively lower than it has in the population, so that more "room" is therefore left for the high participation of the other ethnic groups, which by definition are not large.

The first type of situation, which is less common, is typical of the cities and republic organization of the Macedonian LC, since the Macedonians have a relatively higher share in the membership than they do in the population both in the cities analyzed (Skopje index 124, Bitola 105), and also at the republic level (index 120). Aside from Macedonians, only the Serbs in SR Macedonia have a higher share in the LC membership than in the population. All the other ethnic groups analyzed have a markedly lower share. These same characteristics are also true of the republic organization of the Montenegrin LC (we did not have figures for cities), and in that context only the Montenegrins have a higher share in the membership than they do in the population (index 120), while all the other ethnic groups without exception have a lower share in the party than in the population.

The transition from the first to the second type of situation is to be found in the relationships between membership and population in the cities and republic organization of the Bosnian LC. That is, in all the cities analyzed in SR Bosnia-Hercegovina Muslims had a share in the party membership that was either greater than their share in the population (Banja Luka index 181, Mostar 129, Tuzla 125) or approximately the same (Sarajevo 93, Bosnia-Hercegovina LC 96). Much as in Macedonia, it is only the Serbs that also have a share in the membership that is greater than their share in the population, while all the other ethnic groups, with one exception (the Croats in Sarajevo) have a smaller share.

We find the next step of the transition to the second type of situation in Serbia proper. That is, within Serbia proper the Serbs have a share in the party membership that is smaller than their share in the population (index 96), which is also the case in Belgrade (index 87), but not in Bor (117). By contrast the Serbs in all the other cities and republics and provinces (except SR Montenegro) have a share in the membership that is greater than their share in the population. In cumulative terms this was reflected in their higher representation in the membership of the LCY (index 123), although in Serbia proper (where they are the most numerous) they have a smaller representation in the membership than they do in the population.

The second type of situation exists in "pure" form within SR Croatia and Slovenia and SAP Kosovo and Vojvodina, where within the cities analyzed and at the republic or provincial level the "native" ethnic group has in principle a considerably smaller share in the membership than it does in the population, but exceptionally in some cities it is the same or approximately the same (the Croats in Split index 100).

Finally, there is a rather interesting relationship between representation in the party membership and population for the ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs), since their situation varies extremely both from one urban agglomeration to another and also from one republic or province to another. As an ethnic group they are numerically marginal in SR Macedonia and SAP Kosovo (less than 1 percent), so that the relationship between their representation in the membership and population is not essential. However, in other places they have a substantial representation in the population, especially in SR Croatia (8.2 percent) and SAP Vojvodina (8.2 percent), then Bosnia-Herzegovina (7.9 percent), Montenegro (5.3 percent), Serbia proper (4.8 percent), and Slovenia (1.4 percent). However, their share in the membership relative to their share in the population is high without exception in SR Slovenia both in the cities and at the republic level of the LC. By contrast with this homogeneous Slovenian situation, the representation of ethnically uncommitted (Yugoslavs) in the party membership of Belgrade and throughout Serbia proper is very high (index 187), but it is low in Bor (84), which is also the case in Croatia (a high share in the membership of Zagreb and at the level of the Croatian LC, but a rather low representation in Osijek, Rijeka, and Split). In SR Bosnia-Herzegovina their share in the membership is extremely low both in the cities analyzed and also at the republic level, which is the identical case with the republic organization of SR Montenegro (we do not have figures for the cities).

9.8. On the basis of the large differences presented between the representation of ethnic groups in the membership and their share in the population both in urban agglomerations and also at the level of the republics and provinces, we can conclude without hesitation that they have exceptional political significance. Honoring the fact that the ethnic composition of LC membership is not essentially formed as an independent characteristic, but is essentially refracted through other characteristics of the membership (for example, in the skill structure and social and occupational differential), on the basis of the large differences presented in the relationship between the representation of the ethnic groups in LC membership and their share in the population, we can conclude that there is no organized political campaign to overcome these

disproportions, nor is there an awareness that these disproportions are extremely important to our sociopolitical community (and thereby also to the LC). Especially since there is a certain national homogenization of the population and of the membership of the LC.

9.9. As for differences between the share of the individual ethnic groups in membership of the LC or differences in the proportion of LC members in those groups, it is unambiguously true that these differences still cannot be equated with the degree of influence of the LC in those groups. However accurate this might be, we must still be aware that if the disproportions in the representation of ethnic groups in the composition of the membership of the LC or indeed differences in the proportion of LC members in the various ethnic groups are large and lasting (which they are), and not temporary and reasonable, then there certainly is a possibility if not of actual political instrumentalization of the League of Communists, then at least of the engendering of a certain psychological trauma, which would inflict inestimable political damage on the organization of the League of Communists and would make it considerably more difficult for it to have an influence on society.

#### FOOTNOTE

- \* Subotica, whose population has a lower percentage of membership in the LC than the provincial average in Vojvodina, is an exception! There is an explanation of this paradox in the fact of the ethnic composition of Subotica's population, in which Hungarians and Croats represent over two-thirds of the adult population (69 percent), and those are ethnic groups with a markedly low proportion of LC membership, especially the Hungarians (index 55).

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